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This thesis addresses the use of deception as one means available to states for 
dealing with terrorists.  It begins by exploring the body of theoretical literature to 
establish the foundation necessary for a thorough discussion of deception.  Next, 
the thesis examines the reasons for state use of deception in interstate conflict.  
From this list, three potential uses of deception against terrorists are suggested.  
Specifically, the thesis proposes that states use deception to create and exploit 
organizational inefficiencies and weaknesses in terrorist organizations, facilitate 
counter-terrorist operations, and conceal counter-terrorist capabilities and 
intentions. Subsequently, the cases presented herein reveal that states have in 
fact successfully used deception in the past with all three purposes in mind.  
Finally, this thesis also explores the often-overlooked subject of costs and risks, 
demonstrating that the use of deception is almost never without expense.  Even 
when deception succeeds, its use inevitably incurs costs and opens the door to 
certain risks.  Moreover, the study shows that deception—while both legal and 
ethical in the larger sense—might be illegal or unethical in certain applications.  
In the end, though, this thesis shows that deception is, indeed, a valuable tool 
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A. THE TERROR WAR 
At 8:45 a.m. on 11 September 2001, a hijacked American Airlines flight 
crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center.  Eighteen minutes later, 
a United Airlines flight, also hijacked, crashed into the World Trade Center’s 
south tower.  The crashes set the buildings ablaze and dealt the towers a fatal 
blow; within two hours, both towers collapsed under their own weight.  At about 
the same time, 230 miles away, another hijacked American Airlines flight crashed 
into the outermost wing of the Pentagon.  Within half an hour, that portion of the 
Pentagon collapsed in flames.  At the same time, a fourth hijacked airliner—
another United Airlines flight now believed bound for a target in the vicinity of 
Washington, DC—crashed into the Pennsylvania countryside when passengers 
apparently struggled with hijackers.  By 10:28 a.m., more than 3000 Americans 
were dead in a stunning series of coordinated terrorist attacks. Two of the most 
recognizable symbols of American economic and military power had either been 
reduced to rubble or were aflame.  America found itself thrust into war.1 
In many ways, this new war was—and remains—very different from the 
wars the United States has previously fought.  Most notably, the United States 
found itself at war with a non-state actor, potentially a huge departure for a nation 
accustomed to thinking about war primarily in terms of inter-state conflict.  This 
new kind of war confronted military and civilian decision-makers with a perplexing 
series of questions—questions for which there are no easy answers.  How 
should the nation prosecute a war against an amorphous enemy who chooses 
not to face us in the symmetric, conventional manner to which we’ve become 
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1 Times and details are drawn from “September 11: Chronology of Terror” [Article posted on the 
Web site CNN.COM]. (2001, September 12). Retrieved 23 October 2001 from the World Wide 
Web: http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/chronology.attack/index.html.  Of course, 
Usama bin Laden publicly declared war on the US long before 11 September, and has been 
hitting American targets—the Khobar Towers, the African embassies, and the USS Cole—for 
some time. 
accustomed?  Is it simply a matter of sending aircraft carriers to sea, of finding 
the right targets to bomb with precision weapons, of applying our old way of 
thinking and forcing it to fit the new situation?  Conversely, is a new strategy 
required?  If so, what should that strategy be?  How do we regain the initiative—
to end this war in a time, place, and manner of our own choosing (to paraphrase 
President Bush)—if our old way of war doesn’t fit? 
Indeed, these questions are little different than those that have plagued 
men since the dawn of conflict.  When faced with the perceived inevitability of 
armed conflict, military commanders and national leaders from Ulysses to 
Hannibal, and from Genghis Khan to Winston Churchill have faced a common 
dilemma: how does one achieve an advantage in war? The answer has varied 
with time and changing conditions.  At times, superior strength has provided the 
decisive advantage.  At other times, advantage has been found in superior 
technology, superior use of terrain, better-trained and prepared combatants, or 
superior leadership.  These, however, have not been the only ways.  Throughout 
the long history of military conflict, deception too has played an important role.  
Time and again, creative leaders have relied on stratagems in order to gain an 
advantage: to gain or maintain surprise; to create conditions favorable to 
achieving victory; or to reduce risks and costs of military action.2  Deception has 
deep roots in interstate conflict and is much studied in that context; accordingly, 
there is much written on deception in war.  There is relatively little written, 
however, on deceiving non-state actors.  Does this mean that deception is limited 
to interstate conflict, or does it have a role in more unconventional forms of 
warfare as well?   
In fact, there is considerable evidence to demonstrate that deception has 
played a significant role in past conflict between state and non-state actors—
                                            
2 The term “stratagem,” was first used in the 15th century and revived in the late 20th century by 
the eminent historian Barton Whaley, whose most notable work is Stratagem, an epic empirical 
analysis of the role of deception in warfare.  A stratagem is alternately defined as “an artifice or 
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particularly terrorists and guerrillas.3  As an example of this phenomenon, we 
need only turn to a fairly recent conflict—that between the British Army and the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland.  In 1974, the British Army found 
itself in the fifth year of a vicious campaign against terrorists.  Direct military and 
law enforcement action against the IRA had failed to bring about either its defeat 
or the end of the conflict known as “the Troubles.”  Seeking a new tool to use in 
the ongoing conflict, the British reverted to a means that had proven useful in 
other, more conventional conflicts—military deception.  The British “Prison Sting” 
in 1974-75 provides us an excellent example of deception skillfully and 
successfully executed against terrorists (see Figure 1).4     
In 1974, the British army in Northern Ireland “recruited” two Catholic 
youths from Belfast—Vincent Heatherington and Miles McGrogan.5  British 
intelligence (Special Branch, MI-5, and military intelligence) painstakingly trained 
and prepared the pair and subsequently inserted them into Belfast’s Crumlin 
Road Prison on trumped-up murder charges.  The duo’s mission was to disrupt 
the IRA leadership from within the prison population by implicating a number of 
IRA members as informers, traitors, and the like, with the ultimate objective of 
instituting an organizational purge (Bowlin, 1999, p. 84).  The Prison Sting had a 
firm foundation of intelligence preparation, and Heatherington fed the IRA 
leadership there a mixture of truths, half-truths, and outright lies; what is 
                                                                                                                                  
trick in war for deceiving and outwitting the enemy, a cleverly contrived trick or scheme for 
gaining an end, [or] skill in ruses or trickery” (Merriam-Webster Online, 2001). 
3 The use of the term “states” can be problematic.  I use it here in only the most general terms; it 
is not intended to describe solely the nation-state, the dominant political entity that emerged in 
Northwestern Europe after the 15th century, but rather any number of polities, including empires, 
countries, nations, commonwealths, etc. (Tilly, 1975, p. 26; Kennedy, 1987, p. xvii). 
4 This example—arguably the single best account of a deception perpetrated against terrorists—
is discussed in significantly greater detail in Chapter III.  I have attempted to provide only enough 
detail here to familiarize the reader with the story.     
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5 By some accounts, Heatherington and McGrogan were coerced into participating as a result of 
trumped up rape charges.  By other accounts, they were willing volunteers.  Although versions of 
the method of recruitment vary in accordance with one’s loyalties and preferences in the conflict, 
the pair was successfully recruited to aid the British military in a well-thought-out deception 
operation.   
important is that his stories were either verifiable by the IRA, or fit existing 
preconceptions held by the IRA leadership.   
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Figure 1.   The Prison Sting Deception 
The British used a clever method to introduce the deception story.  Upon 
remand to Crumlin Road Prison, prison administrators would ask new prisoners 
which of three segregated populations they wanted to join: Republican, Loyalist, 
or general.  The appointed leader of the respective population would then 
“interview” the new prisoner prior to admittance into the population.  
Heatherington and McGrogan indicated that they wished to join the Republican 
population of Crumlin Road Prison.  They were immediately “revealed” as 
informers when Heatherington “broke” during his initial interrogations at the 
hands of the IRA leadership.  McGrogan, on the other hand, remained calm 
under both initial and subsequent interrogation, adding credibility to the IRA 
notion that he was a British agent and “confirming” Heatherington’s “admissions” 
(Dillon, 1991, pp. 75-76).  Finally, under extreme duress, Heatherington 
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“admitted” that he’d been sent to assassinate key members of the IRA leadership 
within Crumlin Road Prison and poison was subsequently “discovered” in his cell.  
Heatherington’s story was accepted in its entirety (Bowlin, 1999, p. 86).   
The deception was a stunning success.  The leaders of the IRA, both 
inside and outside Crumlin Road Prison, were deliberately misled.  The IRA 
leadership ordered, and the organization undertook, specific actions that favored 
the British: a vicious internal purge of the organization and the negotiation of a 
ceasefire that was far more advantageous to the British than it was to the IRA 
(Bowlin, 1999, p. 91). Brutal interrogations based on Heatherington’s 
misinformation forced many IRA members who were actually innocent to confess 
to being British agents.  Their comrades subsequently executed these innocent 
men.  According to one Provo leader, the IRA leadership was carried away in 
hysteria:   
We were had.  We knew we had fallen for it.  It was… clever, well 
planned, and brilliantly executed.  The IRA knew and found it 
difficult to admit that British military intelligence was brilliant.  They 
almost destroyed us.  They created paranoia in the ranks and left 
us severely damaged.  Retrospectively, you see how simply it was 
worked.  Heatherington gave us what we wanted only after 
pressure was exerted.  Now that was clever—McGrogan played a 
game designed to make us feel that he was holding back so that 
we could feel pleased when we were making progress with one of 
them… It reinforced our views.  Heatherington gave us those 
names of innocent guys and we believed him because he also 
supplied us with information which [sic] supported our own theories 
about various incidents… The Brits and Special Branch had 
obviously done their homework on us because we reacted with 
predictability (Bowlin, 1999, p. 89). 
While the operation was generally a success for the British, it is important 
to note that the operation had unintended consequences for them as well.  The 
most notable of these unintended consequences concerned the evolution of the 
IRA.  Although severely damaged by the Prison Sting, the IRA ultimately survived 
as a “smarter and more determined organization.”  This smarter organization 
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reorganized from its traditional battalion formations into a cellular structure and 
ultimately proved harder to attack as a result.   
The secrecy, organization, and coordination of the “Prison Sting” were all 
impeccable.  The deception was planned at a high-level, and was extremely 
centralized.  Intelligence preparation was considerable as subsequent inquiries 
proved.  The channels by which the deception was executed were controlled with 
extreme efficiency.  A relatively high level of secrecy was maintained, protected 
by plausibility and confirming details.  The deception was plausible and was 
confirmed repeatedly throughout execution.  Moreover, the deception fit the 
target’s preconceptions or cognitive biases—in other words, it encouraged the 
IRA to see just what it expected.    
State deception against terrorists and non-state actors is neither new nor 
a solely Western phenomenon, however.  Filipino government forces routinely 
used deception as part of a larger counter-insurgency strategy against the Huks 
in the period immediately following WW II (Leites & Wolf, 1970, pp. 142-144).  
The fledgling Soviet Union employed deception from the early 1920’s on to 
marginalize and even kill anti-Communist activists both inside and outside the 
Soviet Union (Tugwell, 1990, pp. 17-18).  More than 150 years ago, the British 
used deception to facilitate the defeat of the Thuggee scourge in India.6  More 
than 2,000 years ago, the Romans cleverly used deception as one of several 
clandestine or covert means in dealing with tribes beyond the Apennine 
peninsula (Sheldon, 1997, pp. 300-301).  The historical record repeatedly 
suggests that state deception been employed against terrorists and other non-
state actors.  Is there anything the United States can learn from this record—
anything that might prove helpful in our own efforts to combat terrorism?   
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6 The Thuggee were a secret cult that practiced ritual murder and robbery in India from the mid-
1500’s until the mid-1800’s. 
B. THESIS OVERVIEW—SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine the potential benefits of deception 
as an instrument of US counter-terrorism strategy.  In order to explore this under-
analyzed area, this thesis takes the following steps.  First, the body of deception 
theory is examined to establish a general foundation for thinking about deception.  
Next, the general foundation of deception theory is applied to the concept of 
deceiving terrorists.  Subsequently, the thesis explores the risks and costs of 
deception, particularly as they compare to the risks and costs inherent in any 
military operation.  Next, a number of scenarios are proffered to suggest how the 
United States might employ deception against terrorists in the future.  Finally, the 
study concludes with a net assessment of the benefits of deception as an 
instrument of US counter-terrorism policy.7 
C. KEY CONCEPTS 
Before beginning study of the potential benefits of deception as an 
instrument of counter-terrorism policy, we must first establish a basic foundation.  
In particular, four questions must be addressed.  What is deception?  Just as 
important, what is not deception: where does deception end and other elements 
of information warfare or command and control warfare (IW and C2W 
respectively) begin? 8   Why do states use deception?  Finally, why try to deceive 
                                            
7 I do not enter into a discussion of the definition of terrorism in this thesis.  In Countering the New 
Terrorism, Ian Lesser points out that terrorism and terrorists are terms whose use is fraught with 
peril: “Discussions [of what those terms mean] tend to be inconclusive…because the rapidly 
changing nature of the phenomenon renders many traditional definitions misleading.  The 
fashionable and often politically charged debate about terrorism makes the definition of terrorism 
a highly subjective, even ethno-centric exercise…  In Rand’s continuing research on this subject, 
terrorism has generally been defined by the nature of the act, not the identity of the terrorists or 
the nature of the cause.  ‘Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence calculated to create an 
atmosphere of fear or alarm,’ generally in support of political or systemic objectives” (1990, p. 85).  
Lesser’s definition shows considerable common sense and proves sufficient for the scope of this 
study.  Thus, where the term terrorism is used in this thesis, Lesser’s definition is the one 
intended unless otherwise specified.  In the same vein, the term “terrorists” applies to those who 
undertake such acts.  Individual terrorists, such as Theodore Kaczynski, the Unabomber, are 
generally excluded from the scope of this work. 
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8 Current US military doctrine considers deception, OPSEC, PSYOPS, electronic warfare, and 
physical destruction to be the five pillars of IW or C2W (Joint Publication 3-13, 1998, p. I-4).  
terrorists?  The answers to these questions establish the boundaries for and 
foreshadow the argument that plays out through the remainder of the thesis.   
1. What Is Deception? 
In order to arrive at a satisfactory definition of deception, it is useful to 
begin with a brief survey of the literature on deception.   The vast body of 
deception-related literature can generally be broken down into four categories: 
historical treatments; classical works; theoretical works; and doctrinal studies.9  
The first category—historical studies—is the largest by far.  Works that fall into 
this category typically consist of single case histories of deception, generally 
based on anecdote.  William Breuer’s Hoodwinking Hitler, a study of Allied 
deception operations in support of the Normandy Invasion in WW II is an 
excellent example; Ewen Montagu’s The Man Who Never Was, an eyewitness 
account of the execution of the deception plan for the Allied invasion of Sicily, is 
another.10   
The second category—classical works on theories of conflict and 
warfare—generally offers prescriptions to decision-makers on how to employ 
deception.  Sun Tzu’s The Art of Warfare and Clausewitz’s Vom Kriege are the 
best known—and most often misquoted or misunderstood—examples.11    Sun 
Tzu, on the one hand, is clearly a proponent of deception.  In one of his best-
known passages, Sun Tzu counsels “warfare is the art (tao) of deceit:” 
                                                                                                                                  
Camouflage is neither a component of IW nor C2W, but is closely related to deception 
nonetheless. 
9 Doctrine is an official statement of a nation’s policy, especially toward other nations (Webster’s 
Dictionary).  The overwhelming majority of works making up this vast body of literature focus 
primarily on military deception. 
10 Citations for all books mentioned in this section can be found in the List of References at the 
end of this thesis. 
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11 Another well-known example is Machiavelli’s The Prince.  Machiavelli “is credited with 
articulating an ‘operating code’ for the use of deception in politics and diplomacy.  ‘The one who 
knows best how to play the fox comes out best’, he wrote, ‘but he must be a great simulator and 
dissimulator’” (Tugwell, 1990, p. 266).  According to Maurice Tugwell, “While many politicians 
since have been accused of following his advice to the point of being Machiavellian’, it is only in 
the 20th century that deception has been ‘institutionalised’ [sic] within government” (p. 266). 
Therefore, when able, seem to be unable; when ready, seem 
unready; when nearby, seem far away; and when far away, seem 
near.  If the enemy seeks some advantage, entice him with it.  If he 
is in disorder, attack him and take him.  If he is formidable, prepare 
against him.  If he is strong, evade him.  If he is incensed, provoke 
him.  If he is humble, encourage his arrogance.  If he is rested, 
wear him down.  If he is internally harmonious, sow divisiveness in 
his ranks.  Attack where he is not prepared; go by way of places 
where it would never occur to him you would go.  These are the 
military strategist’s calculations for victory (Carr, 2000, p. 74). 
Clausewitz, on the other hand, acknowledges the general value of 
deception, but recommends against its use in most cases.  “The person acting in 
war,” he suggests, “has no desire for the game of crafty agility:” 
The bitter earnestness of necessity usually forces us into direct 
action, so that there is no room for that game.  In a word, the pieces 
on the strategical chessboard are lacking in that agility which is the 
element of stratagem and cunning.  The conclusion we draw is that 
a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful 
quality for a general than stratagem, although that also does no 
harm as long as it does not exist at the expense of qualities of 
temperament, which is only too often the case (Carr, 2000, p. 425). 
 
While both categories of works are extremely valuable to deception 
research, neither is sufficient in and of itself to draw generalizations about 
deception.  Lessons drawn about deception from one historical case may not 
apply in another time or conflict.  Moreover, the effectiveness of prescriptions for 
the use of deception drawn from classical works may be limited to the context in 
which they were originally developed. 
By way of contrast, the last two categories—theoretical works and 
doctrine—attempt to transcend the contextual limits of the first two.  Theoretical 
works generally consist of attempts to break down deception in order to describe 
how deception works in a broad range of situations or contexts.  Such 
treatments, particularly those taking multidisciplinary approaches to 
understanding and describing deception, were virtually nonexistent before 1969.  
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Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig’s Strategic Military Deception and Barton 
Whaley’s Stratagem are the best examples of theoretical works.  Deception 
doctrine, on the other hand, prescribes how the agencies of a state—generally its 
military forces—intend to employ deception under a wide variety of 
circumstances.  Current US military deception doctrine is captured in Joint 
Publication 3-58, Joint Doctrine for Military Deception. 
Of these four categories, this thesis focuses on the last two in order to 
develop a working definition of deception.  Table 1, shown on the next page, 
summarizes some of the most popular definitions from the theoretical and 
doctrinal categories; from these we can hope to identify common threads or 
characteristics.  
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 Source Definition 
Amos Perlmutter & 
John Gooch, 
Military Deception and 
Strategic Surprise  
(London: Frank Cass, 
1982) 
Deception is a conscious and rational effort to deliberately 
mislead an opponent.  It seeks to create in the adversary a state 
of mind which [sic] will be conducive to exploitation by the 
deceiver.  As such, deception is one of the oldest and most 
effective weapons of warfare...  Far from being either 
ungentlemanly or random, [deception] is a systematic and 
consistent process in which success may bring substantial 
benefits (Perlmutter & Gooch, 1982, p. 1). 




(New York: Pergamon, 
1982) 
Deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of reality done to 
gain a competitive advantage (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 3).  The 
immediate aim is to condition a target’s beliefs; the intermediate 
aim is to influence the target’s actions; and the ultimate aim is 
for the deceiver to benefit from the target’s actions.  Deceptions 
are often credited with success when only the first goal is 
achieved; but, to evaluate the actual impact deception has on the 
course of events, one should properly measure success vis-à-vis 
the third goal (p. 5). 
Barton Whaley, 
“Toward a General 
Theory of Deception” 
Deception is the distortion of perceived reality.  Operationally, it 
is done by changing the pattern of distinguishing characteristics 
(charcs) of the thing (whether object or event) detected by the 
sensory system of the target.  The task (purpose) of deception is 
to profess the false in the face of the real (Whaley, 1982, p. 
182). 
Ronald G. Sherwin, 
“The Organizational 
Approach to Strategic 
Deception: Implications 
For Theory And Policy” 
The term “strategic deception” refers to instances during war or 
intense international competition when countries attempt to mask 
their diplomatic and military strategy either by confusing or 
misleading their opponents.  The deceiver’s overriding objective is 
to gain a strategic advantage by encouraging an opponent to 
respond inappropriately to the real state of affairs (Sherwin, 





A purposeful attempt by the deceiver to manipulate the 
perceptions of the target’s decision-makers in order to gain a 
competitive advantage (Tugwell, 1990, p. 4). 
Joint Publication 3-58,  
Joint Doctrine For 
Military Deception 
(Washington, DC: US 
Government, 1996) 
Those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary 
decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and 
operations thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions 
(or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the 
friendly mission (1996, p. I-1). 
Table 1.   Commonly Quoted Definitions of Deception. 
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From these varied definitions, it is possible to identify a number of 
common characteristics.  Deception—the distortion of reality to gain a 
competitive advantage—is deliberate and results in a specific action.  Moreover, 
deception has two common variants—confusing and misleading—and appears to 
have utility at multiple levels.  These characteristics merit some elaboration.   
First, deception is a deliberate act—never an accident.  As Whaley points 
out in his “Typology of Perception,” part of his seminal “Toward A General Theory 
Of Deception,” unintentional deception is not deception but rather 
misrepresentation (Whaley, 1982, p. 180; see Figure 2).12  This is significant 
because it implies that deception requires both intent and effort on the part of the 
deceiver to deceive.    Without intent and effort on the part of the deceiver, an 
adversary may still draw the wrong conclusions or may be surprised, but those 
outcomes are not the result of deception. 
Deceiving Terrorists















Figure 2.   A Typology of Perception (after Whaley, 1982, p. 180). 
                                            
12 Barton Whaley points out that deception is but one type of human perception, and is 
distinguishable as such from misrepresentation, delusion, and illusion.  According to Whaley, “All 




Intent to deceive without some specific resulting action on the part of the 
deceived party is generally pointless, however.  As Maurice Tugwell points out, 
deception “succeeds only when the victim acts in the manner intended” (Tugwell, 
1990, p. 398).  Thus, the second characteristic of deception is that it is 
undertaken with the intent of producing or provoking a specific action (or the lack 
thereof); generally, this specific action is ultimately in our best interests and hurts 
the adversary’s interests (although the latter is not clear to the adversary at the 
time).  For this reason, deception normally targets adversary decision makers—
those who have the authority to direct the intended reaction—rather than the 
whole of an adversary’s forces or people.13   
 The third characteristic of deception that merits attention is the fact 
that virtually all deceptions can be distinguished as one of two variants:  
ambiguity-increasing or misleading (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 5).  These variants 
produce somewhat different effects and operate in different ways.  Ambiguity-
increasing deception “confuses a target so that the target is unsure as to what to 
believe” (p. 5).  Such deceptions seek to ensure that “the level of ambiguity 
always remains high enough to protect the secret of the actual operation” (p. 5).  
Operation Fortitude, the strategic deception and cover plan for the invasion of 
Normandy in WW II, is one example of ambiguity-increasing deception (See 
Figure 4).   
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13 Maurice Tugwell points out that it may be a mistake to view only key government or military 
elites as decision makers.  “When an electorate or faction has in its power to influence or dictate 
[a desired] policy,’ says Tugwell, “that group may become the ‘target’s decision-makers,’ even 
though it holds no official executive position” (Tugwell, 1990, p. 4). 
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Figure 3.   Operation Fortitude: An Example of Ambiguity-Increasing Deception 
(After Breuer, 1993, p. 101) 
Misleading deceptions, on the other hand, reduce ambiguity by “building 
up the attractiveness of one wrong alternative” (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 6).  
The ultimate goal of such deceptions, according to Barton Whaley, “is to make 
the enemy quite certain, very decisive, and wrong” (1969, p. 135).  Misleading 
deceptions thus encourage an adversary to focus or concentrate on a single 
contingency, thereby increasing the deceiver’s chances for success in others.  
Barbarossa, the extensive Nazi campaign to deceive the Soviet Union prior to the 
invasion of the latter on June 22, 1941, is one example of a misleading 
deception.  Operation Mincemeat, an elaborate scheme to convince the Axis that 
the Allies’ Mediterranean invasion would come at Sardinia as opposed to Sicily, 
is another WW II example of misleading deception (see Figure 5).   
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Operation Mincemeat: A Misleading Deception
The Means:
1) A corpse is outfitted in 
the uniform of a Royal 
Marines Major; forged 
documents placed in his 
possession.
2) The corpse is dropped 
into the ocean off the coast 
of Spain to wash up in the 
vicinity of Huelva as an 
apparent plane crash 
victim. 
3) Nazi agent in Huelva
passes the forged 
documents on to German 
Intelligence.
4) German Intelligence 
buys the deception and 
passes it on to the  
German High Command.
The Deception Story:
Portray an invasion of 
Sicily as a cover and 
deception operation for 
actual invasions to east 
and west
The Allies intended to 
invade Greece in the 
Eastern Mediterranean 
with a force under Sir 
Henry Wilson
The Allies intended a 
supporting invasion of 







German high command was effectively misled as to location of 
Mediterranean invasion. Critical resources diverted from defense
of Sicily to Greece and the Aegean Sea in the east, 
and to Corsica and Sardinia in the west
 
Figure 4.   Operation Mincemeat: Example of Misleading Deception (After 
Montagu, 1996). 
In practice, most elaborate deceptions tend to employ deception ruses of 
both the ambiguity-increasing and misleading variants.  As Daniel and Herbig 
point out, although ambiguity-increasing and misleading deceptions “are 
conceptually distinct and can be initiated with different intentions in the deceiver’s 
mind, in practice their effects often coexist or shade into one another as the 
deception evolves” (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 7).  Daniel & Herbig further 
suggest, “it may be most useful to consider the outcomes of the two variants as a 
continuum between convinced misdirection at one pole and utter confusion, in 
which all looks equally likely, at the other” (p. 7).   
The final critical characteristic of deception that merits attention is that it 
tends to have utility at more than one level, with different aspects at each level.  
Most theoretical authors distinguish at least two levels of deception: strategic and 
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tactical.14  According to Daniel and Herbig, strategic deceptions “involve large 
numbers of individuals and organizations as perpetrators and victims of 
deception, including the national command authorities on both sides of the 
deception interaction (1982, p. xi).  Moreover, strategic deceptions “are relatively 
long-term deceptions, recurring over the course of weeks or months” (p. xi).  
Ronald G. Sherwin expands on this definition in “The Organizational Approach to 
Strategic Deception: Implications for Theory and Policy.”  Sherwin suggests that 
strategic deception usually involves a much wider array of deception means than 
tactical deception, “using diplomacy, economics, espionage, intelligence, and 
virtually every conceivable dimension of modern international conflict” in order to 
deceive (Sherwin, 1982, p. 70).  Finally, the stakes of strategic deception tend to 
be much higher than other deceptions, since strategic-level deceptions “can 
affect the outcome of wars or large-scale front-level campaigns” (Daniel & 
Herbig, 1982, p. xi). 
Tactical deceptions, on the other hand, are generally much more narrow in 
scope, generally limited to “the outcome of battles or local engagements” (Daniel 
& Herbig, 1982, p. xi).  For the most part, smaller numbers of individuals and 
groups are typically involved, and the targeted decision makers are local rather 
than at the national command authority level.  Moreover, tactical deceptions tend 
to be shorter in duration and the means used to carry them out are usually much 
more limited.   
Despite these differences, however, strategic and tactical level deceptions 
are frequently intertwined.  Tactical deceptions are often undertaken as part of 
strategic deceptions; strategic deceptions, in turn, may constrain or bound 
tactical deceptions.  One way of looking at the relationship between various 
levels of military deception is suggested by Figure 6.  
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14 US military doctrine, on the other hand, distinguishes five categories of military deception: 





































Figure 5.   Relationship of Levels of Deception  
(After Figures 2-3 and 3-1, FM 90-2, 1988, pp. II-10, III-4) 
For the purpose of this study, therefore, the following definition of 
deception is proffered, synthesizing three of four of these common threads:  
Deception consists of actions taken during periods of conflict or 
intense international competition to deliberately confuse or mislead 
enemy decision-makers.   The ultimate goal of deception is to gain 
a decisive advantage by provoking a specific action (or the lack 
thereof) on the adversary’s part.   
2. What Is Not Deception?   
Because of the close relationship between deception and the other four 
elements of IW or C2W, deception is often confused with those other elements.  
However, although it may be closely related, deception is not synonymous with 
propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPS), operations security (OPSEC), 
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and camouflage.15  Still, these concepts quite often support or go hand-in-hand 
with each other.  As Joint Publication 3-58 points out, “deception is done in 
conjunction with the overall C2W effort,” with deception reinforcing and being 
reinforced by the aforementioned concepts (Joint Pub 3-58, 1996, p. II-2).16 
According to Maurice Tugwell, propaganda is “any information, ideas, 
doctrines, or special appeals disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, 
attitudes or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor 
either directly or indirectly” (1990, p. 7).  Propaganda may be classified according 
to source as white, gray, or black.  White propaganda emanates from a source 
that is what it proclaims itself to be (p. 7).  Gray propaganda emanates from 
unidentified sources—“a voice on the radio without station identification, or a 
pamphlet published anonymously” (p. 7).  Black propaganda comes from sources 
pretending to be other than what they really are—“a newspaper claiming 
independent editorial control” but in fact “funded and directed by a foreign 
intelligence service” is one example (p. 7). 
As Tugwell points out, however, propaganda isn’t intrinsically deceptive.17  
Rather, propaganda “is ‘loaded’, meaning that it tends to select the facts it 
chooses to expose, and the interpretations it places upon them, to support 
preconceived bias.  It may give a one-dimensional view of the world without 
actually telling lies” (p. 7).  Propaganda may conceal the truth while propagating 
the false, conceal or falsify the source from which it emanates, or some 
combination of the two (p. 7).  Thus, propaganda may be used to perpetrate 
deception in certain situations, particularly when the deception target is a faction 
or group with the power to influence or dictate a desired action:  
                                            
15 Propaganda is not an element of IW or C2W under US military doctrine. 
16 There is a movement afoot today to revise these concepts somewhat under the guise of 
Information Operations, both with the Joint Publication 3-13, dated October 1998, and the Army’s 
Draft Field Manual 3-13, currently undergoing final revisions.  It is unlikely that the changes will 
significantly alter the descriptions or relationships offered here, however. 
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17 Propaganda does often deceive nonetheless, sometimes by design, and sometimes by default. 
When the ‘target decision-makers’ comprise a mass audience, such 
as an electorate, deception channels may be expanded beyond the 
covert and specialist routes typically used in war to broader means 
of communication such as propaganda.  (Tugwell, 1990, p. 7).    
Like both deception and propaganda, PSYOPS represent a systematic 
process of conveying tailored messages to a specific audience to influence 
perceptions.  Unlike deception and propaganda, however, PSYOPS generally 
promote specific themes that it is hoped will result in desired attitudes and 
behaviors conducive to friendly efforts and objectives.  PSYOPS normally target 
large groups that do not necessarily have any decision-making power, whereas 
deception typically targets specific individuals or groups empowered to make 
decisions.  Still, the distinction between propaganda and PSYOPS is a fine one, 
often depending on one’s perspective.  If the target is general perceptions and 
the message is the truth, the appropriate means is probably PSYOPS.  If the 
target is general perceptions and the message consists of selected truths or even 
lies, the appropriate means is probably propaganda.18  If the target is specific or 
narrow perceptions, decisions, and resulting actions, the appropriate means is 
probably deception.  Despite these differences, however, there is “opportunity for 
mutual support if deception and PSYOPS are carefully coordinated” (Joint 
Publication 3-58, 1996, pp. II-3-4). 
Secrecy, in this case, is the process of denying adversaries information 
about capabilities and intentions by identifying, controlling, and protecting the 
evidence of planning and executing sensitive activities.  In the US government 
lexicon, much of secrecy falls under the rubric of OPSEC.  According to Joint 
Publication 3-58, OPSEC seeks to limit an adversary’s ability to detect or derive 
useful information from friendly activities (usually open) called indicators.  By way 
of contrast, deception generally seeks to increase the likelihood of an adversary’s 
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18 An additional distinction sometimes made between PSYOPS and propaganda is audience.  By 
DoD regulation, American PSYOPS is never used to influence a domestic audience; propaganda 
may be (LTC Paul Mullin, personal communication, 5 November 2001).  Other nations may not 
observe this distinction. 
detection of only certain indicators, usually while hiding others, in order to paint 
an ambiguous or misleading picture.  The relationship between OPSEC and 
deception is thus a close one, since both generally require the management of 
indicators (Joint Publication 3-58, 1996, p. II-4).  As Handel points out, “any 
breach of [secrecy in the attempt to deceive]…will of course lead to failure and 
probably to self-deception” (Handel, 1982, p. 126). 
In terms of guarding capabilities, deception “can be used to protect the 
development, acquisition, and deployment of physical destruction systems,” as 
well as to “mislead an adversary as to the true capabilities and purpose of a 
[new] weapon system” (Joint Publication 3-58, 1996, p. II-5; Axelrod, 1979, 
pp.231-232).  Likewise, deception and secrecy can work hand-in-hand to conceal 
intentions—“the actual goals and plans of the deceiver” (Handel, 1982, p. 126).   
Finally, camouflage consists of efforts by individuals and units to hide, 
blend in, or disguise in order to prevent enemy observation.  Camouflage is, by 
its definition, conceptually distinct from deception; the goal is almost invariably 
protection as opposed to provoking a desired response, while the target is an 
enemy’s sensors (from eyes to high-technology sensor systems) as opposed to 
enemy decision makers.19  Nonetheless, camouflage protects deception, 
particularly at a tactical level, by disguising evidence of the deceiver’s actual 
courses of action (Field Manual 90-2, 1988, p. V-2).  The German use of 
camouflage at the tactical level to conceal the preparations for the 1941 invasion 
of the Soviet Union and the 1944 offensive into the Ardennes is an excellent 
example of the symbiotic relationship between camouflage and deception. 
3. Why Deception Is Used 
Why do states use deception at all?  After all, “As a form of trickery 
[deception] has acquired a pejorative connotation: just as ‘gentlemen do not open 
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19 Chapter II will introduce Barton Whaley’s theory that every act of deception consists of both 
simulation and dissimulation.  Camouflage is one means of dissimulation; hence, camouflage 
may be viewed in some cases as a subset of deception. 
each other’s mail,’ so decent people should not engage in what is sometimes 
seen as an indecent activity,” according to Perlmutter & Gooch (1982, p. 1).  Still, 
there is considerable evidence that states routinely employ deception in 
intrastate conflict.  At first glance, weak states seem to use deception to help 
defeat strong states.  Strong states, on the other hand, seem to use deception to 
reduce their risks and costs.  John Van Vleet, Barton Whaley, and Ronald 
Sherwin suggest that states (or, more to the point, their military forces) employ 
deception during armed conflict in order to gain or maintain surprise, to create 
conditions favorable to victory, and to reduce risks and costs.  Maurice Tugwell 
suggests that states use deception for at least two other reasons in situations 
short of armed conflict: to mobilize groups and to protect legitimacy.  Moreover, 
there is considerable evidence that states use deception in both periods of war 
and peace to conceal capabilities and intentions. 
Van Vleet, Whaley, and Sherwin based their observations on the value of 
deception in gaining or maintaining surprise on empirical analysis of a large 
number of battles between the armed forces of states.  Based on an empirical 
analysis of more than 160 battles fought between 1914 and 1973, Van Vleet 
observed deception provided “a high return in that it [had] at least an 80% 
chance of yielding surprise” (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 27).  Barton Whaley and Ronald 
Sherwin calculated an even higher probability of achieving surprise and victory 
through stratagem, albeit in an analysis of a smaller (and different) group of 93 
cases (Sherwin & Whaley, 1982, pp.187-189). 20   
One must keep in mind, however, that the surprise value of deception is 
relative.  Michael Handel points out that surprise is “only rarely complete or total” 
(1982, p. 149).  In fact, says Handel, “In most cases of sudden attack, the 
surprised side normally had enough information and warning signals to indicate 
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20 In fact, one extremely interesting conclusion of the research of Whaley, Sherwin, Van Vleet, 
and others is that military deception that employs two or more strategic ruses is virtually always 
met with success (Sherwin & Whaley, 1982, p. 188).  The degree of success is relative, of 
course, but the implication is stunning nonetheless. 
the possibility of a forthcoming attack—its timing, place, direction, and the like” 
(p. 149).  Moreover, “In many successful surprise attacks, the attacker achieves 
only a partial degree of surprise” (p. 149).   
Still, states that employ deception in intrastate conflict in order to gain 
surprise are routinely rewarded.  Nazi Germany employed deception to achieve 
surprise on the strategic and tactical levels during the 1941 invasion of the Soviet 
Union.  The Allies returned the favor by employing deception against Nazi 
Germany in order to achieve surprise during the invasion of Normandy in 1944. 
Van Vleet also points to the value of deception in creating conditions 
favorable to achieving military victory.  Van Vleet suggests “deception itself can 
also induce the enemy to make inefficient use of his own resources by causing 
him to make mistakes in timing or utilization” (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 28).  While Van 
Vleet does not provide the same kind of empirical evidence to support this 
observation, his argument is nonetheless seductive.  Handel certainly concurs 
with Van Vleet’s suggestion, arguing that: 
Effective deception will cause the adversary to waste his resources, 
to spread his forces thinly, to vacate or reduce the strength of his 
forces at the decisive point of attack, to tie considerable forces up 
at the wrong place at the worst time; it will divert his attention from 
critical to trivial areas of interest, numb his alertness and reduce his 
readiness, increase his confusion, and reduce his certainty 
(Handel, 1982, p. 143). 
The aforementioned use of deception in Operation Mincemeat is but one 
of many examples of deception to create conditions favorable to achieving 
victory.  With a Mediterranean invasion all but a foregone conclusion, the Allies 
persuaded Hitler and his senior military advisors to waste invaluable resources in 
areas that the Allies had no intention of attacking—Corsica, Sardinia, and 
Greece.  Furthermore, the Allies encouraged the Germans to spread their forces 
thinly, tying up considerable forces far from the field of battle in a “force divisor 
effect.”  Finally, the Allies certainly caused the Axis to divert attention to trivial 
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areas of strategic and tactical interest—at least from the Allied perspective 
(Montagu, 1996, p. 134). 
  In much the same way, says Handel, deception reduces the risks and 
costs of interstate conflict.  Deception, he contends, is a powerful “force 
multiplier,” magnifying “the strength or power of the successful deceiver” (1982, 
p. 122).21  “When all other elements of strength are roughly equal,” Handel 
suggests, “deception will further amplify the available strength of a state—or 
allow it to use force more economically—by achieving a quicker victory at a lower 
cost with fewer casualties” (p. 122).  “Reducing the cost for the deceiver,” he 
contends, “implies increasing the cost for the deceived" (p. 143). 
Van Vleet certainly agrees with Handel on this point, observing that 
“surprise multiplies the chances for a quick and decisive military success, 
whether measured in terms of explicitly sought goals, ground taken, [or] casualty 
ratios” (pp. 27-28).  Moreover, Van Vleet’s analysis seems to lend credence to 
Handel’s observation.  In the analysis, the average casualty ratio suffered by the 
military forces of states that used deception (59 cases) was 1:6.3.  The average 
casualty ratio in cases involving either no surprise or no attempt to deceive (45 
cases), on the other hand, was 1:2 (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 26; Whaley, 1969, p. 
195).    
The case can be made very effectively that the deception operations 
supporting the 1944 Allied invasion of Normandy reduced the risks and costs of 
that operation.  As in the case of the Mediterranean invasion in 1943, invasion 
was a foregone conclusion.  Operation Fortitude, however, reduced the costs of 
the invasion for the Allies by amplifying German uncertainty and thus increasing 
the costs for the Nazis. 
Maurice Tugwell suggests that states have also used deception in periods 
of intense international competition to mobilize groups and to protect legitimacy.  
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21 An observation echoed by Perlmutter & Gooch (1982, p. 2). 
Mobilizing deceptions “have the goal of persuading the target to commit itself in 
support of a cause.  Sometimes, deception is used to break an existing 
commitment; in other cases deception provides the illusion that old and new 
causes are compatible” (Tugwell, 1990, p. 396).  In this respect, mobilizing 
deceptions may target groups as often as they target individual decision-makers.  
Mobilizing deceptions play a key role in ideological conflicts, and were used 
extensively by both the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War 
era (p. 397). 
As one example of mobilizing deception, Tugwell cites the successful 
efforts of the North Vietnamese communists during the Vietnam War:   
By creating false pictures of: a democratic, non-communist, 
indigenous Southern insurrection; an American military employing 
criminal deeds and genocide as a matter of policy; and a 
benevolent North Vietnamese regime with no ambitions towards the 
domination of the South, the Vietnamese communists succeeded in 
mobilizing many American and much Western and Third World 
opinion against the war and the United States (Tugwell, 1990, p. 
396). 
In the eyes of many observers, including Tugwell, these mobilizing deceptions 
thus played a critical role in the eventual “victory” of the North Vietnamese. 
States employ legitimacy deceptions, according to Tugwell, to achieve, 
maintain, or restore perceived legitimacy.  The goal of legitimacy deceptions is 
almost invariably perception management.  “Typically, these take place prior to, 
during, or after some political or military action; they are defensive, even 
apologetic, in their style (Tugwell, 1990, pp. 397-398).  Legitimacy deception 
operations are more often “directed at publics [than individual leaders], with 
domestic audiences as first priority,” since “legitimacy starts at home and it is this 
base that must be protected at all costs” (p. 398).  As evidence of legitimizing 
deceptions, Tugwell cites two examples: Soviet information operations in the 
aftermath of the 1983 shoot-down of Korean Air Lines (KAL) Flight 007, and the 
“American cover-up that followed the U-2 incident” in 1960 (p. 398).  
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Finally, as mentioned in the section on the relation of deception to other 
elements of IW and C2W, there is considerable evidence that states use a 
combination of deception and secrecy in both war and peace to conceal 
capabilities and intentions.  In conjunction with secrecy, deception has 
tremendous utility “to protect the development, acquisition, and deployment of 
physical destruction systems,” as well as to “mislead an adversary as to the true 
capabilities and purpose of a [new] weapon system” (Axelrod, 1979, pp.231-232).  
Likewise, deception and secrecy can work hand-in-hand to conceal intentions—
“the actual goals and plans of the deceiver” (Handel, 1982, p. 126).  The 
American concealment of the fledgling Corona “spy” satellite program in other 
space exploration development programs is one example of the use of deception 
to conceal capabilities.  The German strategic deception carried out throughout 
the 1930’s regarding the capabilities of the Luftwaffe—well chronicled by both 
Barton Whaley and Michael Mihalka—is an example of the use of deception to 
conceal both capabilities and intentions.  
The historical record clearly indicates that states routinely use deception, 
both during periods of armed conflict and during periods of intense international 
competition short of armed conflict.  The reasons for the employment of 
deception are also clear: deception promises potential benefits for those who 
practice it.22    
4. Why Deceive Terrorists?  
While the reasons states employ deception in conventional conflict may be 
relatively clear and straightforward, the same cannot be said about the potential 
reasons to use deception against terrorists.  Still, it seems possible to identify 
three potential benefits or utilities of deception as a counter-terrorist tool.  
Deception may be used to: 
• Create and exploit inefficiencies and weaknesses in the terrorist 
organization; 
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22 The reasons that states use deception may not be shared by non-state actors, who also use 
deception in times of both conflict and relative peace. 
• Facilitate counter-terrorist operations; and  
• Conceal counter-terrorist capabilities and intentions. 
Deception may offer one means to create inefficiencies and weaknesses 
in terrorist organizations.  Clandestine organizations—and many terrorist 
organizations are clandestine organizations—generally struggle to balance 
organizational efficiency with operational security.  Increased organizational 
efficiency—the ability to commit acts of terror—is only purchased at the expense 
of operational security (McCormick & Owen, 2000, p. 186; Bell, p, 27).  By 
targeting a terrorist organization’s confidence in its operational security, a 
deceiver may, for a time, be able to affect the terrorists’ organizational efficiency.  
Furthermore, deception may be used to target the trust bonds upon which 
cellular or network-type terrorist organizations are founded; deception operations 
have been used in the past to cause and exploit organizational dissension in 
these kinds of groups (Bowlin, 1999, p. 89; Garreau, 2001, p. C01).  Moreover, 
deception may offer a means to exploit existing organizational inefficiencies and 
weaknesses once they are created or identified (McCormick & Owen, 2000, p. 
186).     
Deception may also prove useful to facilitate counter-terrorist operations in 
two ways.  First, deception may be used to protect operational counter-terrorism 
units and missions.  While direct action is certainly preferred by many as the 
blunt instrument of choice in many counter-terror operations, the special mission 
units that conduct them are generally valuable assets with extremely limited 
recuperability.23  Deception can be used to give those units a greater chance of 
operational success and the survivability that goes with it just as other 
“commando” units have used it in the past to create relative superiority (Hoffman, 
1985, p. 22).  Second, deception may also be used by special operations or 
counter-terrorist units to create operational & tactical opportunities where none 
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23 A Delta squadron, if such a thing exists, cannot be reconstituted quickly if a majority of the unit 
is lost on one mission.  The organizational capabilities and individual experience such a unit 
would theoretically possess would take years to replace. 
otherwise exist (Hoffman, 1985, p. 22).   Finally, as discussed in the preceding 
sections, deception has been employed throughout history to conceal strategic, 
operational, & tactical capabilities and intentions in general.  In theory, deception 
can certainly be used in the same way against terrorists (Jones, 1979; Handel, 
1982, p. 148).   
At this point, however, these utilities—these potential benefits of deception 
as a counter-terrorist tool—are merely assertions.  In order to determine whether 
any of these assertions holds value, the theory or theories underlying each use 
must first be examined in greater detail.  For each assertion, it seems prudent to 
try to unearth historical examples to support those theories.  Finally, each 
historical example must be examined in detail in order to determine whether 
there are any significant lessons to be learned or conclusions to be drawn from 
those examples.  Only then can we claim with any confidence that these utilities 
hold promise as real-world counter-terrorism applications. 
D. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE—STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
With a basic understanding of what deception is, we can turn our attention 
to other questions that are fundamental to understanding the potential benefits of 
deception as an instrument of counter-terrorism policy: how deception works, 
why states have deceived terrorists, the risks and costs of deception, and what 
deception against terrorists might look like in the future.  Chapter II takes on the 
first of these—the question of how deception works—from two complementary 
perspectives.   The chapter first looks at deception as an activity consisting of its 
component parts.  Then, a brief, multidisciplinary study of deception as a 
process, both in theory and in practice, is undertaken.   
Chapters III and IV turn to the issue of applying deception against 
terrorists.  Chapter III explores the use of deception to create and exploit 
inefficiencies and weaknesses in terrorist organizations.  Chapter IV explores the 
use of deception to facilitate counter-terrorist operations and to conceal 
capabilities and intentions.  The theories underlying each potential utility are 
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examined in detail and case studies or historical examples are offered to support 
each utility.  Finally, the chapters examine a number of cases of deception 
against terrorists and other non-state actors in varying degrees of detail, in order 
to see what common lessons may be drawn from them.24 
A significant line of questioning scarcely addressed by existing studies on 
deception concerns the potential risks and costs incurred by its use.  Chapter V 
tackles this subject in two parts.  The first part offers a summary of the risks and 
costs of deception.  The second part of the chapter, in turn, offers a summary of 
the ethical and legal status of such deceptions.     
Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the concepts of deception both in general 
and of terrorists in particular.  Then the chapter addresses the question “how 
might the US employ deception against terrorists in the future?”  Chapter VI 
offers a series of five loosely connected scenarios depicting a deception 
campaign against a terrorist organization—in this case, Usama bin Laden’s al 
Qa’ida network.25  Each scenario includes necessary background information, a 
detailed narrative, and an examination of the risks, costs, and benefits of each 
deception operation.  These scenarios are not meant to be taken literally, but 
rather to spur thought on how deception operations might be employed as a part 
of American counter-terrorism policy.  The chapter offers a number of questions 
for further research and closes with final assessment of the idea of deceiving 
terrorists. 
Having established a road map of where we are and are not headed with 
this thesis, our journey thus begins with the logical next step, in the form of a 
question.  How does deception work?  Chapter II delves into this question. 
                                            
24 Specific cases of deception of terrorists are often shrouded in considerable secrecy, as Barton 
Whaley notes in Stratagem (1969, p. vii).  While this secrecy complicates the study of deception 
in general, and deception of terrorists in particular, the work of Whaley and others shows that it is 
possible to pierce the veil of secrecy.  I discuss this phenomenon in detail in Chapter III, 
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25 Although the American media commonly uses the transliterations “Osama bin Laden” and “Al 
Qaeda,” I employ the Arabic transliterations “Usama bin Laden” and “al Qa’ida.” 
II. HOW DOES DECEPTION WORK? 
Everything should be made as simple as possible, but not simpler. 
Albert Einstein 
One of the most common human failings is to examine a complex 
phenomenon from only one perspective and claim to make definitive conclusions 
based on that limited perspective.  The parable of the blind men and the 
elephant, excerpted below, makes that point: 
It was six men of Indostan to learning much inclined, 
Who went to see the elephant (though all of them were blind), 
That each by observation might satisfy his mind. 
 
The first approached the elephant, and happening to fall 
Against his broad and sturdy side, at once began to bawl: 
“God bless me! But the elephant is very like a wall!” 
 
The second feeling of the tusk cried, “Ho! What have we here, 
So very round and smooth and sharp?  To me ‘tis mighty clear 
This wonder of an elephant is very like a spear!” 
 
The Third approached the animal, and happening to take 
The squirming trunk within his hands, thus boldly up he spake: 
“I see,” quoth he, “the elephant is very like a snake…” 
 
…And so these men of Indostan disputed loud and long, 
Each in his own opinion exceedingly stiff and strong, 
Though each was partly in the right, and all were in the wrong! 
(Saxe, 1968)26 
The lesson of the parable and its relevance to our topic is this: in order to 
gain a thorough understanding of a complex phenomenon like deception, one 
needs to examine it from different perspectives.  One means of gaining 
perspective into how deception works is to break it down into its component 
parts, defining those activities which, when taken in sum, make up the act of 
deception.  An alternate means is to employ a multidisciplinary approach to 
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26 This is, of course, only one version of a very ancient parable with an uncertain origin.  The fifth, 
sixth, and seventh stanzas are omitted here for the sake of brevity.  For those interested, the 
fourth man thought the elephant was a tree, the fifth a fan, and the sixth a rope. 
describe deception as a process.  In this way, deception can theoretically be 
“mapped” and further analyzed to draw relevant lessons concerning its use.  
Those approaches, respectively, are the basis for the first and second sections of 
this chapter.  The remaining sections draw from the first two to explain why 
deceptions succeed and what factors contribute to deception success. 
A. DECEPTION AS A SUM OF ITS PARTS 
As mentioned above, one way to gain perspective into how deception 
works is to look at the lesser acts, or categories of acts, which make up the larger 
act of deception.  This is the approach taken in the past by Barton Whaley, R.V. 
Jones, and Michael Handel.   Whaley broke the act of deception down into two 
subordinate acts—simulation and dissimulation.  Jones provided us another way 
of looking at how deception works—as a combination of positive and negative 
acts.  Handel, on the other hand, characterized all deceptions as either active or 
passive.  What we have, in the end, are three wise men, all astute students of 
deception, who each describe the “elephant” in slightly different but nonetheless 
complimentary terms.  Each description merits further examination.  
1. Simulation And Dissimulation 
Barton Whaley offers a detailed dissection of deception into subordinate 
components.  According to Whaley, “Every deception operation, whether of man 
or nature, is comprised of only two basic parts: dissimulation and simulation” 
(Whaley, 1982, p. 183).27   Simulation, on the one hand, is that overt, part of a 
deception presented to the target.  The task of simulation is to “pretend, portray, 
profess” the false: to tell one’s adversary a story sufficiently believable and 
compelling to cause him to ultimately take some action that will lend the deceiver 
a competitive advantage (p. 183).  Dissimulation, on the other hand, is “hiding the 
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27 Whaley points out that the systematic analysis of these two terms—simulation and 
dissimulation—goes back as far as the early 17th century, with Sir Francis Bacon’s essay “On 
Simulation and Dissimulation.”  The first application of the concept of simulation and dissimulation 
to military theory, however, was made by the head of British camouflage operations in WW I, 
Solomon J. Solomon, in Strategic Camouflage (Whaley, 1982, p. 191). 
real” (p. 183).  According to Whaley, “it is covert, that part of a deception 
concealed from the target” with the purpose of concealing or at least obscuring 
the truth (p. 183).  Operationally, dissimulation is accomplished by hiding one or 
more of the characteristics that make up the unique pattern of an object or 
activity (p. 183).  Whaley further notes, “Both simulation and dissimulation are 
always present together in any single act of deception.  Nothing is ever ‘just’ 
hidden; something is always shown in its stead, even if only implicitly” (p. 183). 
Deceiving Terrorists
Deception: A Combination of Dissimulation and Simulation
Dissimulation
(Hiding the Real)
•Masking: Hides the real by 
making it invisible
•Repackaging: Hides the 
real by disguising




•Mimicking: Shows the 
false by having one thing 
imitate another
•Inventing: Shows the false 
by displaying another 
reality
•Decoying: Shows the false 
by diverting attention
 
Figure 6.   Simulation and Dissimulation 
The acts of simulation and dissimulation are themselves each comprised 
of three subordinate categories of activities (See Figure 7).  “The three 
procedures by which false things are shown [simulation],” says Whaley, “are 
mimicking, inventing, or decoying” (1982, pp. 184-185).  Mimicking typically 
misleads the observer and “shows the false by having one thing imitate another” 
(p. 185).  Mimicking is accomplished by duplicating a sufficient number of the 
distinctive characteristics of the object or activity to be imitated to passably 
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approximate its distinctive pattern.  The ideal example of mimicking, contends 
Whaley, is the use of the double, or doppelganger (p. 185).  One of the better-
known examples of mimicking deception is a WW II operation code-named 
Copperhead.  Lieutenant Clifton James, a Royal Army Pay Corps officer, 
convincingly portrayed General Bernard Montgomery in a scheme to convince 
the German high command that an invasion was due in southern France about 
the same time as the Normandy invasion (Breuer, 1993, pp. 169-172).  A lesser-
known example of mimicking deception was the use of pseudo-gangs by the 
British in the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, as well as by the Rhodesian Selous 
Scouts during the Rhodesian War.  Pseudo gangs were groups consisting of 
soldiers and former insurgents who adopted insurgent dress and behavior, 
contacted actual insurgent gangs, and passed themselves off as insurgents in 
order to glean information necessary to conduct effective counter-insurgent direct 
action (Thompson, 2000, pp. 1-2).  More recently, Saddam Hussein and Usama 
bin Laden have both purportedly used doubles in mimicking operations designed 
to ensure their own safety. 
Inventing, the second means of simulation, “shows the false by displaying 
another reality” (Whaley, 1982, p. 185).  As opposed to mimicking, in which one 
object or activity imitates another already existing, inventing “creates something 
entirely new, albeit false,” by crafting enough new characteristics “to create an 
entirely new pattern” (p. 185).  The “amphibious operation” portrayed by a SEAL 
platoon using pyrotechnics on the beaches of Kuwait at the initiation of Operation 
Desert Storm is one excellent example of an inventing deception, but it is hardly 
the first time that the United States used a false amphibious landing to carry out 
an inventing deception.   In September 1950, an ad hoc commando-style 
detachment of more than 100 soldiers, under the command of COL Louis B. Ely, 
invented an invasion near the Korean city of Kunsan.  This highly successful 
ruse, supported by carrier-launched air strikes and PSYOPS leaflet drops, was a 
key part of the deception plan for MacArthur’s Inchon landing on 15 September 
(Whaley, 1969, pp. A-483-484).  
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Decoying, the third means of simulation, “shows the false by diverting 
attention” (Whaley, 1982, p. 185).  Decoying is accomplished by “creating 
alternative false characteristics that give an additional, second pattern” (p. 185).  
In this manner, decoying is “a matter of feints and diversions, literally 
misdirection” (p. 185).  One example of a successful decoying deception can be 
found in the historical account of the US invasion of the island of Tinian on 24 
July 1944.  The US 4th Marine Division was faced with the daunting task of 
invading an island whose Japanese defenders were fully alert, fully prepared, 
and forewarned of the precise date of the invasion.  To make matters even 
worse, the island of Tinian had only three beaches, one of which was not 
negotiable with existing amphibious equipment.  The Marines solved the problem 
by using modified landing craft to seize the “untenable” beach, while 
simultaneously conducting a convincing decoy operation at one of the “good” 
beaches at the opposite end of the island.  The deception was so successful that 
the Marines pinned down all of the Japanese reserves at the site of the decoy 
operation and lost less than twenty Marines and sailors in the first sixteen hours 
of the invasion (Whaley, 1969, pp. A-394-395). 
 The three methods or procedures by which objects or activities are 
dissimulated, on the other hand, “are masking, repackaging, or dazzling” 
(Whaley, 1982, p. 183).  The act of masking “hides the real by making it invisible” 
(p. 183).  Masking, according to Whaley,  
Either interposes a screen, shielding [the real object or activity] 
from senses (and any intermediate sensors) of the ‘deceivee’ so it 
is truly covert, or integrates it with its environment so it is unnoticed, 
blending into its background, literally overlooked, hiding in plain 
sight” (pp. 183-184).   
In many ways, masking incorporates the activities traditionally referred to 
as camouflage.  Whaley cites as an example a little known WW II deception in 
which German aircrews “hid” in captured B-17’s to “spy close-up on US bomber 
formations” (p. 184). 
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In contrast, repackaging, the second means of dissimulation, “is simulated 
metamorphosis,” which works to hide the real by disguising it (Whaley, 1982, p. 
184).  Repackaging modifies the appearance of an activity “by adding or 
subtracting characteristics to transform them into a new pattern that resembles 
something else” (p. 184).  The Soviet portrayal of the buildup to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 as “training maneuvers” is one outstanding example of 
repackaging on a strategic scale (Whaley, 1969, pp. A-607-609; Valenta, 1982, 
pp. 53-54).  A lesser-known example of repackaging is the Israeli use of a 
Ugandan-flagged Mercedes as the lead assault vehicle during the commando 
raid on 3-4 July 1976 to free hostages held at the Entebbe airport (McRaven, 
1995, pp. 339-340). 
Dazzling, the third method of dissimulation, “bewilders, confounds, baffles, 
perplexes, reducing certainty about the real nature of a thing” in order to hide the 
real by confusing the observer (Whaley, 1982, p. 184).  This is accomplished by 
“randomizing or otherwise partially obscuring the characteristics of an object (its 
precise location, size, color, etc.) or an event (its exact timing, method of 
operation, etc.) in order to blur their distinctive pattern” (p. 184).  If all works as 
planned, the resulting modified pattern creates ambiguity by conveying less 
certainty than the real but underlying pattern (p. 184).  The former Soviet Union 
used dazzling extensively throughout the Cold War to deceive the Americans and 
NATO about the true capabilities of the combined Soviet strategic, land, and 
naval forces.  As a result, Western leaders viewed the Soviet forces as “a foe of 
towering capabilities;” this ongoing deception had a definite impact on East-West 
relations throughout the Cold War (Bell and Whaley, 1991, p. 347).  Much earlier, 
Gideon used trumpets and torches to dazzle the Midianites—one of our earliest 
examples of tactical dazzling. 
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According to Whaley, there is no textbook combination of simulation and 
dissimulation procedures to optimize the probability of deception success.  
Masking may be accompanied, for example, by mimicking; alternately, inventing 
or decoying may accompany masking just as easily (and profitably).  Whaley 
does conclude, “Masking and mimicking are not only overwhelmingly the most 
common methods used for dissimulation and simulation respectively,” but are 
also “the two used most often in combination” (1982, p. 187).  Still, he 
acknowledges, “In practice as in theory, all three ways of hiding the real can 
accompany the three ways of showing the false in any of their possible 
combinations” (1982, pp. 186). 
2. Negative And Positive Deception 
R.V Jones approaches the task of describing how deception works in a 
manner similar to that employed by Whaley: as a whole comprised of two parts. 
In his essay “Intelligence, Deception and Surprise,” Jones observed that every 
deception consists simultaneously of both negative and positive acts (Handel, 
1982, p. 148)(A summary of Jones’ classification of positive and negative 
deceptive activities, expressed in terms of their objectives, is found in Table 2).28  
Negative deceptive acts are essentially dissimulation: acts undertaken to 
“prevent the enemy from deducing” the deceiver’s true capabilities and intentions 
(p. 148).  John Van Vleet subsequently expanded on Jones’ observation: “The 
negative side of deception is the protection of certain portions of the real 
operation and plans for future operations” (1985, p. 15).   
                                            
 35
28 Jones presented “Intelligence, Deception and Surprise” at the 8th Annual Conference of the 
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy—Tufts University International Security Studies Program 
in April 1979.  The essay can also be found in Raanan, Pfaltzgraff, and Kemp (Eds.), (1981), 
Intelligence Policy and National Security, London: MacMillan. 
    Negative Objectives 
Prevent the enemy from deducing at least 
one of the following: 
Positive Objectives 
Persuade the enemy to deduce: 
1. Where you are 1. You are somewhere else 
2. What weapons and forces you have at 
your disposal (Capability) 
2. Your weapons and forces are different 
from what they are (Capability) 
3. What you intend to do (Intention) 3. You intend to do something else 
(Intention) 
4. Where you intend to do it (Intention) 4. You intend to do it elsewhere (Intention) 
5. When you intend to do it  (Intention) 5. You intend to do it at a different time 
(Intention) 
6. How you intend to do it (Intention) 6. You intend to do it in a different manner 
(Intention) 
7. Your knowledge of the enemy’s intentions 
and capabilities (Capability) 
7. Your knowledge of the enemy is either 
greater or less than it actually is (Capability) 
8. How successful his operations are. 8. His operations are either more or less 
successful than they actually are. 
Table 2.   Positive and Negative Deception Objectives (After Jones, 1981; 
Handel, 1982, p. 148) 
Positive deceptive acts, on the other hand, are similar to what Whaley 
characterized as simulation.  Positive deceptive acts “persuade the enemy to 
deduce” something other than the ground truth concerning the deceiver’s 
capabilities and intentions (Handel, 1982, p. 148).  According to Van Vleet, these 
acts thus incorporate “the presentation of the false tale, the deception 
story…[which] leads the enemy away from the truth” (1985, p. 15).   
3. Passive And Active Deception 
Michael Handel approached the task of describing how deception works in 
a somewhat different way.  Rather than characterizing deception in the same 
manner as Whaley and Jones, as a whole comprised of two parts, Handel 
characterized two distinct types of deception—passive and active.  “Passive 
deception,” says Handel, is based primarily “on secrecy and camouflage, on 
hiding and concealing one’s intentions and/or capabilities for the adversary” 
(1982, p. 133).  By way of contrast, “active deception normally involves a 
calculated policy of disclosing half-truths supported by appropriate ‘proof’ signals 
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or material evidence” which must be picked up by the adversary’s intelligence 
network (p. 134).  According to Handel, the former frequently receives less 
attention from casual observers:   
Some experts view passive deception as inferior and not likely to 
succeed against any competent intelligence organization.  This, as 
we have already seen…is not necessarily true.  While measures of 
secrecy do not have the same aura of romance and intellectual 
excitement as that associated with active deception, they can 
frequently be as effective as any more elaborate type of deception 
operation.  Moreover, active types of deception are dependent on 
the success of passive deception.29  What is even more important, 
passive deception can tremendously complicate and therefore 
increase the costs of intelligence work [for the deceived] (pp. 183-
184). 
Handel’s view of deception as either an active or passive proposition, 
although conceptually distinct, is not inconsistent with the perspectives adopted 
by Whaley and Jones.  Whereas in the descriptions of Whaley and Jones two 
activities work together to achieve one effect, in Handel’s description two distinct 
activities accompany each other more often than not.  The difference is minor at 
best.  Accordingly, if we take all three views in sum, we have adequate reason to 
conclude that deception is a complex activity that works by simultaneously doing 
two things: hiding indicators of the deceiver’s true capabilities and intentions and 
showing false capabilities and intentions in their place.  Furthermore, in Whaley’s 
theory we find valuable conceptual categories to catalog the subordinate 
activities by which a deceiver may hope to accomplish these two tasks. 
B. DECEPTION AS A PROCESS—A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
The first method this thesis described to gain perspective into how 
deception works, while insightful, has limits in what it can tell us.  Although this 
approach give us an idea of some of the most important sub-activities of the act 
of deception, it tells us little or nothing about the deceiver, the deceived, their 
                                            
 37
29 Emphasis is from the original. 
environment, and the interactions between all three.  A basic understanding of 
these various elements, Van Vleet points out, is absolutely critical: 
Deception is not easy to plan.  It requires an understanding of a 
complex process.  The enemy is an uncooperative part of that 
process.  The enemy organization and the entire system must be 
understood in order to control deception signals and project a 
coherent deception story.  Human behavior cannot be predicted, 
but patterns of behavior can be predicted.  The prediction of those 
enemy human behavior patterns requires an understanding of the 
nature of the deception process (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 206).  
1. What Is A Multidisciplinary Approach? 
To gain some perspective into those areas, it is necessary to adopt a 
multidisciplinary approach similar to the one first taken by Donald Daniel and 
Katherine Herbig in Strategic Military Deception.   In 1979 and 1980, Daniel and 
Herbig adopted a multidisciplinary approach in “an effort to go beyond the typical 
single case history of deception based on anecdote”  (1982, p. xiii).  Observing 
that there were “as yet few basic concepts established with which to think 
systematically about deception,” the group’s aim was to adopt “a more theoretical 
approach” in order to generate “theories that hold promise for encompassing 
deception without violating its complexity” (p. xiii).  “It is consistent with this 
research tactic,” Daniel and Herbig noted, “to divide the concept of strategic 
deception into intellectually manageable components and, where possible, apply 
principles from other disciplines in hopes of gaining theoretical leverage on the 
concept” (Sherwin, 1982, p. 71). 
The resulting multidisciplinary approach combines elements of 
organizational, systems, and communications theories, along with perspectives 
into human perceptual and cognitive processes, to attempt to explain how 
deception works.  Organizational theory focuses on the intelligence or 
information-processing organizations that are on the opposing sides of the 
deception process.  Once the “discrete properties [of these organizations] which 
remain relatively constant regardless of the personnel who belong to the 
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organization” are understood, it is theoretically possible to manipulate those 
factors to perpetrate deception (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 57).  
Systems theory focuses on the interaction of the two organizations and 
their respective and combined environments (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 63).  As Van 
Vleet points out, the environment “is a third part of the [overall] system which [sic] 
introduces stimuli into sensing capabilities of the two opposing organizations” (p. 
64).  This environment is dynamic in that it may either “be changed by the actions 
of either organization or by factors which are out of human control.  
Unpredictable behavior of the system may be generated by random or 
unaccountable events caused by the environment or by imperfect knowledge of 
the predictable events” (p. 64).  In order for deception to succeed, this 
unpredictable behavior must “be adjusted for,” according to Van Vleet, since 
“deception requires the ability to predict future behavior of the system and 
influence it” (p. 64).  Systems theory thus explains the impact of the environment 
on the deception process, as well as the role of feedback (p. 64).  
Communications theory, in turn, describes the flow of information 
throughout the system, “from a source through an encoder, channel, and 
decoder, to a destination” (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 46).  By mapping and analyzing 
this linear progression of information, communications theory identifies some of 
the problems of transmitting deceptive information between a sender and a 
receiver (p. 46).  Among these problems are the introduction of “noise” and its 
resulting effect on deception efforts.   
Finally, psychological theories on perceptual and cognitive biases help to 
further illuminate understanding of the process of deception.  The reason for this 
is simple, as Richards J. Heuer, Jr. points out: “To be successful, deception must 
achieve a desired impact on the thinking of the deception target” (1982, p. 31).  
Theoretically, the more a deceiver understands about the thought processes of 
the target leaders or analysts, the greater the chance of deception success.   
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Perception is the process of constructing reality based on the clues the 
mind receives.  Perception is not simply a passive process of seeing, hearing, 
smelling, tasting, or feeling, but is an active process by which we construct rather 
than simply record “reality” (Heuer, 1982, p. 33; 1999, p. 19).  “Perception 
answers the question: what do I see?” (Dahl, 1996, p. 10).  Cognition, on the 
other hand, tackles the subsequent question: what does it mean? (Dahl, 1996, p. 
10; Heuer, 1982, p. 34).  In both processes, “the mind follows certain rules of 
convenience, sometimes called biases, which are not always optimal ways of 
sorting out information.  Often these biases favor the deceiver” (Daniel and 
Herbig, 1981, p. 35).  Perceptual biases “result from the way the world is 
perceived and they limit the accuracy of [subsequent] perceptions” (Van Vleet, 
1985, p. 81).  Cognitive biases “result from the way the mind works,” and tend to 
hinder accurate interpretation (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 81; Dahl, 1996, p. 10).  
Moreover, “they influence the way that a person treats evidence, attributes 
causality, and estimates probability” (Van Vleet, 1996, p. 81).  Taken together, 
theories on perceptual and cognitive biases may offer an explanation for how and 
why deceptive messages are ultimately interpreted the way they are.  If 
deceptions can be designed to take advantage of enemy perceptual and 
cognitive biases, the target will theoretically do much of the work of deception for 
the deceiver (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 91).  Some common perceptual and cognitive 
biases are listed in Table 3.   
 40
 Common Perceptual Biases Common Cognitive Biases 
Expectations influence perceptions.  More 
information and more unambiguous 
information is required to recognize an 
unexpected phenomenon than an expected 
one. 
Probability estimates are influenced by 
availability—how easily one can imagine or 
remember instances of an event. 
Perceptions are quick to form but resistant 
to change, even in the face of new 
contradictory evidence. 
Probability estimates are frequently 
anchored by some natural starting point and 
adjusted incrementally; normally, they are 
not adjusted enough. 
Initial exposure to ambiguous information 
interferes with subsequent accurate 
perception, even after more and better 
information becomes available. 
Observers place more confidence in flawed 
conclusions drawn from a small body of 
consistent data than more valid conclusions 
from a larger body of less consistent 
information.30 
We tend to perceive our own actions as the 
result of circumstance; we tend to perceive 
the actions of others as dictated by motive 
rather than circumstance or chance. 
 
Table 3.   Examples of Common Perceptual and Cognitive Biases Relevant to 
Deception (After Heuer, 1982, pp. 62-63; Van Vleet, 1985, pp. 90-91) 
These summaries of systems, organizational, communications, and 
psychological theory only scratch the surface of the respective fields.  None does 
full justice to the intricacies of the theoretical field it summarizes; each description 
could certainly be expanded in almost infinitely greater depth.  That, however, is 
not the descriptions’ purpose.  Rather, the point of these cursory descriptions is 
to demonstrate that each of these theoretical fields is, in effect, a microscope that 
allows us to examine one part of the bigger picture of the workings of deception.  
What each of these theoretical fields offers is its own more-or-less simple model 
that can be applied to gain a better understanding of how various elements of the 
deception process work.   
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30 A phenomenon discussed in great detail by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman in “Belief in 
the Law of Small Numbers,” Psychological Bulletin, 76, pp. 105-110 (1971). 
Each of the simple models, however, is inadequate in and of itself to 
describe the whole of the deception process.  As Van Vleet, himself a proponent 
of the multidisciplinary method, noted, “The overall deception process is more 
complex than [any one of] the simple models” (1985, p. 101).  Hence, in-depth 
analysis and understanding of deception “requires a thorough understanding of 
all of the processes involved so that the necessary signals” of a deception “reach 
the enemy [decision-maker] to result in the correct interpretation and desired 
action” (p. 101).  Taken together in one multidisciplinary approach, each of these 
disciplines allows us to craft the bigger picture—to describe the elephant, as it 
were—out of the descriptions of its various parts.   
One note of caution is due, however, before we look at the resulting “big 
picture.”  As Handel points out, “deception is a creative art and not an exact 
science or even a craft” (1982, p. 136).  Thus, the picture of deception that 
results from this multidisciplinary approach, no matter how accurate, is still 
analogous at best.  This is the shortcoming of any picture, of course, so—
understanding this potential limitation—we drive on.    
2. Deception In Theory 
The multidisciplinary approach allows us to map deception as a process in 
a manner typical of a traditional systems model (See Figure 8).  At one end of the 
process are the deceivers.  “The deceiver’s side,” according to Daniel and 
Herbig, “consists of decision-makers, planners, and implementers.  Regardless 
of who had the inspiration, a deception does not begin until a decision-maker 
agrees to it” (1981, p. 15).  Decision makers generally direct appropriate 
organizations to plan and execute deception operations in order to induce an 
adversary to take a certain action favorable to the deceiver.  This direction is 
generally stated in the form of a deception objective that “states the action or 
nonaction [sic] that the target must take to bring about the desired situation” 
(Field Manual 90-2, 1988, p. IV-6).   
 42
Deceiving Terrorists



































Figure 7.   The Theoretical Process of Deception31 
The deception planner then devises a scenario based on “what he wants 
the target to think about the facts or event, precisely what it is they should 
perceive” in order to provoke the desired action (Whaley, 1982, p. 188).  
Subsequently, the deception planner “must decide specifically what is to be 
hidden about those facts or impending events and what is to be [simultaneously] 
shown in their stead” (pp. 188-189).  Next, he analyzes the pattern of the activity 
or object to be hidden to identify the distinguishing characteristics that must be 
masked, repackaged, or otherwise obscured by dazzling. Moreover, the planner 
does the same thing for the object or activity to develop a “pattern that plausibly 
mimicks [sic], invents, or decoys” (p. 189).   
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31 This figure is synthesized from the works of a number of different observers, including Donald 
Daniel & Katherine Herbig (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, pp. 17-21; 1982, p. 8), William Reese (Reese, 
1982, p. 99), and Paul Moose (Moose, 1982, p.137). 
Once he has identified all of these things, the deception planner 
determines the means necessary to transmit the scenario.  If sufficient means 
are unavailable, the deception planner has no option but to “return to the drawing 
board and develop a new scenario that is capable of being transmitted using the 
available means (Whaley, 1982, p. 189).  Once a scenario suitable for the means 
has been developed, “in the military and intelligence fields, the deception planner 
usually hands over to operational units to present (‘sell’) the effect” (p. 189).  The 
message is then “encrypted” into a form that may be transmitted to the 
adversary’s observers and subsequently transmitted through a variety of actions 
(Daniel & Herbig, 1982, pp. 8-9). 
Although Whaley focuses on military and intelligence “operational units,” in 
actuality the transmitter of deception may range from an Army maneuver brigade 
to a Foreign Service diplomat, from a web page designer to an international 
businessman.  Transmitters may be willing, knowledgeable participants in the 
deception plan or may alternately be unwitting accomplices carrying out 
instructions that they believe to attend a different purpose altogether.  Moreover, 
each potential transmitter has its own strengths and weaknesses, its own 
potential or actual biases, and its own vulnerability to deception and manipulation 
(Heuer, 1999, p. 88).   
Deception messages, in turn, may be the actions of a military unit, the 
content of a diplomatic message, the content of a web page, or the actions of the 
businessman; the array of possibilities is virtually limitless, bounded only by the 
imagination of the deceiver, the “channels” available and the information-
gathering abilities, organs, and tendencies of the deception target.  Moreover, the 
messages themselves may be conduit, clues that convey some greater meaning, 
or content, wherein the deception message is not disguised in any way but is, in 
fact, the actual intended message.   
On the opposite side of the field from the deceiver is the adversary—the 
target of the deception.  Virtually every group seeks information in numerous 
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ways in order to conduct its normal functions.  Thus, the deception adversary 
potentially gathers (receives) deceptive messages through a variety of receivers.  
Adversarial intelligence organizations receive, decrypt, and process raw 
information and analyze it in order to convert it into intelligence (Reese, 1982, pp 
105-110).  The various resulting messages are, theoretically at least, collated 
and subsequently passed to gatekeepers—key individuals who screen incoming 
information and analyses and control the resulting flow of information to 
adversary decision makers (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, pp. 8-9; Sherwin, 1982, p. 
76).  Gatekeepers, in turn, “make decisions that affect whether or not the 
information processed at one level is allowed into the next level of the hierarchy” 
(Sherwin, 1982, p. 76).  Finally, decision makers apply perceptual and cognitive 
processes to the decoded deception message.  “Presumably relying on 
information received, these leaders make the strategic or tactical decisions that 
the deceivers seek to influence” (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 9).   
Once adversary decision-makers direct action based on these decisions, 
the deceiver monitors the resulting communications and actions in order to derive 
feedback as to the effectiveness of the deception.  The deception story and 
subsequent messages are adapted as necessary, and the deceiver adjusts his 
overall concept of operations accordingly (Whaley, 1982, p. 189; Reese, 1982, 
pp. 112-113; Moose, 1982, p. 147). 
3. Deception In Practice 
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In practice, however, the process of deception rarely functions as 
smoothly as Figure 1 and the narrative suggest (See Figure 9).  Given the 
complex nature of the deception process, Herbig and Daniel note, “There are 
many points at which deception can in theory fail.  It is a fragile and risky 
enterprise” (1981, p. 27).  On the deceiver’s side, the deception objective and 
story, though perfectly clear to the deceiver, may be unclear to the adversary 
upon transmission (Jervis, 1976, pp. 473-474).  As with any operation, the 
transmitters may fail to carry out their orders, may be unconvincing in their 
actions, or may go unnoticed by the adversary’s observers and receivers.  
Moreover, actions on the part of the deceiver—as the result of his interaction with 
the environment, interactions with the adversary, or of the dynamic interactions of 
actors within the deceiver’s organization—may either compromise the deception 





































Figure 8.   The Practical Process of Deception32 
In transmission, the various deception messages, in turn, may be distorted 
in transmission or reception, may be lost or interdicted, or may be ignored, with 
the target receiving a different signal than intended (Herbig & Daniel, 1982, pp. 9-
11; Jervis, 1976, p. 474).  Noise may interrupt the deception message as it is 
transmitted, or may alternately interrupt feedback as the deceiver receives it 
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32 Like Figure 8, this figure is synthesized from the works of a number of different observers, 
including Donald Daniel & Katherine Herbig (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 8), William Reese (Reese, 
1982, p. 99), and Paul Moose (Moose, 1982, p.137).  Although I do not cite them parenthetically, I 
certainly acknowledge their influence. 
(Reese, 1982, pp. 99-102).33  Alternately, noise or competing signals of various 
types may overwhelm the transmission.  The message may be lost in 
transmission and never reach the target.   
On the target’s side of the deception equation, the target intelligence 
organizations may receive the transmission, but analysts may garble the 
transmission or may dismiss the message as trivial or irrelevant.  Additionally, 
analysts may not interpret the deception messages as they were intended, may 
misperceive other actions taken by the deceiver, or may see through the 
deception (Jervis, 1976, pp. 474-478).  Moreover, “The ever-present possibility of 
deception always introduces [artificial] ‘noise’ into the collection and analytical 
work of intelligence and weakens the clarity of the signals received” (Handel, 
1982, p. 143).  The transmission may be received and interpreted correctly but a 
gatekeeper may not allow the information to pass on to decision makers for one 
reason or another.  In turn, adversary decision makers may take no action at all, 
or may take any of a variety of unanticipated actions.  Finally, the transmission 
may be received and interpreted correctly, only to be ignored by the decision-
maker; alternately, it may be received and interpreted correctly, only to prompt 
the decision-maker to take unintended actions (Herbig and Daniel, 1981, pp. 28-
32).  In short, even if the target “buys” the deception message, he may do 
something entirely different than what the deceiver wants and intends; every 
deception thus may have unintended consequences. 
Even if all goes well in the exchange between the deceiver and his target, 
third parties may take actions that cause a deception to fail or to be altered.  On 
the one hand, third parties may interject their own messages that interrupt, 
overwhelm, modify, or contradict the deceiver’s signals.  Moreover, third parties 
may see through and unmask the deception either intentionally or unintentionally.  
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33 Although Reese very narrowly defines the concept of noise, he acknowledges the much 
broader interpretation reached by Roberta Wohlstetter in Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).  The concept of noise that I apply here is based 
on both interpretations. 
Finally, third parties may be deceived themselves and take unintended actions as 
a result (Reese, 1982, pp. 99-102; Moose, 1982, pp. 137-138).   
Finally, other environmental factors may undo or alter the deception.  As 
time passes, the situation may change and become something quite different.  
The original deception signals, however convincing and appropriate they might 
have originally been, “may not elicit the expected action if events overtake them 
in the meantime” (Daniel and Herbig, 1981, p. 33).  Additionally, chance, in the 
form of bad weather, misplaced orders, bungled execution by any participant, or 
any of a virtually limitless number of possibilities, may “intervene to prevent 
action otherwise intended” (p. 33). 
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 Potential Deception Outcomes 
Target receives and interprets the signal as intended and takes the desired action 
Target receives and interprets signal correctly but the decision-maker ignores it 
Target decision-maker receives and interprets the signal as intended but takes an 
unintended action 
The message is lost in transmission and never reaches the target 
A competing signal or noise overwhelms the message in transmission 
The “clue” is modified or garbled in the channel; the target receives a different signal 
The transmission is received but competing signal(s) overwhelm it in interpretation and 
replace it 
Target receives the transmission but analysts garble the interpretation 
Analysts receive and interpret signal correctly but dismiss the message as trivial or 
irrelevant 
The transmission is received and interpreted correctly but a gatekeeper prevents it 
from reaching the decision-maker 
Third parties receive deception signal and take unintended action 
Third parties interfere with target taking desired action 
The situation may have changed and become quite different 
Chance—bad weather, misplaced orders, bungled execution of orders by either side, 
etc.—may intervene 
Table 4.   Summary of Potential Deception Outcomes34 
C. WHY DECEPTIONS SUCCEED DESPITE DIFFICULTIES 
Obviously, deception seems to be a process fraught with potential pitfalls.  
These might lead one to conclude that deception seldom succeeds.  In reality, 
though, quite the opposite is true: the historical record suggests that deception 
often succeeds despite the milieu of potential problems (Daniel & Herbig, 1981, 
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34 This list is not exhaustive; rather, it merely illustrates that deception has a wide range of 
potential outcomes. 
p. 33; 1982, p. 10).  One reason for this, of course, may be due to the fact that 
“bungled deceptions rarely appear in a deceiver’s historical record” (Daniel and 
Herbig, 1981, p. 33).  Nonetheless, Daniel and Herbig concluded that deception 
frequently succeeds despite the difficulties for three reasons. 
First, every “competitor”—whether a state, organization, or informal 
group—actively seeks information.  This ultimately favors even the clumsy 
deceiver.  Because each competitor does seek information, each is forced to 
open up communications channels to the outside.  Generally, an enormous 
amount of raw information about the enemy and the situation flows in through 
these channels in a variety of forms.  Even in this deluge of information, a large 
number of the deceiver’s “signals reach the target largely unscathed” (1982, p. 
10).  Furthermore, a competent intelligence structure or organization tends to 
evaluate and put together the signals that are received and then fill in the 
blanks—using intuition—to complete the picture (Heuer, 1999, pp. 35, 90-91).  
Thus, the target tends to work around the problem of missing information.  As a 
result, not all of the signals making up a particular deception need get through, 
only enough for the adversary to complete the picture. 
Moreover, even given the deluge of raw information, highly reliable 
information is scarce.  As a result, a competitor does not have the luxury to 
simply dismiss information that appears to be plausible and warns of serious 
consequences for the receiver.  According to Daniel and Herbig, “This puts the 
benefit of the doubt about the validity of such information on the side of the 
deceiver, for it ensures his deceptive clues a hearing by his target” (Daniel and 
Herbig, 1981, p. 34).  In such a case, ambiguity is increased for the target even if 
he is not ultimately misled. 
Second, the processes of human perception and cognition tend to 
conspire against the deceiver.  As Daniel and Herbig note, the deceiver “is more 
often betrayed than served by his own processes of thought” (1981, p. 34).  
Several biases in particular “converge to put a target of deception at the mercy of 
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his initial impressions,” especially if reinforced by a deceiver as part of a 
deception (p. 34): 
Expectations shape what we in fact perceive; perceptions are quick 
to form but resistant to change; initially ambiguous perceptions 
delay the ability to clarify an assessment even when clear-cut 
evidence becomes available; estimates of the probability of some 
future events cluster around an initial starting point and resist 
radical alteration; and even after evidence has been completely 
discredited, the impressions based on it often persist and shape 
one’s thinking (Daniel and Herbig, 1981, p. 36). 
The effect of these biases on analysts, gatekeepers, and decision-makers 
alike is fairly evident.  Deception targets unknowingly and unwittingly “help” 
deceptions along through the maze of potential problems.  As a result, 
deceptions often succeed despite what appears to either the deceiver or the 
detached observer to be obvious and overwhelming contradictory evidence.   
Third, the inherent uncertainties of international conflict tend to forgive or 
cover up many of the deceiver’s mistakes.  Even in peacetime, “traditional 
diplomatic and other forms of verbal communication are extremely susceptible to 
twisting, misconstruction, and even honest misunderstanding” (Arquilla, 1993, p. 
171).  In periods of conflict, this phenomenon is magnified.  According to Daniel 
and Herbig, “Especially in competitions where virtually all data are ambiguous 
and to some degree suspect, so often the case in war, the situation forgives most 
of the mistakes a deceiver makes” (1981, pp. 36-37).  Contradictory actions and 
“even leaks which come from well-placed sources” that the target trusts “or over 
channels which are usually reliable” must compete against the range of 
alternatives that the target’s hypotheses and evidence suggest (p. 37).  
Furthermore, even these contradictory pieces of evidence are susceptible to 
many of the same outcomes as the deception signals themselves.  As a result, 
“What seems to the deceiver a glaringly bright give-away often seems to the 
target either too good to be true or only one more among his many grey-colored 
clues” (P. 37). 
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D. DECEPTION SUCCESS FACTORS 
A number of well-meaning observers have approached deception, usually 
from a historical case study perspective, and attempted to divine some resulting 
set of simple maxims, list of rules, or compilation of lessons learned for those 
who would practice deception.  Invariably, however, the vast majority of these 
maxims, rules, and lessons prove to be either overly simplistic or wrong.35  
Moreover, such maxims and rules may actually do more harm than good; if one 
attempts to practice deception without a detailed understanding of how it works, 
cookie-cutter instructions will almost certainly lead to failure.   
 A more beneficial approach is to look at how deception works to 
see what qualities or factors seems to contribute to successful deception, 
regardless of situation or context.  In the last quarter of the Twentieth-century, a 
number of observers took this alternate approach (for a summary of deception 
“success factors,” see Table 5).  One such pair of observers already quoted in 
detail in this work, Donald Daniel and Katherine Herbig, identified “Five Factors 
Conditioning the Success of Deception” (1982, p. 15).  Another observer, Major 
Donald Bacon, in a study of World War II deception operations, noted “seven 
primary factors [that] enabled successful…deception operations” (1998, p. 13).  
More recently, Roy Godson and James Wirtz suggested four components of “a 
successful denial and deception campaign” (2000, pp. 426-427).  
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35 One example is Charles A. Fowler and Robert F. Nesbit, who, in 1995 issued six “rules” for 
successful tactical deception.  Although there is much of value in their article, their rules can be 
misleading to those who do not fully understand deception.  The first of these rules was, “To be 
effective, a deception operation must be one that causes the enemy to believe what he expects” 
(p. 41).  Richards Heuer, Daniel and Herbig, Van Vleet and others have proved that this is simply 
not the case.   
  
 
Daniel and Herbig 
 
• Secrecy, organization, and coordination; 
• Plausibility and confirmation of the lie; 
• Adaptability of deception; 
• Target predispositions; and, 
• Strategic initiative (1982, pp. 15-25) 
 
Godson and Wirtz 
 
Strategic coherence 
Understanding of the adversary’s strategic culture and 
perceptual context 
Information channels which reach the adversary 
Reliable feedback mechanisms (2000, pp. 426-427) 
 
 
MAJ Donald Bacon 
 
• Control key channels; 
• Intelligence preparation and intelligence feedback are 
critical; 
• Need high-level and centralized deception planning; 
• Sound deception execution: plausible stories and 
preexisting beliefs, conditioning, and putting the puzzle 
together; 
• Deception supports strategic and operational 
objectives; 
• Maintain secrecy; and, 





Table 5.   Observations on Deception “Success Factors” 
The twin luxuries of academic comparison and hindsight allow us to pare 
this list of potential “success factors” down somewhat, as well as to add one that 
has previously been overlooked.  As a result, four factors in particular can be 
identified as integral to the success of deception: centralized control, 
coordination, and integration; intelligence; adaptability and feedback; and 
plausibility and confirmation. 
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1. Centralized Control, Coordination, and Integration 
The relative complexity of the deception process dictates that centralized 
control and detailed coordination are essential components of successful 
deception operations.  Centralized control and detailed coordination contribute to 
the success of deception by facilitating mutual support between deceptions and 
actual operations.  This mutual support subsequently contributes to the likelihood 
of success by insuring against compromise of the deception, by facilitating 
protection of limited resources, and by facilitating positive control.   
The mutual support afforded by centralized control and detailed 
coordination is a critical underpinning of simultaneous simulation and 
dissimulation.  To successfully deceive, “The overall activity must not only 
provide believable indicators of the false operation, but must deny believable 
indicators of the real operations” (Fowler and Nesbit, 1995, p. 44).  To achieve 
mutual support, Fowler and Nesbit advise, “Deception must be integrated with 
[actual] operations” (p. 44).  “The deception plan should never be created 
independently from the operations plan,” they observe, but rather, “operation and 
deception plans must complement and support each other” (p. 44).  “The two 
plans,” Van Vleet notes, “must be mutually supporting if the deception is to be 
optimized” (p. 200).  Deceptions are “well coordinated,” he suggests,  “when 
directed from one central point—that being the highest headquarters” or lead 
agency controlling assets “directly benefiting from the deception” or when the 
activities of the various agencies are coordinated sufficiently to prevent the 
compromise of the deception (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 19).  This ensures that “all 
instruments of power are integrated into deception planning, and all actions are 
consistent with the deception story” (Bacon, 1998, p. 17).  Moreover, Bacon 
adds, “high-level centralized planning ensures that critical information, which 
otherwise might remain compartmentalized, can be shrewdly exploited for 
deception purposes” (p. 17). 
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Centralized control and detailed coordination, while certainly necessary for 
any deception, is especially important for higher-level deception operations, 
according to Godson and Wirtz:  
[High level deception and denial] campaigns require coherent, if not 
coordinated, action from many departments, agencies, or 
ministries.  Public statements, press articles, and Internet 
communications must [all] be shaped to support the goals of the 
nation intent on deception (Godson and Wirtz, 2000, p. 426). 
The mutual support achieved by centralized control and detailed 
coordination additionally contributes to the likelihood of deception success by 
insuring against the possibility of compromise.  “Deception must be well 
organized and well coordinated,” notes Van Vleet, “else leaks may occur and 
deception unravel” (Van Vleet, p. 19).  Deceptions, especially high-level 
deceptions, may be compromised by either security leaks or by the incongruent 
activities of other agencies and organizations.  In practice as well as ultimate 
effect, there is little difference between the two.  If, for example, the CIA and the 
State Department “expose” a strategic military deception by their incongruent 
activities, the outcome is virtually the same as if a secret had been inadvertently 
slipped.36  Current American military doctrine attempts to institutionalize this 
concept.  Joint Publication 3-58 offers six principles of military deception; the 
third of the six is centralized control.  In explanation, JP 3-58 states, “a deception 
operation must be directed and controlled by a single element” in order to avoid 
confusion, compromise, “and to ensure that the various elements involved in the 
deception are portraying the same story and are not in conflict with other 
operational objectives” (1996, p. I-3).   
It is necessary to mention at this juncture that herein lies one of the more 
notable paradoxes of deception.  While centralized control and detailed 
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36 American practitioners of strategic deception should, of course, observe that there is a 
considerable amount of “incongruence” or friction in the various, day-to-day activities of the 
United States government.  A deception in which all the activities of the US government were 
seamlessly synchronized (admittedly not a likelihood), might appear too good to be true.  
coordination are necessary to avoid compromise, they may also be sources of 
compromise.  The more individuals and agencies that are brought into “the know” 
on a particular deception, the greater the risk of exposing the deception by some 
kind of security breach.  Thus, the need for centralized control and detailed 
coordination must be balanced on a case-by-case basis with the potential risk of 
compromise of deception operations.37   
Centralized control and detailed coordination also protects limited 
resources.  Competition for finite resources is a dilemma that every commander 
faces at one point or another.  Even for a resource-rich nation such as the United 
States, there are rarely enough resources for a decision-maker or commander to 
do all that he would like to do.  As John Van Vleet points out, “Competition for 
resources…is such that the requirements [to carry out deception] will have to be 
filled using the existing force structure.  Any proposal for how to do that will have 
significant drawbacks and will produce many reasons that it cannot be done” 
(Van Vleet, p. 229).  Centralized control and detailed coordination is the 
mechanism by which conflicts over scarce resources can be resolved. 
Finally, Richard Schultz captures a fourth potential contribution of high-
level, centralized control in The Secret War Against Hanoi, his history of covert 
operations during the Vietnam War.   Since the Vietnam War, Schultz suggests, 
American presidents have routinely mixed eagerness “to employ covert methods 
[including deception] to accomplish specific policy objectives, “ with apprehension 
“over the trouble they could cause if exposed” (Schultz, 1999, p. 336).  The 
political and strategic risks of exposure are very real concerns for high-level 
decision-makers.  High-level, centralized planning and detailed coordination 
facilitate the oversight required by the inevitable combination of “interest and 
caution” (p. 336).  
                                            
37 Some Pentagon staffers refer to a “feel the magic phenomenon” that exists around sensitive 
operations such as deceptions or special operations direct action missions.  Such operations are 
being planned, it seems, many individuals who have no real need-to-know (but who are otherwise 
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2. Intelligence 
Good intelligence is an integral part of every successful deception 
operation from inception to completion.  As Daniel and Herbig observed, 
“Accurate intelligence on what the adversary is intending and how he is reacting 
is one of the basic goals in any competition, but for deception it has particular 
importance” (1982, pp. 20-21).  “Knowledge of what the enemy will accept as 
plausible and what degree of confirmation is necessary before he will believe,” 
says Van Vleet, “is a firm requirement for a successful deception” (1985, p. 191).  
“Knowledge of the enemy organization,” in turn, “is the key to prediction of how 
the enemy will react to the information he receives” (p. 191).  Bacon concurs, 
expanding on the significant role of intelligence: 
Deception planners need intelligence to identify enemy perceptions, 
channels of information, and susceptibility to deception.  Planners 
also need methods to gather feedback.  Allied intelligence 
successfully provided such information [during WW II], whereas 
Germany’s intelligence failed.  The Allies won the intelligence war38 
and the impact was most prominent with Allied deception efforts 
(Bacon, 1998, p. 16). 
Intelligence performs five critical roles in the planning and conduct of 
deception.  First, it allows identification of adversary decision-makers and 
assessment of their vulnerability to deception (JP 3-58, 1996, p. II-2).  Second, it 
facilitates determining the adversary’s preconceptions of friendly capabilities and 
possible courses of action (p. II-2).  Third, intelligence permits the development 
of estimates of adversary actions under various friendly actual and deception 
scenarios (p. II-2).  Fourth, it makes it possible to identify adversary information 
gathering capabilities and communication systems to determine the best conduits 
for a particular deception (pp. II-2-3; Sherwin, 1982, pp. 79-80).  Finally, it 
                                                                                                                                  
understandably motivated by curiosity) appear out of the woodwork wanting to “feel the magic” of 
knowing what is going on.   
38 While the Allies unquestionably won the intelligence war, there are some historical indications 
that they had help from inside Germany’s intelligence organizations.  For a more detailed history, 
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facilitates the establishment and monitoring of feedback channels to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the deception operation by observation of the adversary’s 
reaction (JP 3-58, 1996, p. II-2).   This, in turn, facilitates the adaptability of 
deception to the changing situation.  Moreover, intelligence preparation allows 
the deception planners to develop reliable measures of effectiveness (MOE) to 
gauge deception effectiveness. 
The role of intelligence in allowing deception design to be based on 
enemy preconceptions is especially significant.  “To be successful” at deception, 
suggest Godson and Wirtz, “the deceiver must recognize the target’s perceptual 
context to know what (false) pictures of the world will appear plausible (2000, p. 
426).  Once a target’s preconceptions and cognitive biases are known, a 
deceiver may customize a deception in three ways.  First, the deceiver has the 
option to devise a deception story that “fits” and thus capitalizes on the target’s 
preconceptions.  The American invasion of Tinian, discussed earlier in this 
chapter, capitalized on Japanese expectations.  The Japanese defenders of 
Tinian were deceptively encouraged to believe that the scenario that they thought 
most likely was, in fact, coming true (Whaley, 1969, pp. A-394-395).  By the time 
the Japanese realized their error and were able to respond to the actual 
operation, the Marines had established a solid beachhead on the island. 
Alternately, the deceiver may be forced to devise a deception that goes 
against the target’s preconceptions.  Van Vleet, Heuer, and Daniel and Herbig 
have all theorized that to do so—to convince the enemy that what he doesn’t 
expect is, in fact, true—is harder to carry off than deceptions that fit the target’s 
preconceptions.  The literature on perceptual and cognitive biases tells us that to 
do so generally requires “a considerable and concentrated shock” to the target’s 
system (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 23).  The Mincemeat deception, discussed in 
Chapter I, is one example of a deception that successfully challenged the target’s 
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see W.B. Breuer, Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception, Westport, CT: Praeger 
Publishers, 1993. 
initial preconceptions.  The introduction of a windfall of authoritative evidence 
proved to be sufficient catalyst to induce Hitler and his high command to change 
their notion of where the Allied Mediterranean assault would come. 
Finally, if the target has no observable preconceptions regarding a 
particular activity or if sufficient intelligence information is not available to 
ascertain the target’s preconceptions, it is possible to create certain expectations 
on the part of the target.  “Here, the deceiver sets up the target for a future 
surprise by conditioning him to expect something he hadn’t considered before” 
(Daniel and Herbig, 1982, p. 24).  In early 1942, the Germans used this concept 
to cover the escape of the destroyers Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen 
from the barricaded port of Brest.  Over the course of several weeks, the 
Germans conditioned the British to expect a certain amount of radar jamming at 
the same time every day in the area.  Ultimately, the British came to attribute this 
jamming to atmospheric interference.  On 12 February 1943, the Germans again 
jammed the British radars; this time, however, the three destroyers used the 
deceptive jamming cover to slip to sea without being noticed or engaged by the 
British Navy (FM 90-2, p. I-5). 
The connection between intelligence and successful deception is hardly 
confined to the modern era of warfare, however.  Although intelligence staffs, 
agencies, and organizations as we know them today are arguably a Twentieth-
century phenomenon, the link between intelligence and deception is much older 
(Van Creveld, 1985, p. 4).39  J. Bowyer Bell and Barton Whaley observed that the 
Mongols recognized the importance of intelligence more than 750 years ago:   
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39 Of course, successful generals and rulers have always sought intelligence, employing a variety 
of means.  Van Creveld’s point—and mine—is that large, standing intelligence organizations like 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) are 
twentieth-century inventions. 
Mongol strategic intelligence was superb.  Their campaigns were 
planned and launched only after detailed and political military 
information had been obtained, information that gained them many 
bloodless victories through bribery, treason, or alliance.40  This fine 
intelligence also enabled the Mongols to design highly effective 
strategic psychological warfare programs, by means of which they 
panicked, demoralized, and terrorized their prospective victims, 
again sometimes inducing surrender without battle (1991, p. 30). 
Intelligence—particularly intelligence preparation and feedback—has 
proven to be a critical success factor in deceptions throughout history.  There is 
every indication that this trend will continue. 
3. Adaptability and Feedback 
“A deception campaign,” Godson and Wirtz tell us, “is a dynamic 
enterprise” (2000, p. 427).  The situation of both deceiver and target is in 
constant flux.  The resulting implication for deception, Van Vleet points out, is 
that “the simple deception plan that has only one explanation may deviate from 
the system reality too soon to receive confirmation” (1985, p. 192).  Accordingly, 
notes Van Vleet, “The deception must be able to change as reality changes” 
(Van Vleet, p. 191).  “Cover stories, communications channels, and specific 
initiatives require fine tuning to take advantage of unforeseen opportunities or 
problems” (Godson and Wirtz, 2000, p. 427).  As a result, adaptability is a 
necessary component of every successful deception.  “An adaptable deception,” 
in turn, “requires the ability to react to change and also requires knowledge about 
when to react.  The ability to react to change is a function of planning and 
execution flexibility,” as well as of “coordination and intelligence” (p. 192).  
Adaptability allows the deceiver to continue deceptions for a longer time, to react 
to unforeseen changes in the situation, to take advantage of unforeseen or 
unpredictable enemy actions and reactions, and to protect valuable intelligence 
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40 The Mongol campaigns made extensive use of “feints, demonstration attacks, camouflage by 
raising dust clouds to conceal movement or exaggerate strength, stuffed dummies on spare 
horses, false campfires, ambushes, and especially the carefully rehearsed feigned flight intended 
to lure the enemy into a precipitate charge” (Bell & Whaley, 1991, p. 30). 
and deception resources by ending the stratagem if the deception wears thin or 
is compromised (Daniel and Herbig, 1982, p. 21; Sherwin, 1982, p. 80).  
Furthermore, adaptability provides some degree of “insurance” against 
intelligence shortcomings or failures.  As Van Vleet points out, “Alternative 
planning does not reduce the demands for quality intelligence, but it does provide 
more security against the possibility that the intelligence is wrong or that it 
becomes ‘fogged’” (Van Vleet, p. 227). 
If adaptability is a necessary component of every successful deception, 
feedback is the mechanism that makes adaptability possible.  “The ultimate asset 
that allows deceivers to adapt their scenarios” to changing situations, Daniel and 
Herbig point out, “is feedback from the target” (1982, p. 20).  Feedback is 
necessary, notes Van Vleet, “if the deception planner is to know if the enemy has 
interpreted the signals in the desired manner so that the deception…can 
continue as planned or so that the execution can be modified to produce the 
desired effect (1985, p. 194).  Godson and Wirtz point out: “To pursue a course 
of action that relied on deception if the target failed to ‘take the bait’ would be 
foolhardy.  Alternatively, if an initial deception plan failed, the feedback 
mechanism could activate backup [deception and denial] campaigns” (Godson 
and Wirtz, 2000, p. 427). 
Reliable measures of effectiveness (MOE) are a key component of 
feedback.  The deceiver must develop MOE that tell him whether the adversary 
has taken notice of the deception, found the deception relevant or irrelevant to 
his own concept of operations, formed the intended hypothesis about the 
meaning of the deception and taken the appropriate action, taken some other 
unintended action, or failed to detect the deception (Whaley, 1982, p. 189).  MOE 
must be flexible enough to shed light on alternative explanations for enemy 
perceptions and actions.  Furthermore, in order to be truly effective, MOE must 
allow sufficient time both for the deception to work and for the deceiver to adapt 
his plans if the deception does not work.   
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The deceiver has three basic options when feedback indicates that the 
situation has changed and the original deception is in danger of failing.  The 
deceiver’s first option is to abandon the deception.  While this option has the 
advantage of preserving key resources for later use by the deceiver, it may also 
increase certainty for the target about the deceiver’s true course of action.  The 
second option open to the deceiver is to continue the deception in hopes of 
producing or increasing ambiguity for the adversary.  Even if this option 
succeeds, however, it may ultimately reduce the deceiver’s flexibility by 
committing him to an operational concept or course of action that is untenable.  
The deceiver’s third option is to attempt to adapt the deception to fit the new 
reality.  The final course of action is generally also the most desirable, although 
often the most difficult, (Van Vleet, pp. 191-192).  Regardless of which course of 
action the deceiver chooses, “It seems reasonable that when a change must be 
made, that change should be to adopt an alternative that has been carefully 
evaluated” (Van Vleet, p. 215). 
4. Plausibility and Confirmation 
One of the most basic problems of deception is creating a story and 
indicators that the target will accept as valid (Reese, 1982, p. 107).  Plausibility, 
therefore, is a prerequisite for deception success.   Citing the conclusions of both 
SHAEF and German planners from World War II, Daniel and Herbig note that in 
order for a deception to succeed, “the lie must be plausible”  (1982, p. 17).  One 
of the key components of plausibility, Van Vleet points out, is enemy perceptions 
regarding the deceiver’s capabilities and intentions: “An important consideration 
in deciding whether the enemy will accept the plausibility of the deception story is 
determining whether the deception plan might be acceptable” to the enemy as 
the real plan (Van Vleet, 1985, p. 190). 
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The historical record suggests that deceiver decision-makers often reject 
deception concepts not because of their relative costs, but rather because the 
concepts seem implausible to the decision-makers.  Simply put, decision-makers 
often believe, based on the insights afforded by virtue of their own privileged 
positions, that because a particular course of action is either not possible or not 
feasible, the target will reject it as a deception.  Roger Hesketh and Ewen 
Montagu both note their own experiences with this phenomenon as deception 
planners during WW II (1982, p. 236); Hesketh also notes that this is a logical 
fallacy.4142  “What is or is not possible” from the deceiver’s point of view, notes 
Hesketh, “matters less than what the enemy believes is possible” (p. 236).  
Hesketh goes on to point out that “One is always inclined to credit the enemy 
with knowing as much about one’s own affairs as one does oneself” (p. 236).  In 
fact, he suggests, “A reasonable and straightforward story, even if it involves 
maneouvres which cannot in reality be performed,” is preferable to “a more 
complex one which is capable of execution,” but whose objects and activities the 
adversary is much less likely to discern (p. 236).   
A key component of plausibility is confirmation.  “A lie is made more 
plausible,” according to Daniel and Herbig, “when it has been confirmed by a 
variety of credible sources” or means (1982, p. 18).  Confirming details are 
necessary because virtually every target of deception continues to seek 
information to support his conclusion.  “The usual [proximal] targets of 
deceptions, intelligence organizations,” according to Daniel and Herbig, demand 
“that all claims be confirmed and evidence evaluated and ranked according to its 
estimated reliability” (p. 18).  Given the role of perceptual and cognitive biases, a 
target is far more likely to accept data that confirms his hypotheses: “the target is 
likely to ignore, twist, or explain away those details that do not fit, and often those 
                                            
41 Montagu describes in great detail an incident in which the British Chiefs of Staff rejected a 
deception intended to convince the Germans that an invasion would come at the Bay of Biscay.  
Although Ultra suggested that the Germans greatly feared such an operation, the Chiefs of Staff 
knew that an invasion in this area was beyond the range of fighter aircraft support.  The Chiefs of 
Staff reasoned that certainly the Germans would know this as well.  In fact, the Germans either 
did not know or did not seem to care, but the deception was scrubbed nonetheless (Handel, 
1982, p. 135). 
42 Roger Fleetwood Hesketh served as the head of the “Intelligence” or “Special Means” 
subsection of OPS (B), the section of the Chief of Staff Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) 
designated to handle strategic deception, from April 1943 until the end of World War II.  Among 
Hesketh’s responsibilities were the coordination of the actual Allied operations, physical 
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are the incongruities on which the deception hinges” (p. 19).  If there is no 
confirming data, however, the target is likely to receive sufficient contradictory 
information to overcome his cognitive biases and see through the deception 
more easily. 
5. Secrecy—A Fifth Success Factor? 
Finally, the nature of the complex process that is deception suggests that 
deception success requires maintenance of a certain threshold of secrecy.  
Daniel & Herbig cite a review of German cover and deception by General Hans 
von Greiffenberg: “knowledge that cover and deception is [sic] being employed 
must be denied the enemy” (Daniel & Herbig, 1982, p. 16). “’If the strictest 
secrecy is not observed,’ says von Greiffenberg, ‘all deception projects are 
condemned to failure from the very start’” (p. 16).  Daniel & Herbig conclude that 
there are two levels on which such secrecy must be maintained.  “One tries to 
protect the truth about what a side [actually] intends to do in an impending 
operation,” while the other tries to “protect the truth about the existence of the 
deception itself” (p. 17). 
There is considerable evidence, however, that secrecy—although 
important—need not be absolute.  Daniel & Herbig point out, “Total security is an 
elusive, usually unattainable goal even in the best organized and coordinated 
operations” (1982, p. 16).  As a result, “Breaches of security…need not be fatal 
to deception’s success.  Some leaks may not catch the target’s attention, and, if 
they do, may only increase his ambiguity43.  A target’s predispositions may cause 
other leaks to be ignored or misinterpreted as to their true significance” (Daniel & 
Herbig, 1981, p. 37; 1982, p. 17).  Furthermore, so long as the deception is 
planned to reinforce the target’s existing preconceptions, “the target’s propensity 
to rationalize discrepancies commonly offsets security leaks and uncontrolled 
                                                                                                                                  
deception means, and the controlled leakage of information using double agents (Hunt, 1982, p. 
225). 
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43 What Daniel & Herbig do not point out is that increased ambiguity, coupled with increased 
risks, may make an adversary more unpredictable, rather than less so (Jervis, 1968). 
channels of information” (Daniel and Herbig, 1981, p. 37; 1982, p. 16).  
Furthermore, Whaley’s empirical analysis suggests that deception has a “high 
probability of achieving surprise even though a warning has been given” 
(Sherwin & Whaley, 1982, p. 192).  In fact, Sherwin and Whaley’s analysis 
implies that the probability of achieving surprise despite warning is more than 
90% (p. 192). 
Since absolute secrecy is likely to prove elusive or overly expensive to 
attain, a more reasonable goal for deception might be relative secrecy, coupled 
with plausibility and confirmation of the deception.  These qualities are 
interrelated.  Relative security prevents significant indicators of either the 
deceiver’s actual operational concept or of the existence of deception.  
Confirming details from a variety of sources augment plausibility, a necessary 
component of deception; together, these work to mitigate minor security leaks. 
Having addressed what deception is and how it works, this thesis now 



































III. DECEIVING TERRORISTS—ORGANIZATIONAL APPLICATIONS 
At the beginning of December 2001, a fresh wave of violence rocked the 
Middle East.44  Late in the evening of 2 December, a pair of serious-looking 
young Palestinian men walked into Jerusalem’s Zion Square shopping complex 
and blew themselves up.  The initial explosions killed nearly a dozen—including 
the two bombers—and wounded almost two hundred, the vast majority of whom 
were marked as victims simply because they happened to be Israeli citizens.  
Just as in a hundred other instances, the well-practiced Israeli emergency 
response system swung into action immediately following the initial explosions.  
Rescue workers were just beginning to arrive at the scene a few minutes later 
when a third explosion—this one a car bomb—targeted the emergency 
responders themselves.  Less than twenty-four hours later, a third young 
Palestinian man boarded a bus in Haifa, quietly paid his fare, and took his seat.  
Moments later, he detonated the bomb strapped to his body, killing himself and a 
number of his fellow passengers and turning the bus into a moving fireball.  The 
burning bus careened across the centerline of the road, slamming into another 
crowded bus.  More than a dozen people died and nearly three dozen were 
injured in this latest incident.   
Chairman Arafat of the Palestinian Authority quickly denounced the 
attacks, but Hassan Abdel Rahman, Palestinian representative to the United 
States, suggested that the attacks were the result of “the conditions that are 
created by Israel that makes the Palestinian people very angry and very 
frustrated” (CNN, 2001).  These latest suicide attacks, however, were not merely 
the coincidental acts of a trio of disillusioned young Palestinian men indignant at 
a system that repressed them, as Rahman claims.  Such an explanation, 
although certainly containing strong strands of truth, is misleading.  With only a 
few exceptions—most notably Ted Kaczynski and Tim McVeigh—terrorism is 
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44 Admittedly, these acts represented the latest round within the second Intifadah.  Thus, in a 
larger sense, they represent neither beginning nor end. 
predominantly the deliberate act of groups rather than disgruntled individuals.  
“The brutal, sometimes criminal, activists who do [terror’s] bidding,” Gerald 
McKnight points out, “are simply instruments.  Behind every act of planned terror 
and clandestine revolt is a brain, highly specialized and tuned to guerrilla 
warfare” (1974, pp. 68-69).  If McKnight is correct, then some counter-terrorism 
measure is necessary that targets not just the individuals who carry out the 
violence, but also the brain behind the violence.  Deception, it seems, is one 
potential means of striking at that brain.   
A. INTRODUCTION 
The historical record suggests that deception has considerable counter-
terrorism potential.  In particular, states may use deception to create and exploit 
inefficiencies and weaknesses in terrorist organizations, to facilitate counter-
terrorist operations, and to conceal counter-terrorist intentions. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore these potential uses of deception 
in greater detail.  In order to determine whether any of these potential utilities 
holds value, some discussion of the concept or theory underlying each use is 
necessary.  Next, it is essential to try to unearth historical examples to support 
those theories.  Finally, each historical example must be examined in detail in 
order to determine the lessons to be learned or conclusions to be drawn from the 
examples.  Only then can we proclaim with any confidence that these utilities 
hold promise as real-world counter-terrorism applications. 
The study of state use of deception, particularly deception against 
terrorists, does not promise to be a simple process.  As Maurice Tugwell pointed 
out, “By its very nature, deception is very difficult to research and document.  The 
most successful examples presumably delude us and remain undetected.  Many 
others so muddy the waters that the truth and falsehood remain 
indistinguishable” (1990, p. 20).  This is certainly the case concerning counter-
terrorism deception.  Because the “war against terrorism” is not over, secrecy 
continues to shroud many of the counter-terrorism operations and campaigns of 
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the last half-century or so.45  Only occasionally is the veil of secrecy pulled back 
to reveal the mysteries underneath.  As a result, Ronald Sherwin noted, “there 
are few [well-documented] empirical cases from which to draw generalizations 
and data, and the available data may be filtered to protect national security 
interests” (1982, p. 71).  In the end, however, there may yet be enough glimpses 
behind the veil to allow us to draw solid conclusions about the potential utility of 
deception.46   
B. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST—BACKGROUND ON TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Before the discussion about deceiving terrorists is joined, there are three 
questions that must first be addressed concerning the nature of terrorist 
organizations.  While these observations most directly affect the efficacy of the 
first kind of counter-terrorist deception, they have some relevance across the 
spectrum of such deceptions.  First, what is the general nature of the 
organizations that occupy the lower right side of the process diagram established 
in Chapter II (see Figure 10)?  Do these organizations possess any unique 
characteristics that may be exploited for the purposes of deception?  In theory 
and in practice, a general understanding of this nature seems vital for those who 
would deceive terrorists.47   
Second, how do terrorists and terrorist organizations undertake those 
activities shown in the center of the diagram—specifically, how do they gather 
                                            
45 The vast majority of details of Allied deception during WW II remained secret for more than a 
quarter of a century after that war ended.  Only in the 1970’s did information begin to surface 
about the scope and nature of those operations.  Details about Soviet deception and 
disinformation campaigns against activist Russian émigrés only emerged in the period following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union.  Given these perspectives, it is understandable that there may 
as yet be a lack of solid information concerning recent deception operations against terrorists. 
46 The veil of secrecy is not limited to recent deception operations against non-state actors.  Rose 
Mary Sheldon has noted that accounts of Roman deception against tribes and other non-state 
actors, though suggestive, are conspicuously deficient in detail.  She suggests that the one-sided 
nature of the literary evidence, coupled with the “official” Roman line disdaining “anything that 
appeared artificial or disingenuous,” is to blame (1997, p. 300). 
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47 On this point, it seems particularly important to heed Sun Tzu’s advice to know the enemy’s 
“way”—tao—in order to gain the strategic advantage—shih (Carr, 2000, pp. 73-74). 
and process information?  Is there anything in those processes and procedures 
that the deceiver can exploit to gain a competitive advantage?  The answers to 
this question, in turn, may suggest the means by which deception may be 
“transmitted” to the target.   
Finally, is the general nature of terrorist organizations changing, and, if so, 
what are the potential implications of those changes?  If one hopes to establish 
any general theory about deceiving terrorists, something akin to Whaley’s 
general theory on deception, one must understand not only what the historical 
record holds regarding how terrorists have operated in the past, but also what the 
future appears to hold.   
Deceiving Terrorists
 





























Figure 9.   Another Glimpse Of The Process Of Deception 
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1. The Difficulties Of The Dragonworld48 
Making universal proclamations about the general nature of terrorists and 
terrorism is, of course, risky business, academically speaking.  That is certainly 
the case when one talks about the potential complications that terrorists face on 
a day-to-day basis and how terrorist and insurgent organizations gather 
information.  It is extremely difficult to reach conclusions that apply equally to the 
overwhelming majority of cases.  This is due in no small part to the enormous 
differences that may exist in terms of terrorist ideology, goals, means, size, 
membership, and organizational structure.  Still, for more than a quarter of a 
century, one historian—J. Bowyer Bell—has made detailed studies of the nature 
of terrorist, guerrilla, and insurgent organizations that generally “get it right.”49  
a. The Dragonworld 
Bell suggests that the terrorist operates in a world and with a sense 
of reality that is far different from that of the vast majority of “civilized” people.  
Bell dramatically and figuratively describes the world of the terrorist as “a world 
filled with monsters, a Dragonworld” (1999, p. 61).  Bell’s terrorist Dragonworld 
“is a world that is not structured by traditional values or by personal 
consideration,” but rather by “an ideal that cannot be achieved except by 
recourse to violence” (1999, p. 81).   The terrorist generally seeks legitimacy for 
himself and his cause; this legitimacy is only purchased at the risk of exposure to 
direct counter-terrorist action (1990, p. 200).   
                                            
48 This discussion of the general nature of terrorists and terrorist organizations is admittedly 
cursory.  Countless volumes exist on terrorism; the discussion offered here only touches on one 
aspect of terrorist organizations.  For more on the subject, see the works of Hoffman, Crenshaw, 
Bell, and Reich listed in the Bibliography. 
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49 Bell has not merely studied terrorism from the “ivy-covered walls” of his office at Columbia 
University, but has been a frequent and long-term eyewitness to conflicts in Beirut, Belfast, Aden, 
Gaza, Ethiopia, Central Africa, Italy, Cyprus, and others.  While Bell’s work does have its 
shortcomings, most notably a tendency toward lengthy, flowery phrases and sweeping 
generalizations, few scholars can truthfully claim to have been offered a ride on a car bomb, to 
have been kidnapped by revolutionaries, or even to have assisted in the medical treatment of 
wounded guerrillas.  The fact that Bell can claim all of these things, coupled with his knack for 
generally “getting it right,” generally excuses his shortcomings. 
One of the defining aspects of this terrorist ecosystem, according to 
Bell, is inefficiency.  “A revolutionary organization engaged in an armed struggle 
is inherently inefficient,” he writes, “a price paid for the capacity to persist” (1990, 
p. 193).  To accomplish even the simplest task, Bell suggests, the terrorist must 
overcome the always-present “enormous penalties in the covert, a myriad of 
obstacles to action, and obstacles always increasing” (1990, p. 194).   “It is 
impossible to overstress the penalties paid by those on the run,” Bell tells us, 
“who must survive, appear normal, and still operate.  Error or bad luck is almost 
always irreversible.  The simplest task,” he says, “is complex.  The strain is 
constant.  The covert support mechanism is always stretched” (p. 194). 
b. The Efficiency-Security Tradeoff 
Perhaps the single most dominant characteristic shared by 
clandestine organizations, Bell repeatedly suggests, is the inherent tradeoff 
between security on the one hand and operational efficiency on the other: “As a 
general rule, the greater the secrecy, the greater the inefficiency of the 
organization or operation; absolute secrecy assures absolute chaos” (1990, p. 
203).  Even for an organization that seeks armed confrontation, secrecy is a 
must.  The “typical” terrorist organization cannot afford to waste limited resources 
on haphazard meeting engagements; rather, the terrorist organization must 
husband these assets to be used when and where they can achieve the greatest 













Figure 10.   The Traditional Underground Dilemma—Security Versus Efficiency 
Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen have expanded on Bell’s 
concept of the security-efficiency balance.  Every clandestine group, they 
observe, faces a critical tradeoff “between its operational capacity on the one 
hand and its level of operational security on the other” (2000, p. 190).  According 
to McCormick and Owen, 
This tradeoff is a defining characteristic of underground (and other 
secret) organizations which, in distinction to their “above ground” 
counterparts, must worry about minimizing their risk of exposure, 
even as they worry about the competing need to maximize their 
capacity to operate (p. 190). 
The implication of this characteristic for counter-terrorism is this: 
security is a pressure point, to one extent or another, for every terrorist 
organization.  Theoretically, measures leveraged against that pressure point, if 
applied effectively, will force the terrorist organization to sacrifice operational 
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efficiency for organizational security.  The theoretical implication of this 
characteristic for deception, in turn, is that deception measures leveraged against 
that pressure point, if applied effectively, will force terrorist decision-makers to 
take actions that will ultimately cause the terrorist organization to sacrifice 
operational efficiency for organizational security.  Some terrorist organizations 
will ultimately prove much more resilient in this aspect than others, but every 
terrorist organization must nonetheless deal with the tradeoff.  
2. Terrorist Intelligence Gathering 
How do terrorists and other non-state actors gather information and 
process it into usable intelligence?  This question, frequently overlooked by those 
who study and write about terrorists and terrorism, is of utmost importance to 
those who would deceive them.  The information necessary to facilitate terrorist 
operations doesn’t just come to terrorist decision-makers in the form of sudden 
revelations from above—the claims of some millennial or religious terrorists 
notwithstanding.  Every terrorist organization gathers information.  In some 
cases, the information is the result of the casual observations of sympathizers.  
In other cases, information is gleaned from the Internet and other media sources.  
Operatives may be tasked by the organization to gather specific information.  
Finally, information may come from not just one but a combination of sources.  
Like a state target of deception, the terrorist organization collates the information 
flowing in from a variety of sources.  All of it is analyzed, even if only superficially 
and informally, and some or all of it is passed along.  The gatekeepers who 
protect terrorist decision-makers, in turn, receive and filter the incoming 
information, allowing varying amounts of it to reach those decision-makers.  
Ultimately, the decision-makers do something with the information, whether 
choosing to act upon or ignore it.   
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The problem for every terrorist organization, then, is one of information 
gathering and processing.  Some groups tend to do the former very well, only to 
falter at the latter.  Some groups are just the opposite, on the other hand, making 
up for weaknesses in information gathering by excelling at analysis—making the 
most of the limited information that they do receive.  There is, however, a third 
group as well.  This group tends to establish good processes and procedures for 
both gathering and analyzing information.  If these groups can match operational 
capabilities to their intelligence capabilities, then they theoretically have the 
potential to be the most dangerous (Arquilla, personal communication, 29 
November, 2001).  Only by understanding a terrorist organization’s processes, 
procedures, strengths, and weaknesses can a deceiver realistically hope to 
deceive a terrorist, inducing a desired response on the part of his target.       
a. J. Bowyer Bell On Underground Intelligence 
In The Dynamics of the Armed Struggle, J. Bowyer Bell suggests 
that terrorists gather information in two ways: passive observation on the one 
hand and active observation and surveillance on the other.  All of the members of 
a clandestine organization, says Bell, “and often their friends, neighbors, and 
contacts make up a huge intelligence net, a net in place of those conscious of 
movement priorities, those often alert, silent, working without trace—and, of 
course, often without result” (1998, p. 196).  From this passive observation net, 
Bell points out, the terrorist organization is able to gather very basic information 
on “targets and routines, habits and adjustments, vulnerabilities, secrets, and 
intentions” (p. 196).  While the information that flows from many of these passive 
sources may be erratic and unrefined, it is nonetheless sufficient, if used 
correctly, to enable terrorist operations.  According to Bell, “A little intelligence 
can go a long way—and does” (p. 206). 
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When passive information gathering proves insufficient, especially 
when more information is needed on a specific subject, underground leaders and 
decision-makers direct specific information-gathering efforts in the form of active 
observation and surveillance (Bell, 1998, p. 196).  In the transition from passive 
to active information gathering, Bell notes, there are certain risks or costs 
assumed by the terrorist organization.  First, the terrorist incurs a certain risk of 
exposure.  Active observation may expose the nature of pending operations to 
the rank-and-file terrorists and the authorities alike.  Second, the terrorist invites 
what Bell terms the “difficulty of precision,” the dangers associated with the 
relative lack of training and proficiency on the part of those tasked to perform the 
surveillance (p. 196).   This places an unexpected burden on the terrorist 
organization. While most terrorist organizations are hampered in active 
observation by the relative lack of ability, however, many make up for it with 
creativity (p. 200).  As Bell points out, “what is impressive is that for those, ill-
trained or not, who are absolutely dedicated, completely focused on particular 
targets, that so much useful can be found” (p. 198).  
One example that highlights the ability of terrorists to overcome the 
dangers Bell describes comes from the Troubles in Northern Ireland.  In early 
1979, British and loyalist forces in Belfast initiated Operation Hawk, a major 
surveillance operation employing highly sophisticated electronic equipment, 
covert operations, and thorough supporting intelligence analysis to track key IRA 
suspects.  In March of 1979, the operation received a lucky break when a Royal 
Ulster Constabulary (RUC) checkpoint stopped a car carrying Brian Keenan, a 
high-level IRA GHQ operational officer.  More significant that Keenan’s capture, 
however, was the discovery of his coded address book—a source that proved to 
be an intelligence windfall.  In mid-June, based on analysis of Keenan’s coded 
notes, the British and RUC raided three houses in the Belfast area.  The raids 
were an eye-opener for the British (Bell, 1998, p. 197).   
To the authorities’ amazement, the raid exposed a highly 
sophisticated terrorist intelligence operation.  The Provisional IRA, it turned out, 
had been running its own surveillance on Operation Hawk and a number of other 
covert activities for more than six years.  The Provos used military-style 
transmitters, specialized monitors, and even position-fixing devices, all fabricated 
with components from the Ulster Polytechnic and Grundig and Strathearn Audio 
factories.50  The Belfast IRA had even established surreptious wiretaps on the 
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50 The IRA even used equipment acquired from Grundig and Strathearn Audio to develop their 
own electronics factory, manufacturing sophisticated electronic devices and state-of-the-art radio 
detonators for IRA bombs (Bell, 1998, p. 198). 
British Telecom telephone network, including the private line of the general 
officer commanding the Dunmurry army garrison.  Even more importantly, the 
IRA had been able to crack the codes being used for Operation Hawk; as a 
result, they were able to move their own people around to avoid observation and 
turn the tables on their observers (Bell, 1998, pp. 197-198). 
Just as significant was the fact that the IRA had been keeping its 
own detailed files on the authorities, “just as a real intelligence operation would 
generate” (Bell, 1998, p. 198).  The IRA files included minute detail on the 
houses, cars, and lifestyles of civil servants, security personnel, and judges.  
Moreover, IRA files contained numerous clandestine photographs and endless 
pages of transcripts of secret security force transmissions.   The IRA case is 
important for two reasons.  First, it suggests that some terrorist organizations are 
able to overcome shortcomings in capabilities and experience to develop 
sophisticated intelligence apparatuses.  Second, it suggests that terrorists can 
mitigate the risk of exposure through discipline and sound security measures. 
Underground organizations, according to Bell, seek to fulfill three 
basic categories of intelligence needs with passive and active means: strategic 
intelligence, tactical intelligence, and counterintelligence.  Bell downplays the 
importance of the first: “Strategic intelligence is data accumulated to give 
substance to the rebel vision and has, once the killing has begun, almost no 
further role to play except as exhortation” (p. 192).  Of much greater and 
enduring importance, he suggests, are tactical intelligence and counter-
intelligence.  In terms of tactical intelligence, Bell notes, “what is next needed 
[are] the most mundane operational details.  Since most rebel operations are 
small, the tactical is often actually technical” (p. 192).  The hijackers who carried 
out the 11 September attacks, for example, didn’t require detailed strategic-level 
intelligence but rather simple tactical and technical information on airline in-flight 
procedures, flight times to cruising altitude, and the like. 
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The details emerging concerning the planning, preparation, and 
execution for the hijackings suggests that the perpetrators conducted very 
rigorous clandestine intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing at a tactical 
level.  For example, during the months of May through August 2001, the would-
be hijackers traveled on a number of cross-country commercial flights to actively 
gather a wealth of information ranging from airport security procedures to flight 
crew practices.  On virtually all of these reconnaissance flights, the hijackers 
traveled in the first class cabins.  From the less crowded first class seats, the 
terrorists had a much better view of the cockpit and of airline procedures than 
they would have had in coach.  After each series of cross-country flights, the 
terrorists gathered in a Las Vegas Econo Lodge, where investigators believe that 
they analyzed and shared the intelligence that had been gathered to that point 
(Zernike and Van Natta, 2001, p. A1). 
Tactical intelligence is frequently only of secondary importance to 
terrorists, however.  One of the greatest collective fears of every terrorist 
organization, according to Bell, is the fear of penetration or betrayal.  As a result, 
the greatest intelligence efforts of most terrorist organizations tend to be devoted 
to counter-intelligence, “the search for conspiracy and spies, informers and 
heretics” (Bell, 1998, p. 194).  The fear of penetration or betrayal is not merely 
focused on attempts by the state forces to penetrate the terrorist organization, 
however.  Bell contends that terrorist organizations also have a closely related 
collective fear of internal divisiveness: 
Rebels yearn for a single road to salvation, a single crusade, 
control of the faith and the faithful by the elect.  Sometimes there 
are internecine conflicts over the faith, the movement, the 
organization or the secret army—a shooting war to solve 
ideological problems.  These problems may arise from all sorts of 
reasons, personality clashes, communications problems, agenda 
differences or real theological problems but are always seen once 
the shooting begins as a struggle not between variables but over 
the control of the truth (1998, pp. 203-204). 
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In short, an organization of rebels must always be conscious of a rebellion inside 
the rebellion.  Bell’s observations on terrorist counter-intelligence are significant 
for two reasons.  First, they suggest that terrorist organizations are likely to have 
a motivated bias toward information regarding penetrations and betrayals, 
whether that information proves to be true or not.  Second, they suggest that 
tactics designed to promote divisiveness in terrorist organizations may prove 
particularly useful.  A deception that can convincingly portray any of the “reasons, 
personality clashes, communications problems, agenda differences or real 
theological problems” that Bell mentions, therefore, promotes internal dissension, 
potentially turning the terrorist organization in on itself (1998, pp. 203-204).  
Since many terrorist organizations are effectively “trust networks,” deception can 
be used effectively to “sow dissension in the organization,” further undermining 
operational efficiency (McCormick, personal communication, May 11, 2001). 
b. A More Detailed View Of Insurgent Intelligence 
In many ways, Bell’s treatment of terrorist intelligence gathering, 
while generally informative on a macro- level of understanding, gives only a 
broad-brushstroke view of actual terrorist intelligence activities.  Lincoln B. 
Krause, an intelligence officer with the Defense Intelligence Agency, notes that 
this phenomenon is all-too-common:  
Practitioners and theorists of insurgent warfare agree on the critical 
importance intelligence plays in the survival and success of 
insurgent movements.  Yet, almost no specific writings on guerrilla 
intelligence exist.  Especially lacking are works from those who 
imply the centrality of intelligence but almost never deal with its 
nuts and bolts: its requirements, sources, and organization.  The 
lack of detailed literature on this type of intelligence stands in 
curious contrast to the critical role that it plays in guerrilla 
operations (1996, p. 291). 
To remedy this shortcoming, Krause offers his own detailed 
analysis of insurgent intelligence activities.  While there are conspicuous 
differences between terrorists such as bin Laden’s al Qa’ida organization on the 
one hand, and insurgents such as Nicaragua’s Sandanistas on the other, there 
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are numerous, sufficiently close parallels to find utility in Krause’s description of 
insurgent intelligence.  As a preface, Krause acknowledges that every insurgency 
is differentiated by local conditions, goals, strategy, and organization.  Despite 
these differences, however, “most insurgencies do share common traits” (1996, 
p. 291).    As a result, Krause has mapped out the “typical” intelligence needs, 
sources, and organizational requirements associated with each phase of 
insurgency (see Table 6).51  
Krause’s categorization is useful because it suggests the potential 
intelligence activities of terrorist organizations at various stages of group 
development.  Well-established terrorist groups tend to fit passably (with some 
exceptions) into the guerrilla warfare category of Krause’s framework.  Usama 
bin Laden’s al Qa’ida, for example, appears to be in the guerrilla warfare phase.52  
Although there is much ambiguous information on the organization, it is apparent 
that al Qa’ida has passed through the organizational phase and is relatively well 
developed.  The organization is undertaking actions equivalent to guerrilla 
warfare against its enemies, but has yet to achieve its goal of open warfare 
between Islam and the West.  There are indications that the network gathers 
basic operational information on its enemies, information on an ever-expanding 
area of operations, and basic tactical intelligence on a wide variety of potential 
targets using both passive and active means.  Evidence further suggests that the 
various groups that comprise the al Qa’ida network task a wide variety of 
potential sources, from operatives living abroad to infiltrators or sympathizers in 
the militaries and intelligence agencies of Islamic governments, and from 
                                            
51 Krause suggests that insurgencies progress through at least three common phases—the 
organizational phase, the guerrilla warfare phase, and the conventional warfare phase.  Not all 
insurgencies pass through all of the phases, nor do all insurgencies spend the same amount of 
time in each phase.  Yet, the needs of insurgents are common in each of these phases.   
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52 A terrorist or insurgent group, such as al Qa’ida, almost certainly doesn’t think about what 
phase they may be in and what they should be doing as a result.  Still, each group does think 
about what it needs to do based on its current situation and goals.  There are, admittedly, 
problems with analyzing al Qa’ida according to a framework such as this; at the same time, 
however, there are benefits.  The observer has to exercise judgment to understand what the 
framework can and cannot tell him. 
sympathetic civilians to the Internet.  Moreover, it is becoming apparent that the 
network has developed its own intelligence structures and standardized 
intelligence-gathering procedures.53    
Krause offers two additional observations that hold potential for 
counter-terrorist operations, including deception.  First, he notes, “The 
intelligence structure, once established, will be reorganized, grow, or shrink 
according to the needs and fortunes of the insurgency” (1996, p. 292).  By this 
line of reasoning, states can expect the intelligence structures and activities of 
groups like al Qa’ida to shift in response to the state’s counter-terrorism 
activities.54  These shifts will likely be the most pronounced in response to overt 
activities, such as direct action.  Covert measures such as deception will also 
lead to adaptive shifts, of course, but those shifts may not occur as quickly.   
Second, Krause suggests, “The new frontiers of information warfare and other 
technological considerations, and insurgent use of them, will bring both new 
insurgent intelligence requirements and new techniques to fill them” (p. 307).  
New terrorist intelligence requirements and techniques, in turn, imply new 
challenges and opportunities for counter-terrorism—such as new channels with 
which to deceive.   
                                            
53 A copy of the al Qa’ida manual describing intelligence gathering activities and procedures, 
captured during a raid by Manchester (England) Metropolitan Police during a search of an al 
Qa’ida member’s house, is available on the US Department of Justice web site: 
http://www.usdoj.gov.  
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54 One way of viewing these shifts, in keeping with the line of reasoning introduced in the previous 
section, is between two poles, with targeting at the one end and defense at the other.  Terrorist 
organizations are rarely likely to forego one at the expense of the other, but defense needs may 
force targeting activities onto a back burner.  
 









♦ Immediate threats to 











Info to further political 
expansion 
Strategic-level, politically-
oriented intelligence on the 
state and opposition groups 
Information on specific 
targets 



































Basic military intelligence on 
the government and its 
forces 
Information on an ever-
expanding area of interest 
Specific information on 


























the country, to 






















Gauge the will and political 
strength of both the 
government and its 
international supporters 
Information on other 
opposition and political 
groups 
General military intelligence 
requirements 
Increased emphasis on 
and expansion of 











Figure 11.   Insurgent Intelligence Needs, Sources, and Organization (Krause, 
1996, pp. 292-307) 
                                            
55 As Krause notes, “One major position used to infiltrate is that of translator.”  This is a 
phenomenon of which I have personal experience.  During a tour in Bosnia, one of the factions 
inserted an agent into our base-camp as a translator.  Although the agent was eventually 
discovered and dismissed, a potential course of action might have been to use the agent as a 
deception channel to feed misleading information to the concerned faction. 
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The point of all of this is that terrorist organizations, like their state 
opponents, gather and process intelligence.  Some organizations do so with a 
greater degree of finesse, but all terrorist organizations do so to one extent or 
another.  Gaining an understanding of how they do so and to what degree of 
sophistication is a subject of critical importance for the deceiver.  A basic 
framework along the lines of that offered by Krause offers a basic starting point 
for gaining that understanding.  The key to all of this, of course, is intelligence 
preparation and feedback.  If the deceiver’s intelligence sources cannot identify 
how a particular terrorist organization gathers and processes information, then 
the probability of conducting successful deception is likely to be extremely low. 
3. The Future of Terrorism—The Trend Toward Networks  
The nature of international terrorism, it seems, is slowly but noticeably 
changing.  In 1997, Edward Mickolus, the eminent chronologer of international 
terrorism, noted, “the first half of 1993…saw the advent of a new type of terrorist 
‘non-group.’  Composed of small, loosely organized bands of like-minded 
coreligionists with world-wide contacts,” Mickolus notes, “these noncentralized 
terrorist networks make combating terrorists all the more difficult.  They in turn 
can count on the assistance of fundamentalist extremist colonies throughout the 
world” (1997, p. xii).56 In April 2000, the US State Department report Patterns of 
Global Terrorism: 1999 also noted a major shift taking place in terrorism today.  
This shift is away from “well-organized, localized groups supported by state 
sponsors” and toward “loosely organized, international networks of terrorists.”  
These sources and others observe that a wide variety of actors—from 
transnational terrorists to drug syndicates, and from NGO’s to environmental 
movements—are modifying their organization and concepts of operations to 
capitalize on the inherent advantages of network designs.57  Terrorists, it seems, 
                                            
56 Mickolus has published five exhaustive chronologies of international terrorism over the past two 
decades.  These chronologies are an invaluable source for the serious student of terrorism.  For a 
complete list of Mickolus chronologies, see the Bibliography. 
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57 For a full treatment of the subject, see Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s Networks and Netwars: The 
Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (2001).  Much of the discussion here is derived from this 
have grasped the enormous potential of networks and netwar concepts of 
operation. 
John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt coined the term netwar to refer to an 
emerging mode of conflict short of traditional military warfare, in which the 
protagonists exploit network forms of organization and related doctrines, 
strategies, and technologies suitable for the information age.58  According to 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “these protagonists are likely to consist of dispersed 
organizations, small groups, and individuals who communicate, coordinate, and 
conduct their campaigns in an internetted manner, often without a precise central 
command” (2001, p. 6).  This form of conflict differs from the more traditional 
forms, according to Michele Zanini and Sean Edwards, in which the actors 
employ “conventional” hierarchical organizations and associated doctrines and 
strategies (2001, p. 30).  In theory, netwar allows numerous, dispersed small 
groups using the latest in communications technologies to act conjointly across 
great distances.  Non-state actors have proven that a netwar concept of 
operations can be used to great advantage, particularly against more traditional 
hierarchically organized actors such as states (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 2).  
Recent examples of netwar include the Zapatista National Liberation Army’s 
campaign against the Mexican government beginning in 1996, the first and 
second Chechnyan wars, and the Serb opposition campaign to Slobodan 
Milosevic in 2000.   
a. Networks Explained 
Networks are one of the most common forms of social organization, 
“simultaneously pervasive and intangible, ubiquitous and invisible, everywhere 
and nowhere” (Williams, 2001, p. 64).  Like other organizational forms, networks 
may vary in size, shape, membership, and purpose.  At the very simplest, a 
                                                                                                                                  
book.  A complementary perspective is found in Jay Galbraith’s Designing Organizations (1995, 
pp. 11-17, 101-129). 
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network is a group of nodes connected in one way or another.  Nodes, the basic 
building block of networks, may be individuals, groups or organizations, or even 
states, so long as they are interconnected in some way (p. 66).  The nodes, 
according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “may be large or small, tightly or loosely 
coupled, and inclusive or exclusive in membership” (2001, p. 8).  On the one 
hand, they may be segmentary—they may look alike and engage in similar 
activities (p. 8; Gerlach, 2001, pp. 290-293).  On the other hand, they may be 
specialized—that is, “they may undertake a division of labor based on 
specialization” (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 8).  The boundaries of the 
individual nodes and the network alike may alternately be well defined or “blurred 
and porous in relation to the outside environment” (p. 8).   
Large networks will generally have both a core and a periphery 
(Williams, 2001, pp. 72-74).  The core of a network typically exhibits strong 
collective identity, characterized by “dense” connections among a relatively small 
group of individuals who provide “steering” for the network.  The members 
comprising the core frequently include the network’s creators, and they tend to 
initiate or approve major network activities, arbitrate disputes, and provide 
direction (p. 72).  The relationship between core members is often underpinned 
by deep interpersonal bonds—such as family, kinship, ethnicity, or shared 
experiences—that facilitate trust and cohesion (p. 72).  The cohesion and strong 
collective identity of the network’s core, while typically a network strength, may 
also be a weakness.  As Williams points out, “cohesion does not necessarily 
enhance—and can actually reduce—the [core’s] capacity to obtain information 
and ‘mobilize resources from the environment’” (p. 73). 
Network peripheries, on the other hand, are the eyes, ears, hands, 
and feet of the network.  In effect, the individuals and groups that are the 
peripheral nodes allow the network to undertake more geographically dispersed, 
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58 Netwar is not simply cyber terror, as some have confused it to be.  Cyber terror, however, is a 
tool of tremendous potential in the hands of terrorist networks (Zanini and Edwards, 2001, pp. 41-
45; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 331). 
more extensive, and more diverse activities than might otherwise be possible in a 
more conventional organization (Williams, 2001, p. 73).  The nodes also give the 
network a unique capacity to carry out intelligence collection activities (p. 73).59  
The periphery of a network is characterized by less dense patterns of interaction 
and looser relationships between nodes than the core.  As a result, the periphery 
has a capacity for rapid reconfiguration.   Nodes can be added as needed to 
meet opportunities or challenges more effectively, or severed to respond to 
external threats.   
It is possible to identify three primary types of networks: the chain 
or line network; the hub, star, or wheel network; and the all-channel or full-matrix 
network (see Figure 12).  The first, the chain network, consists of a line of 
separated nodes or contacts; communication must pass through all of the 
intermediate nodes to move from one end to the other.  A hub network, in turn, 
consists of a set of actors tied to a central, although not necessarily hierarchical, 
node or actor.  In the hub network, each of the respective nodes goes through 
the central node in order to communicate or coordinate with each other.  Finally, 
an all-channel network is one in which each of the nodes is connected to all of 
the other nodes.  This last type, according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, is the 
archetypal netwar network (2001, pp. 7-9).  One of the three types may prove 
more appropriate to certain conditions or purposes than the others.  There may 
be hybrids of the three types, “with different tasks being organized around 
different types of networks” (p. 8).  Conversely, there may be hybrids consisting 
of both networks and hierarchies, with a traditional hierarchy operating inside a 
particular node in a network, or there may be networks operating inside of 
networks (p. 8).  The number of potential variations is virtually limitless.   
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59 The late Colombian drug kingpin Pablo Escobar, for example, established a very effective star-
type network of cab drivers and vendors in Medellin.  Utilizing cellular phones, the network would 
provide Escobar early warning and real-time information on the activities of the Bloque de 
Busqueda, the Colombian National Police “Search Bloc,” which was tasked with apprehending 
Escobar (Bowden, 2001). 
Deceiving Terrorists
Chain Network Star or Hub Network
All-Channel or Full-Matrix Network
 
Figure 12.   A Summary of Network Types 
(After Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 8). 
The archetypal netwar network—the all-channel network—is the 
type, according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “that gives the network form its new, 
high potential for collaborative undertakings and that is gaining new strength from 
the information revolution” (2001, p. 9).60  Visually, an all-channel network 
resembles a geodesic “Bucky ball” more than it does a pyramid:   
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60 If the available open-source information is correct, Usama bin Laden’s al Qa’ida is, in many 
ways, a good example of the all-channel network, bringing together a “complex network of 
relatively autonomous groups that are financed from private sources” (Zanini and Edwards, 2001, 
p. 34; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, pp. 363-365).   
Ideally, there is no single, central leadership, command, or 
headquarters—no precise heart or head that can be targeted.  The 
network as a whole (but not necessarily each node) has little to no 
hierarchy; there may be multiple leaders.  Decisionmaking and 
operations are decentralized, allowing for local initiative and 
autonomy.  Thus, the designs may sometimes appear acephalous 
(headless), and at other times polycephalous (Hydra-headed) 
(2001, p. 9).   
This all-channel network form has generally proven the most 
difficult to organize and sustain, primarily because of the “dense” 
communications that it requires to function optimally.  This same type has, 
however, proven to generally possess the greatest potential, gaining tremendous 
new capabilities with the advent of the information revolution (Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 9).  To realize its full potential, Arquilla and Ronfeldt point out, 
this type of network “requires a capacity for constant, dense information and 
communications flows,” more so than for other forms of organizations (p. 10).  
This capacity may take the form of the latest information and communication 
technologies: cellular or satellite phones, fax machines, email, computer 
conferencing, or even Internet web site content.  Alternately, however, the 
capacity may take the form of older technologies, such as human couriers, or of 
mixes of old and new technologies (pp. 10-11). 
The use of technology is not the single measure of a network’s 
potential, however.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt (2001) suggest that a network’s 
performance depends on what happens across five levels of analysis or practice: 
• Organizational—what type of network design is being used; 
whether and how nodes may act autonomously; where leadership 
resides or is dispersed; and the mix (if any) of hierarchical 
dynamics and network dynamics (p. 325). 
• Narrative—why the members have assumed and remained in a 
network form; what stories or narratives, if any, express a common 
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sense of identity, belonging, cause, purpose, and mission (p. 
328).61 
• Doctrinal—what doctrine exists for gaining the maximum utility from 
the network form; what doctrine exists to guide members in the 
case of outside pressures or attacks; what doctrine direct decision-
making in the absence of specific guidance (p. 333). 
• Technological—what is the pattern of and capacity for information 
and communications flows within the network; what technologies 
exist to support those flows; how well the existing technologies “fit” 
the network’s design, doctrine, and story; the security and 
vulnerabilities of the existing technology (p. 339). 
• Social—the nature of and reliance on strong, personal ties at the 
core, in the periphery, in between the core and periphery, and with 
the outside; the degree to which the network is or is not a “trust 
network” (p. 341). 
As Arquilla and Ronfeldt point out, “Netwar actors that are strong at 
all five levels are, and will be, very strong indeed” (2001, p. 343).  Organization, 
narrative, social underpinnings, and doctrine, are just as important as 
communications to the network’s ultimate effectiveness—if not more so.  
Doctrine, in particular, lends a great degree of resiliency to the network, 
mitigating weaknesses in the other areas.  The network’s long-term capacity for 
optimal performance depends, in all likelihood, on the existence of a common set 
of principles, interests, goals, or even doctrine or ideology, which is shared by all 
the members of the network.  “Such a set of principles, shaped through mutual 
consultation and consensus-building,” Arquilla and Ronfeldt note, “can enable 
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61 The right narrative can help keep people connected in a network whose loose peripheral 
structure otherwise makes it difficult to prevent defection.  Furthermore, the right narrative can 
help bridge differences between disparate nodes, and can generate the perception that the 
movement has a winning momentum (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, pp. 328-329).  
members to be ‘all of one mind’ even though they are dispersed and devoted to 
different tasks” (p. 9).  This common doctrine may facilitate tactical 
decentralization, setting boundaries and providing “guidelines for decisions and 
actions so that the members do not have to resort to a hierarchy because ‘they 
know what they have to do’” in the vast majority of situations (p. 9).   
b. Network Strengths 
The principles of the networked organization—relative flatness, 
decentralization of operations, delegation of decision-making authority, and loose 
lateral ties between physically dispersed nodes—lend a number of strengths.  
Perhaps the most significant is that networks are uniquely suited to benefit from 
communications and computing advances.  Such advances tend to empower the 
underpinning relationships that make networks so potent an organizational form, 
according to Zanini and Edwards (2001, p 35).   In particular, new 
communications and information technologies have the potential to aid 
networked organizations in three ways.  First, they tend to greatly reduce 
transmission time and allow geographically dispersed actors to communicate 
effectively and coordinate their tasks for maximum effect (p. 35).  Second, they 
tend to significantly reduce communications costs.  With these lowered 
communication and coordination costs, networked organizations are able to 
further disaggregate through decentralization and autonomy (pp. 35-36).  Finally, 
new technologies tend to substantially increase “the scope and complexity of the 
information that can be shared, through the integration of computing with 
communications” (p. 36).  Even traditional hierarchical terrorist groups can 
benefit from advances in communications and computing technologies, of 
course, but the network benefits the most from these advances. 
Another significant strength of networked terrorist organizations lies 
in their offensive and defensive capabilities.  On the offense, Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt point out, “networks have the capacity to be adaptable, flexible, and 
versatile vis-à-vis opportunities and challenges,” particularly where they can take 
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advantage of swarming strategies (2001, p. 12).62  On the defense, “networks 
tend to be redundant and diverse, making them robust and resilient in the face of 
attack” (p. 13).  Networked groups, particularly those that shun centralized 
command and control and display a capacity for interoperability, can prove 
extremely difficult to crack and defeat as a whole.  Such groups can much more 
easily defy targeting of either leadership nodes or other typical Clausewitzian 
centers of gravity.  In this manner, networks tend to be very good at self-
protection (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 13; Williams, 2001, p. 75). 
A third strength of networked organizations is their ability to operate 
clandestinely (Williams, 2001, p. 71).  This is critical to many terrorist 
organizations for whom visibility equates with vulnerability.  What can be seen 
can be identified, and what can be identified can be targeted and killed.  The 
individual nodes of a particular network may occasionally be visible, and thus 
vulnerable; the overall networks, on the other hand, frequently are not 
immediately, obviously, or fully visible.  In fact, many illicit networks tend to 
operate under the observable horizon of their enemies, making gathering 
intelligence on networks a difficult task. 
Yet another potential strength of networks is their capacity to 
transcend typical jurisdictional boundaries and distinctions.  The individual nodes 
of a network may be spread over a number of states, countries, or even 
continents. As a result, transnational networks in particular have the potential to 
exploit differences in national laws and regulations, as well as the common 
distinctions between public and private, war and peace, and civilian and military.  
This makes it difficult for a government (or group of governments) to adequately 
implement a single, coherent strategy for dealing with networks (Williams, 2001, 
p. 71; Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 14,). 
                                            
62 “Swarming,” according to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, “is seemingly amorphous, but it is a 
deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions” at a particular 
target (2000, p. vii).  The overall aim of swarming, they suggest, is sustainable pulsing, wherein 
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Finally, networks display an ability to leverage relationships, 
particularly outside the network, to favor the network (Williams, 2001, p. 79).  
Relationships, particularly between members of the network and individuals 
outside the network, “can be understood as social capital that can be exploited” 
to benefit either individual nodes or the network as a whole (p. 78).  Williams 
suggests that criminal and terrorist organizations extend their reach and 
capabilities by “coopting individuals and organizations in ways that facilitate, 
enhance, or protect their activities” (pp. 79-80).  A well-connected terrorist 
network thus can theoretically call on the efforts of lawyers, accountants, 
bankers, financial professionals, businessmen, government officials, and a host 
of other players who—unlike the terrorist—operate in the licit realm.   
c. Network Weaknesses 
Although networks clearly enjoy a number of potential strengths, 
the form is not without its potential weaknesses as well.  First, as already 
discussed in some detail, the archetypal netwar actor requires a dense 
communications capacity in order to function optimally (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 
2001, p. 10).  Although cutting-edge communications and information 
technologies are increasingly resistant to compromise, all communications carry 
some risk of compromise for terrorist networks.63  These new technologies, in 
virtually all cases, have their own weaknesses that the network must cope with.  
Cellular and satellite telephones, personal computing, email and Internet chat 
may increase a network’s ability to communicate quickly and over great 
distances, but they also open the door to tracing, hacking, and computer attacks.  
In many cases, new risks have merely supplanted old risks.  Networking and 
information technology have undoubtedly increased the efficiency of terrorist 
groups, but have not necessarily mitigated the tremendous risks described by 
Bell, McCormick and Owen (Zanini and Edwards, 2001, pp. 39-40). 
                                                                                                                                  
network nodes assemble rapidly and stealthily, strike a target from all directions, then break off 
and disperse again, immediately ready to assemble again for a new pulse (2001, p. 12). 
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Second, many networks still rely on personal contact (Zanini and 
Edwards, 2001, p. 39).  The need for these contacts, dictated by the nature of the 
network’s social underpinnings, may limit a network’s capacity to take maximum 
advantage of technological advantages.  Visually, the need to balance 
organizational benefits with needs for personal contact and security can be 
viewed as a juggling act in which one characteristic is always on the rise, one is 
always on the fall, and one is always in transition (p. 40).   
A related potential for weakness lies in the fact that networks, like 
all groups, have a certain potential for segmentation (Gerlach, 2001, p. 305).  
Like J. Bowyer Bell, Gerlach suggests that networks are as susceptible to schism 
as other forms of organization, and may divide over personal power, preexisting 
cleavages, competition among members, and ideological differences.  While this 
can be a strength when the network faces external threats, it can be a weakness 
when perceived differences arise between members over ideology, tactics, and 
objectives.   
 A fourth weakness common to networks, according to Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt, is the potential for coordination problems (2001, p. 327).  It is clear by 
this point that coordination is an essential element, if not a raison d’etre, of the 
network.  Coordination is, however, a friction point for all organizational forms.  
This is particularly the case for organizations—such as the archetypal netwar 
network—that have and practice diffuse leadership. 
Finally, one of the lesser-noted potential weaknesses of networks is 
that some degree of discipline is required to effectively implement the network 
form.  A network will only function optimally if the nodes communicate and 
coordinate effectively with each other and/or operate according to the network’s 
doctrine.  The failures of a number of nodes to do so threatens not only network 
effectiveness, but also network survival.    
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63 Many terrorist and criminal networks have, for example, made effective use of encryption and 
steganography for some time now, a trend that is likely to increase. 
d. Implications For Counter-Terrorism Strategies  
In the end, the rise of networked terrorist organizations brings a 
number of implications for those who would combat them.  First, intelligence 
preparation and feedback are of critical importance in combating networks.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt predict that in a war involving networks, the side with 
superior intelligence wins (Garreau, 2001, p. C01).  A state’s intelligence 
preparation should result in an accurate description of a network’s dimensions, 
characteristics, and vulnerabilities on a framework approximating Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt’s levels of network analysis.  Specifically, counter-network intelligence 
should strive to answer the following questions:  
• Organization.  What kind of network design is being used?  Are 
members allowed to act autonomously?  Where does leadership 
and decision-making reside in the network?  Are hierarchical 
dynamics mixed in with network dynamics and, if so, to what effect?  
In short, intelligence must be able to answer these questions to be 
“able to identify and portray the details of a network’s structure” just 
as accurately as when charting a traditional adversary’s leadership 
and organizational structure (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 325).   
• Narrative. Intelligence must also be able to identify a particular 
network’s narrative, since “whose story wins” is often a critical 
determinant of which side wins overall in a conflict (p. 330).  
Furthermore, intelligence must be able to answer how the story is 
told, since conduit is often as important to the narrative as content. 
• Doctrinal.  What doctrines does the network use and espouse (p. 
333)?  How does the network’s doctrine allow it to respond to 
external threats?  Is the doctrine strongly shared by all members, or 
does it represent a potential source of schism for the network?   Is 
the network’s doctrine a potential source of either commonality or 
friction with other groups?  These are often extremely difficult 
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questions for intelligence to answer accurately; in many cases, 
indications of the answers may come as much from action as from 
edict.     
• Technological.  What is the pattern of and capacity for information 
and communications flows within the network?  What technologies 
exist to support those flows?  How well do the existing technologies 
“fit” the network’s design, doctrine, and story (p. 339)?  What are 
the strong points and vulnerabilities of the employed technology?  
These are the critical technological questions that intelligence must 
be able to answer to effectively combat a network. 
• Social.  How well and in what ways do the networks members know 
each other and interact (p. 341)?  Are there potential preexisting 
cleavages within the network?  What are the key relationships 
between the core and the periphery, as well as between the 
network and the outside?  What relationships, both internal and 
external, are the most fragile under duress?  On a related note, 
how are relationships likely to be affected by threats to the 
network? 
Few of these questions, if any, are easy to answer.  Some may, in 
fact, prove virtually impossible to answer except with the advantage of hindsight.  
Yet, the answers clearly suggest vulnerabilities that may be targeted as part of a 
counter-terrorist campaign.  Many of the answers, moreover, suggest 
vulnerabilities to deception.  The answers to technological questions, for 
example, suggest channels that may be targeted either overtly or covertly to 
perpetrate deception.  The answers to the organizational and social questions, in 
turn, may suggest particular deception tasks, such as targeting relationships 
between key individuals in order to induce certain responses that will disrupt the 
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network’s effectiveness.64  As another example, a terrorist network’s story may 
be the focal point of a combined deception and disinformation campaign.  The 
significance of intelligence does not end with intelligence preparation, however.  
Intelligence feedback is a critical component of counter-network operations, 
including deception.  Given the potential resiliency of networks to attack, it is 
critical to be able to quickly and accurately measure the impact of such 
operations in order to exploit success and maintain pressure on the network 
(Williams, 2001, p. 92). 
A second implication of the trend toward netwar lies in the forms of 
organization and concepts of operation required to effectively fight networks.  
Arquilla and Ronfeldt observe that hierarchies traditionally have a difficult time 
fighting networks (2001, p. 15).  As a result, they suggest that it takes networks 
to fight networks, and that whoever masters the network form first and best will 
gain major advantages, including the strategic initiative (p. 15).  Zanini and 
Edwards draw a similar conclusion, implying that it may be possible for more 
traditionally organized states and organizations to beat networked terrorists at 
their own game by learning to draw on the same principles of network forms 
(2001, p. 54).   
The subject of homeland defense is fertile conceptual ground for 
considering Zanini and Edwards’ suggestion.  Currently, the new Office of 
Homeland Security faces the Herculean task of coordinating the activities of 
more than 120 governmental agencies.  Figure 13 suggests the complexity of 
this task as currently organized, utilizing a traditional hierarchy.  A networked 
organization for the conduct of homeland security, on the other hand, taking 
advantage of all the communications and computing technologies available to the 
US government, might prove to be more suited to the task.  Figure 14 suggests 
such an organization, with the Office of Homeland Security serving as a hub of 
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64 The Fawaz Yunis case, an example forthcoming in this chapter, displays the use of trust 
relationships to transmit deception and create opportunities for direct counter-terrorist action. 
an all-channel network consisting of each of the major departments of the 
Executive Branch.  Each department, in turn, could either serve as the hub of a 
network of its own subordinate agencies or continue to utilize its original 
hierarchical form.  Furthermore, direct communication and coordination between 
agencies of different departments could be established or abolished as 
necessary to meet changing situations and challenges.  This example should not 
be misconstrued as a critique of existing homeland security policy, but merely as 
an illustration of the potential utility of a network form of organization in dealing 





 Figure 13.   Current Homeland Security Organization.  
(From Jakub, 2001). 
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Figure 14.   Network Approach To Homeland Security 
The requirements for successfully attacking networks—particularly 
centralized control, detailed coordination, and intelligence—are the same 
requirements for successful deception (Williams, 2001, pp. 91-93).  Thus, just as 
networks or network principles may be required to combat networks, a network 
form may be necessary to achieve centralized control and coordination of 
deception activities directed against terrorist networks.  There is, however, a 
precedent to follow.  During World War II, Winston Churchill established the 
London Controlling Section (LCS) to control and coordinate British strategic 
deception activities against Nazi Germany (Breuer, 1993, p. 60).65   Although it 
had no real authority, the LCS coordinated the efforts of battlefield commanders, 
heads of states, and innumerable military, civil, and political agencies alike in a 
manner very similar to a star or hub network.  In order to effectively deceive 
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65 The LCS had a counterpart American agency in the Joint Security Control, organized under the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and consisting of the directors of intelligence for the Army, Navy, and Air 
Corps (Breuer, 1993, pp. 60-61).  
terrorist networks in the future, particularly terrorist networks with a global reach, 
it may prove beneficial or even necessary to create an LCS-type agency to 
centrally control and coordinate the activities of a wide variety of agencies and 
actors.   
A third implication of the trend towards networks is that effectively 
combating networks requires establishing clear, attainable objectives (Williams, 
2001, p. 91).  Williams suggest that attacks on networks “need to be carefully 
orchestrated, finely calibrated, and implemented in a comprehensive and 
systematic fashion” (p. 91).  Accordingly, whether the objective of counter-
network operations is to destroy the network, degrade the network’s capacity to 
carry out operations, plant misinformation, or to sever the network’s external ties, 
objectives must be carefully calibrated with means and weighed against potential 
unintended consequences. 
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While the actual objectives of a counter-network operation will vary 
according to the network, Arquilla and Ronfeldt, Zanini and Edwards, Williams, 
and others suggest a number of potential objectives.  One potential objective is a 
network’s information flows, since a network’s efficiency hinges on smooth 
communication and coordination (Zanini and Edwards, 2001, p. 53; Garreau, 
2001, p. C01).  Attacking the network’s dense communications, whether by 
deception or direct action, may force the network to be more inefficient; on the 
other hand, it may also cause the network to innovate.  Another potential 
objective are the network’s external links (Leites and Wolf, 1970, pp. 39-41; 
Williams, 2001, p. 79).  At the very least, cutting external links may starve the 
network for a time.  A third potential objective, particularly for transnational 
networks, is the boundaries that those networks exploit for operation, movement, 
and survival (p. 94).  Finally, the interpersonal relationships that provide the 
social basis for the network may be targeted.  Although interpersonal 
relationships and strong social underpinnings may make actual penetration of a 
network difficult, these same relationships may be particularly susceptible to 
deception and other information operations (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 341).   
A final implication of the trend towards networks and netwar 
concerns the unintended consequences of counter-terrorist operations.  
Unsuccessful targeting of individual nodes may have adverse effects (Williams, 
2001, p. 92).  If one node is compromised or targeted, for example, it may simply 
be cut away and other nodes given increased responsibilities to compensate.  If 
intelligence on the larger network is limited, the network may become more 
elusive once the known nodes are thus eliminated.  Another potential unintended 
consequence is that smaller, more nimble networks may arise as successors to a 
defeated large network (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001, p. 365). 
C. DECEPTION TO CREATE AND EXPLOIT INEFFICIENCIES AND 
WEAKNESSES 
The arguments in this chapter thus far imply that, as a general rule, 
terrorist organizations have a number of potential vulnerabilities to deception.  
Thus, one potential use of deception is to create inefficiencies and weaknesses 
in terrorist organizations.  Furthermore, once these are created or identified, 
deception may also offer a means to exploit existing organizational inefficiencies 
and weaknesses.    McCormick and Owen, Bell, and others have shown that 
clandestine organizations generally struggle to balance organizational efficiency 
with operational security.  Increased operational efficiency—the ability to commit 
acts of terror—is purchased at the expense of organizational security.  Increased 
organizational security, on the other hand, is purchased at the expense of 
operational efficiency (McCormick & Owen, 2000, p. 186; Bell, p, 27).  By 
targeting a terrorist organization’s confidence in its operational security, a 
deceiver should, for a time, be able to affect the terrorists’ organizational 
efficiency.  Furthermore, deception may be used to target the trust bonds upon 
which many terrorist organizations, particularly cellular and networked terrorist 
organizations, are founded (Bowlin, 1999, p. 89; Garreau, 2001, p. C01).   
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1. The Prison Sting 
The “Prison Sting” is one illustration of deception to create inefficiency in a 
terrorist organization; although this case was discussed in significant detail in 
Chapter I, additional insight is offered here (see Figure 15).   
a. Review Of The Case 
In May 1974, IRA assassins gunned down Constables John 
Malcolm Ross and Edmund Bell on Finaghy Road in Andersonstown, part of 
Belfast.  Five young men were charged in connection with the killing, but only 
two—Vincent Heatherington and Miles McGrogan—were ultimately remanded to 
Crumlin Road Prison.  Upon remand, the pair indicated to the IRA officer 
“commanding” the Republican wing that they were Provisionals from the IRA’s 1st 
Battalion and that they wished to join the Republican population.  Even before 
the men settled into their cells, the IRA began routine, surreptious inquiries into 
each man’s background.  The inquiries revealed three key points.  First, the 
reports indicated that Heatherington and McGrogan were not, in fact, regulars 
from the 1st Battalion, but had merely been members of Fianna Eireann, the 
youth section of the IRA.  The reports also revealed that Heatherington and 
McGrogan had been tarred and feathered and ejected from the organization for 
petty larceny.  Finally, the reports revealed that Heatherington and McGrogan 
were in no way responsible for or connected to the murders of the two 
Constables (Dillon, pp. 75-77).   
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As a result of the 1st Battalion’s reports, the IRA “officer 
commanding” (OC) questioned the two further regarding their role in the 
constables’ killings.  Both indicated that they were innocent, but that they had 
been coerced into signing confessions.  As Mark Dillon points out, “this allayed 
IRA fears that McGrogan and Heatherington were ‘plants’” (1990, p. 77).  The 
OC then quizzed the pair on why they had asked to be admitted to the 
Republican wing.  The pair indicated that they feared for their lives if admitted to 
either the Loyalist or general population wings on charges of killing policemen.  
Furthermore, they indicated that their allegiance lay with the Provisional IRA.  
The Provo OC accepted the answers, and attributed the pair’s omission of their 
prior tarring and feathering to simple embarrassment.  Although the IRA didn’t 
know it yet, a firm foundation of credibility and confirming details was already 
being laid for the impending deception. 
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Figure 15.   The Prison Sting Revisited 
Despite having bought into the pair’s stories, the IRA nonetheless 
continued their debriefings of Heatherington and McGrogan.  Under interrogation 
McGrogan remained calm and collected, revealing nothing of value.  
Heatherington, on the other hand, became increasingly nervous, evasive, and 
agitated.  As a result, the IRA interrogators began to focus their efforts on 
Heatherington.  Before long, Heatherington “broke” and admitted that he had 
been a minor British informer, albeit unwillingly, for more than two years.  
Heatherington seemed relieved to have his secret in the open, and the IRA took 
his cooperation to indicate that the young man was simply the pawn of more 
clever and devious people.   Heatherington eventually revealed his British 
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handler’s names, and implicated McGrogan as a co-conspirator.  As Dillon puts 
it, “Heatherington was now in full flow, providing a list of names of IRA men, 
some of whom were in Crumlin Road, others in the Maze [Long Kesh Prison] and 
several on the outside, whom he claimed were British agents (informers)” (1990, 
p. 79).  Additionally, Heatherington began to reveal details of incidents that the 
IRA formerly believed were caused by Army forces or Loyalist groups, as well as 
details of his training and handling by the British. 
“All of this,” Dillon points out, “was exactly the kind of information 
that the IRA was eager to hear” (1990, p. 80).  The interrogators kept 
Heatherington and McGrogan apart, and Heatherington’s admissions were not 
revealed to McGrogan.  McGrogan’s interrogators indicated that he remained 
calm under interrogation.  Then, a note was discovered in Heatherington’s cell, 
ostensibly from McGrogan, warning the former “if he talked he was a dead man” 
(p. 81).  To the IRA interrogators, the note only confirmed their strengthening 
perception that “in Heatherington they had the right man and McGrogan was 
confirming his own guilt” (p. 81). 
The final confirming evidence appeared to come when the 
interrogators pressed Heatherington on the real reason for his insertion into 
Crumlin Road Prison.  Under great stress, Heatherington told his interrogators 
that the charges against him had only been intended to get him into prison.  After 
a time, he confessed, he was to be contacted by a member of the prison staff 
and supplied with a quantity of poison.  He was, he said, to use this poison to kill 
three senior Provisional officers housed in the Prison.  A search of 
Heatherington’s cell was subsequently ordered and poison was, predictably, 
discovered.  Since the plot directly threatened those responsible for assessing 
Heatherington’s story, and since it fit an earlier attempt on an IRA official in 
Crumlin Road Prison, the IRA bought Heatherington’s story hook, line, and sinker 
(Dillon, 1990, pp. 81-82).     
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The deception was a stunning success; according to one Provo 
leader, the IRA leadership was carried away in hysteria.  The Provisional IRA 
responded in a violent, spasmodic rage.  Men implicated by Heatherington, both 
inside and outside of Crumlin Road Prison, were brutally interrogated.  An 
unknown number admitted to crimes that, IRA officials only discovered too late, 
they could not have committed.  Their comrades subsequently executed these 
loyal men.  The leaders of the IRA, both inside and outside Crumlin Road Prison, 
were deliberately misled.  The IRA leadership ordered, and the organization 
undertook, specific actions that favored the British: specifically, a purge of the 
organization and the negotiation of a ceasefire that ultimately led to four years of 
bitter internal feuding and division (Dillon, 1990, p. 83; Bowlin, 1999, p. 91).  
b.  Assessment Of The Operation  
The Prison Sting is a notable example for several reasons.  First, it 
is an excellent showcase for the role of the deception success factors described 
in Chapter II.  In retrospect, the secrecy, organization, & coordination of the 
“Prison Sting” were all impeccable.66  The deception was planned at a high-level, 
and was extremely centralized.  Subsequent inquiries on both sides of the affair 
showed that the Prison Sting had a firm foundation of intelligence preparation, 
and Heatherington was able to feed the IRA leadership there a mixture of truths, 
half-truths, and outright lies; all of his stories were either verifiable by the IRA or 
fit existing preconceptions of the IRA leadership.  The channels by which the 
deception was executed were controlled with extreme efficiency.  A relatively 
high level of secrecy was maintained, protected by plausibility and confirming 
details.  The deception was plausible, and was confirmed repeatedly, particularly 
when the poison plot was discovered.   
Second, the Prison Sting displays the potential in such operations 
for unintended consequences.  Although the IRA was severely damaged by the 
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66 As for secrecy, even to this day, the only accounts of the affair come from journalists and the 
IRA themselves; the British have yet to admit to the affair. 
Prison Sting, the organization ultimately reorganized from its traditional battalion 
formations into a cellular structure, and ultimately proved harder to attack as a 
result.   Having thus survived, the IRA emerged as a “smarter and more 
determined organization” (Bowlin, 1999, p. 91).  It is not clear whether the 
original deception would have been as successful against the networked cellular 
organization subsequently adopted by the IRA.  A second unintended 
consequence is that the Provisional IRA ultimately tried Heatherington and 
McGrogan in absentia and executed the pair. This kind of outcome, however, is 
always a possibility in such affairs.  Mark Urban describes the paradigm of a “Big 
Boy’s Game” played by “Big Boy’s Rules”:  Those who play the game, he 
suggests, are aware of the potential consequences (Urban, 1992).  As one “IRA 
man” puts it in Dillon’s account, “When it comes to the sting, winning matters, not 
the survival of the double agent” (p. 35).   
The final notable feature of the Prison Sting that must be 
considered is that the deceiver and the deceived shared a number of cultural and 
language similarities.  It is unclear what role these similarities played in the 
ultimate preparation, execution, and outcome of the deception.  Moreover, it is 
uncertain whether this particular deception would have been as successful 
against an adversary who didn’t share the same general cultural 
characteristics67. 
2. Deception In The Philippines 
Because insurgents—as one form of non-state actor—tend to have far 
more similarities to terrorists than they have differences, cases of state deception 
against insurgents have a certain appeal as illustrative examples.  There are a 
number of cases of deception to create and exploit inefficiencies in insurgent 
groups to be found in the insurgency of the Communist Hukbo ng Bayan Laban 
Sa Hapon—“Huks,” for short—in the Philippines after World War II.   
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67 The concept of deceiving terrorists who are also one’s fellow citizens also raises sticky issues 
regarding the constitutional and legal rights of those targeted.  The British government has 
suffered immense damage to its reputation for some of their actions during “the troubles.” 
a. An American In The Philippines 
From 1950 to 1954, Edward Geary Lansdale served as an advisor 
to the Filipino government of Ramon Magsaysay.  An enigmatic figure, Lansdale 
played a key role in the Filipino government’s campaign against the Huks.  
According to his friend and biographer, Cecil B. Currey:  
Lansdale devised tactics, implemented by Magsaysay, that ensured 
a truly popular election there for the first (and almost the last) time 
in history.  He successfully advocated to Magsaysay policies that 
helped the government destroy the Huks as a threat to Filipino 
society.  Upon his arrival there, Lansdale found the nation ill and 
tottering, drained by political leeches, bloodied by an internal 
insurgent conflict.  He left it strong and whole, under the guidance 
of a magnificent leader (Lansdale, 1991, p. xi). 
Lansdale’s In the Midst of Wars is a thrilling account of his role in 
the counter-insurgencies in the Philippines and, later, in Vietnam.  In a 
fascinating series of anecdotes, Lansdale gives a number of examples of the 
value of deception and other psychological warfare measures against insurgents. 
One case Lansdale recounts concerns the deception of the Huk 
leadership on the eve of the 1951 national elections.  The Philippine Military 
Intelligence Service (MIS) had discovered a Huk agitprop cell operating in the 
capital of Manila.  Lansdale persuaded the MIS to delay arresting members of 
the clandestine group in favor of exploiting the group to deceive the Huk 
leadership and undermine their attempts to interfere with the elections.  Lansdale 
crafted “a strongly worded, fake Huk directive asking all Huk adherents to 
‘Boycott the Election!’” (1991, p. 92).  The directive was prepared on a captured 
Huk typewriter, using captured Huk stationery, and included the appropriate 
authenticating information.  The finished product was inserted via the agitprop 
cell into the Huk propaganda channels.  Within days, the Huk Politburo 
implemented Lansdale’s “Boycott the Election!” slogan, adopting the arguments 
and slogans that Lansdale had incorporated into the fake directive.  The results 
were disastrous for the Huks.  On election day, more than 80% of Filipino 
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registered voters turned out to vote—a resounding victory for the proponents of 
democracy and a shattering defeat for the Communist Huk forces.  According to 
Lansdale, 
The government forces, the press, and the citizen volunteers in 
NAMFREL publicly called to the attention of the Huks and their 
sympathizers how wrong had been their predictions about the 
elections…68 If the Huk leaders could be so wrong this time, then in 
how many other things could they have been wrong all along?  Why 
should anyone follow them anymore?  The Huk rank and file started 
echoing these sentiments, and Huk morale skidded.  Groups of 
Huks began to come into army camps, voluntarily surrendering and 
commenting bitterly that they had been misled by their leaders.  
Well, it was true enough.  They had (1991, p. 93). 
The Election deception is notable in two decidedly different ways.  
First, it suggests that deception can be useful to influence terrorist or insurgent to 
adopt courses of action ultimately harmful to their cause, without actually 
targeting the interpersonal dynamics of the group.  This may prove useful in 
targeting groups with extremely strong social underpinnings, who otherwise 
prove difficult to penetrate.  Second, it raises an enormous potential risk that is 
not otherwise discussed in the following chapter on risks and costs.  The Filipinos 
did not have a strong history of unfettered democratic elections prior to 1951.  
The election deception, had it been exposed, would likely have been accepted as 
business as usual, particularly since Lansdale’s role in the deception was 
plausibly deniable.  For other, similar situations, however, it may prove too costly 
for the United States—or other nations viewed as champions of free, democratic 
elections—to be caught interfering in the conduct of another nation’s elections. 
b. The Filipino Perspective 
Colonel Napoleon Valeriano’s Counter-Guerrilla Operations: The 
Philippine Experience, covering the same period, recounts a number of other 
episodes similar or parallel to those offered by Lansdale.  Both Valeriano and 
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68 NAMFREL stands for the National Movement for Free Elections (Lansdale, 1991, p. 95). 
Lansdale recount how the discovery of a Huk unit in the field was sometimes 
exploited by a simple “Eye of God” ruse.69  A light liaison airplane assigned to the 
BCT would over-fly the Huk unit.  The pilot or a passenger—sometimes 
Valeriano himself—would use a beach master’s bullhorn to call out the names of 
key members of the Huk unit, telling them that they were surrounded (although 
they typically were not).  The deception typically culminated with the observer 
thanking an anonymous informant within the Huk unit for the information that had 
allowed the government forces to locate the insurgents, and expressing the hope 
that the informant had not exposed himself unnecessarily.  The Huks' deepest 
suspicions were invariably aroused, overcoming even the strongest social 
underpinnings, and Huk kangaroo courts singled out and executed an unknown 
number of insurgents (Lansdale, 1991, p. 74; Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 143).  
According to both Lansdale and Valeriano, this tactic “frequently caused as many 
casualties to the enemy as a fire fight” (Valeriano, 1962, pp. 49-50).  This 
account suggests that even simple ruses, carefully crafted and skillfully executed, 
can have a tremendous deceptive impact within a terrorist organization. 
Valeriano also recounts the use of deception to cause a village 
mayor sympathetic to and clandestinely supportive of the Huks to flee his post.  
Although the government forces in the area had reason to suspect him of 
collaboration, the mayor had influential contacts in Manila that prevented his 
removal.  After a chance firefight outside the mayor’s village, Colonel Valeriano 
brought some of the Huk dead into the village.  Leites and Wolf quote Valeriano’s 
account of what happened next: 
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69 The “Eye of God” ruse is a simple psychological warfare technique that Lansdale remembered 
from the siege of Caen in WW II.  According to Lansdale, “In the siege of Caen, a German officer 
would be told by name [using a combat loudspeaker] that he was the next to die because he 
refused to surrender and moments later an artillery shell would hit his house or headquarters” 
(1991, p. 73).  This is, of course, a technique almost as old as warfare itself, but Lansdale’s 
account suggests the concept’s value in operations against terrorists. 
When a large crowd had assembled and the mayor was about to 
inspect the bodies, Colonel Valeriano stepped up and loudly 
thanked him “for the information that led to the killing of these two 
men.”…The mayor fled to Manila the next day (1970, p. 143). 
In conclusion, Leites and Wolf suggest that deceptions such as this, 
which compromise members of an insurgent or terrorist group—or members of 
their support base—by falsely acknowledging their help, can be used to attack 
both the internal and external relationships upon which the group depends (1970, 
p. 143).  
c. Assessment Of Filipino Deception Operations 
In the end, two aspects of the Philippine deceptions require 
mention.  First, the historical record of the counter-insurgency suggests that 
deception was sufficient in many instances to target strong trust relationships, 
even tribally based ones.   
Second, in most of the cases of government deception in the 
Philippines, one deception success factor stands out.  Lansdale notes that when 
he arrived in the Philippines, the Huks were the only force using deception or 
psychological operations to achieve their goals.  At Lansdale’s urging, however, 
the Filipino army adopted a concept of operations that made frequent and routine 
use of deception and PSYOPS.  Filipino commanders such as Valeriano 
aggressively coupled adaptability with this new concept of operations—finding 
new and innovative ways to apply deception in a wide array of situations to gain 
an advantage.   
3. The Abu Nidal Affair 
The Prison Sting and Filipino examples of deception against terrorists and 
insurgents is compelling, but they indirectly raise another question: what of the 
use of deception in other cultures and regions, such as the Middle East?  Are 
there any operations that exhibit the potential effectiveness of deception to create 
or exploit inefficiencies and weakness in Middle Eastern and Arab terrorist 
organizations, such as al Qa’ida?  While there is, unfortunately, a dearth of open-
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source examples to draw from, there is one well-documented case of an 
information campaign that caused a well-known Arab terrorist organization to turn 
inward on itself.  In A Spy For All Seasons, Duane R. “Dewey” Clarridge recounts 
the results of an informational campaign against the Fatah Revolutionary 
Council, better known as the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO).70 
a. The Abu Nidal Organization 
At its zenith, the ANO was one of the two highest priorities of the 
CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC).  The ANO declared itself an enemy of 
both the US and Israel, as well as of moderate Arab governments such as 
Jordan, Kuwait, and Egypt.  The ANO’s activities were largely international in 
nature, with Americans among the group’s favorite targets; by 1986, the CTC 
estimated that the ANO had been responsible for killing more than 300 people 
and wounding more than 600.   
The ANO was notable for a number of characteristics, including its 
methods and concepts of operation, its exceptional transnational capabilities, and 
its strong social cohesion.  On the first point, the ANO was an organization that 
“employed highly sophisticated tradecraft, including rigorous compartmentation 
and secure electronic communications” (1997, p. 331).  ANO operations were 
planned at a high level and with the utmost of secrecy; even those executing a 
mission were frequently kept in the dark.  Operatives would be trained and sent 
abroad with no knowledge of their ultimate objective.  Upon arrival in the target 
country, the operatives would link up with a support team, which would provide 
instructions, weapons, and explosives.  Clarridge observes, “If something went 
wrong, individual terrorists knew nothing, and they could compromise or betray 
virtually no one else in the organization, even if they wanted to” (pp. 331-332).71 
                                            
70 Clarridge was founding director of the CIA’s Counter-Terrorism Center (CTC). 
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71 Not surprisingly, Usama bin Laden’s al Qa’ida used much the same concept of operations to 
carry out the 11 September attacks.  Although all of the hijackers had indicated a willingness to 
become martyrs, very few knew that they were going to die on 11 September. 
Second, the ANO was truly a transnational enterprise.  CIA 
intelligence-gathering activities and analysis revealed that the ANO had a 
network of “sleeper” operatives in the US, Mexico, and South America.  
Additionally, the ANO had an extensive network of commercial interests in 
Eastern Europe, Greece, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and to a lesser extent in England, 
France, and Germany.  The head of the ANO commercial enterprise was a 
Warsaw-based gray-market arms dealer named Samir Hasan Najm al-Din (p. 
333).  The commercial interests financed the organization’s terrorist activities, 
provided critical cover and support apparatuses, and even gave cover to Eastern 
European intelligence services.   
Finally, ANO recruiting and discipline depended on strong social 
underpinnings, coupled with an unhealthy dose of intimidation.  “Brother would 
recruit brother and then become responsible for ensuring he didn’t screw up” 
(Clarridge, 1997, p. 332).  Betrayal of the organization was answered not only 
with the execution of the guilty member, but his sponsor and other members of 
his family as well.  This last characteristic made the ANO extremely hard to 
penetrate (p. 332).  
b. Bringing Down The ANO 
Although the CIA was able to uncover a tremendous amount of 
information about the ANO by 1986, the US was relatively impotent when it came 
to doing anything with the information.  Most of the key ANO members and 
leadership lived in southern Lebanon or Libya; this rendered their extraction 
impossible.  Frustrated, but unwilling to concede, the CTC concluded that the 
“best way to attack Abu Nidal was to publicly expose his financial empire and his 
network of collaborators” (Clarridge, 1997, p. 334).  The first attempt to do so 
consisted of State Department demarches to the various governments that either 
knowingly or unknowingly harbored his activities.  This effort ultimately proved 
fruitless.  In almost all the cases, the demarches were watered down to the point 
that they proved useless. 
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Frustrated by the failure of the demarches, the CTC pursued a 
different tack, persuading the State Department to issue a publication titled The 
Abu Nidal Handbook.   According to Clarridge: 
The Abu Nidal Handbook laid out chapter and verse on the ANO, 
its members and accomplices, and its crimes.  It even had an 
organizational chart.  Starting with Sabri al-Banna (Abu Nidal’s 
given name), it set forth in great detail much (but by no means all) 
of what [the CIA] knew about the organization, including the 
address of Najm al-Din’s headquarters in Warsaw, his home 
address, the addresses of companies he did business with, and the 
litany of bombings, hijackings, grenade attacks, and assassinations 
for which they were responsible.  Many ANO addresses were within 
countries friendly to the United States (1997, p. 335). 
The publication of the handbook had an explosive and positive 
effect from the US perspective.  Although many governments squirmed, virtually 
all—even the Poles and East Germans—divorced themselves from the ANO.  
For all intents and purposes, the ANO found itself virtually shut down (Clarridge, 
1997, p. 335). 
To exploit this victory, the CTC stepped up efforts to actively recruit 
operatives and agents within what remained of the ANO in various countries.  
Although most of the recruitment pitches failed, they nonetheless had a 
significant effect within the ANO.  Clarridge explains: 
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Seeing his financial empire under attack and listening to reports of 
CIA efforts to recruit his cadres, Abu Nidal was aware for the first 
time of a concerted offensive against him—we were coming after 
him and his people.  He, like many in his line of work, was 
paranoid.  The CTC fueled his hysteria over plots against him—
feeding fear to a paranoid is something we know how to do.72  Not 
surprisingly, Abu Nidal panicked.  Those who reported having been 
approached by us were not rewarded for their loyalty, because Abu 
Nidal never quite believed that anyone in his group had turned us 
down.  Their loyalty was suspect thereafter, and the punishment for 
disloyalty was torture and death (1997, p. 336). 
By 1987, Abu Nidal redirected his external campaign of terror 
inward on his own organization.  A simple allegation of disloyalty usually resulted 
in torture.  Torture, in turn, resulted in a coerced confession.  Confession 
ultimately resulted in summary execution.  In southern Lebanon alone, more than 
300 hard-core ANO operatives were murdered as part of Abu Nidal’s bloody 
purge.  Clarridge points out the brutal toll within the ANO’s ranks: 
On a single night in November of 1987, approximately 170 were 
tied up and blindfolded, machine-gunned, and pushed into a trench 
prepared for the occasion.  Another 160 or so were killed in Libya 
shortly thereafter.  Distrust reached high into the politburo ruling the 
ANO.  Even his closest surviving lieutenants began to believe that 
Abu Nidal was insane.  Abu Nidal’s paranoia, fed by our crusade 
against him, caused him to destroy his organization (1997, p. 336). 
Predictably, the ANO collapsed.  By 1988, the organization had 
been rendered virtually ineffective. 
c. Assessment Of The Abu Nidal Affair 
Although there is no evidence of deception in the Abu Nidal affair, 
the case nonetheless suggests that a skillfully applied information campaign may 
prove useful against terrorists whose strong social underpinnings and 
organizational form otherwise make them difficult to attack.  In the case of the 
ANO affair, the majority of the information, including the underlying narrative, 
                                            
72 Whether deception or other measures were used to help fuel Abu Nidal’s paranoia is not clear 
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happened to be true.  Still, the case suggests that deception—another form of 
information campaign—has value as a counter-terrorist measure in the cultures 
of the Middle East. 
4. Summary 
In the end, there is compelling evidence to support the assertion that 
deception has value to create and exploit inefficiencies in terrorist and insurgent 
organizations.  In particular, deception operations that suggest the presence of 
infiltrators, informers, or double agents within a terrorist organization have proven 
particularly effective.  As Leites and Wolf point out, “Once a side becomes aware 
that infiltration has occurred, the false suspicion and unjust punishments that 
may be provoked may have a more deleterious effect that the infiltration itself: 
that is, the second-order impact of the infiltrators may be greater than the first-
order impact (1970, p. 144). 
Deception to create and exploit inefficiencies and weaknesses in a 
terrorist organization is not the only application of deception against terrorists, 
however.  Just as deception has played a significant role in conventional tactics 
and strategy throughout history, so has deception played an important role in 
facilitating counter-terrorist operations and concealing states’ capabilities and 
intentions toward terrorists.  That is the subject of Chapter IV. 
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IV. DECEIVING TERRORISTS—OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS 
On 13 October 1977, Lufthansa Flight 181, a Boeing 737 en route to 
Frankfurt, was hijacked less than an hour after takeoff from the resort island of 
Mallorca.  At a refueling stop in Rome, the four terrorists—claiming to represent 
the Organization of Struggle Against World Imperialism—issued their list of 
demands.  First, they demanded the release of eleven members of the Baader-
Meinhof gang imprisoned in West Germany, as well as two Palestinian terrorists 
jailed in Turkey.  Furthermore, the terrorists demanded a $15 million ransom, as 
well as a payment of DM 100,000 to each of the soon-to-be-released prisoners.  
Finally, the terrorists demanded that the prisoners be flown to Vietnam, Somalia, 
or the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) (Mickolus, 1980, pp. 734-
735).   
Having established their demands, the hijackers took off again, heading 
first to Larnaca, Cyprus.  It was the beginning of a long and bizarre trip.  On 
Cyprus, the hijackers refused the attempts of the local PLO representative to 
negotiate the release of the women and children on board and, fearing an 
Entebbe-style commando raid, took off almost immediately for Bahrain.  Airports 
in Beirut, Damascus, Kuwait, and Iraq subsequently refused to allow the 
terrorists to land as well.  Vietnam, Somalia, and the PDRY, all suggested by the 
hijackers as tentative destinations, indicated a similar reluctance to receive them.  
Bahrain and Dubai, the next points on the terrorist itinerary, likewise initially 
refused the aircraft permission to land, although Dubai ultimately assented 
(Mickolus, 1980, p. 735). 
Frustrated by a plan gone awry, the hijackers were forced to let their first 
deadline slip by and set a new one.  The hijackers attempted to increase 
pressure on the West Germans to acquiesce to their demands by their treatment 
of the hostages, “establishing an image of being quite willing to kill,” and refusing 
all requests to release sick, young, or female passengers (Mickolus, 1980, p. 
736).  Before the West Germans could mount a hostage-rescue attempt in Dubai, 
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the hijackers once more extended their deadline and ordered the plane to take 
off, this time heading for Yemen.  Yemeni officials, in turn, denied the hijackers 
permission to land in Aden, but the hijackers forced the pilot to land anyway on a 
rough dirt strip adjacent to the main runway at Aden’s airport.  At the hijacker’s 
direction, the pilot left the airplane to examine the possible damage that the 
landing had inflicted on the landing gear.  Upon his return to the aircraft, 
however, he was summarily executed in full view of passengers and crew for 
“trying to escape” (p. 736).  Less than twelve hours later, the terrorists forced the 
copilot to fly the plane to Mogadishu.  Once on the ground in Mogadishu, the 
terrorists dumped the pilot’s body on the runway and doused the passengers and 
themselves with alcohol in preparation, they said, for burning.  The terrorists then 
issued what they termed their “final ultimatum” (p. 737). 
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Figure 16.   Hostage Rescue At Mogadishu 
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Early on in the hijacking, the West German government deployed the 
special anti-terrorist unit Grenzschutzgruppe Neun, better known as GSG-9, to 
be in position in the event that a decision was made to undertake a hostage-
rescue operation.  At the same time, though, German negotiators pursued a 
primary course of action focused on a peaceful resolution of the hijacking.  The 
execution of the airliner’s pilot, however, steeled the resolve of the West German 
government.  The Germans decided to attempt a daring hostage rescue (see 
Figure 16).  Once this agonizing decision was made, the Germans were faced 
with a new problem: how to overwhelm the terrorists and rescue the hostages 
before the hostages could be killed. 
In order to gain the initiative, the Germans resorted to a series of 
deception measures (Mickolus, 1980, pp. 735-738).  First, the Germans 
announced fairly early on, on 15 October, that GSG-9, which it acknowledged 
had been standing by for two days in Turkey, had been recalled to West 
Germany.  Then, once the terrorists reached Mogadishu, the Germans informed 
the terrorists that their demands would be met—that their counterparts would, in 
fact, be released in exchange for the hostages.  Noting the necessity for more 
time, the West German negotiator requested and was granted a new deadline.  
Next, with the complete cooperation of the Somali government, a plane landed at 
Mogadishu’s airport carrying 30 GSG-9 commandos and 30 backup medical and 
communications personnel.  The Germans deplaned dressed in “sports outfits,” 
although by midnight they had reverted to black uniforms and face paint.   
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At 0200 on 18 October, the assault force moved on the hijacked plane.  
The commandos noiselessly approached the rear of the airliner, placing assault 
ladders silently beside the airliner’s rear doors.  Once in position, the Germans 
resorted to a simple yet effective ruse.  According to Bruce Hoffman, “A burning 
oil drum was…rolled from the rear of the plane toward its nose and down the 
runway to attract the hijackers’ attention” (1985, p. 57).  As the hijackers hurried 
to the cockpit to get a better look at the diversion, the commandos opened the 
plane’s doors simultaneously and rushed the cabin, quickly overpowering the 
terrorists.  Three of the terrorists were killed immediately; the fourth was 
wounded and captured.  Only one of the assault force members was injured, and 
all of the hostages were released.73  Less than six minutes after beginning the 
assault, all the passengers were safely off the plane, and an ordeal of more than 
100 hours was satisfactorily resolved, in no small part due to the contributions of 
deception. 
A. INTRODUCTION—A REVIEW OF SCOPE AND METHOD 
Chapter I established that states have routinely used deception in 
interstate conflict, and suggested that deception also has a role to play in conflict 
between states and terrorists and other non-state actors.  In particular, the 
chapter suggested that states might use deception to create and exploit 
inefficiencies and weaknesses in terrorist organizations; to facilitate counter-
terrorist operations; and to conceal strategic, operational, and tactical intentions.  
Chapter II, in turn, established a necessary foundation for thinking about how 
deception works and what factors contribute to deception success.  Chapter III 
returned to the argument that deception has considerable counter-terrorism 
potential, exploring the value of deception to create and exploit inefficiencies and 
weaknesses in terrorist organizations.  Cases like the rescue at Mogadishu, 
however, suggest quite clearly that the potential value of deception versus 
terrorists is not limited to attempts to create and exploit inefficiencies in terrorist 
organizations.  On a tactical level, there is evidence that deception is extremely 
useful to facilitate counter-terrorist operations.  Moreover, there is ample 
evidence to suggest that deception is useful to conceal capabilities and 
intentions.  We now address these latter potential uses of deception against 
terrorists.   
This chapter follows the method established in Chapter III.  In order to 
determine whether the potential value of deception to facilitate counter-terrorist 
operations and conceal capabilities and intentions, the concept or theory 
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73 Four of the hostages were injured, but all survived the ordeal (Hoffman, 1985, p. 57). 
underlying each use is briefly explored.  Next, historical examples are offered to 
support those theories.  Finally, each historical example is examined carefully in 
order to determine the lessons to be learned or conclusions to be drawn from the 
examples.   
In many ways, this chapter is hindered by the same constraints mentioned 
at the outset of Chapter III, although they may be more acute.  Most modern-
counter-terrorist units are less than thirty years old.  The United States’ 1st 
Special Forces Operational Detachment—Delta, for example, was not founded 
until the late 1970’s.  West Germany’s GSG-9 was only created after the terrorist 
attack at the 1972 Munich Olympics.  These forces and their equals in other 
countries generally remain shrouded in secrecy; some states refuse to even 
acknowledge their existence.  Operations conducted by these units, accordingly, 
typically remain shrouded in mystery, only occasionally exposed to the light of 
day. 
B. A THEORY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Understanding the role of deception in facilitating modern counter-terrorist 
operations requires some understanding of the nature of special operations 
themselves.  Bill McRaven’s theory of special operations, first proposed in a 
thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School and later published in the book Spec 
Ops, is a practical source from which to draw that necessary foundation.  
McRaven’s theory suggests “special operations forces are able to achieve 
relative superiority over the enemy if they prepare a simple plan, which is 
carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with 
surprise, speed, and purpose” (1995, pp. 381-382).  The theory places 
exceptional importance on the concept of relative superiority.  According to 
McRaven, “Relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, 
generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well-defended 
enemy” (p. 4).  Relative superiority, once achieved, gives a special operations 
force the initiative to exploit the enemy’s defenses and achieve victory.  Gaining 
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relative superiority doesn’t guarantee success, but no special operation succeeds 
without it (p. 382).   
Relative superiority has three basic properties.  First, relative superiority is 
achieved at the decisive point—in terms of time—in an engagement.74  Typically, 
this point is also “the point of greatest risk” for the force conducting the mission 
(McRaven, 1995, p. 5).  Second, relative superiority, once gained, must be 
sustained in order to guarantee victory.  The ability to sustain relative superiority 
depends on Clausewitz’s moral factors—courage, intellect, boldness, and 
perseverance (p. 5).  Finally, once lost, relative superiority is difficult to regain.  
Special operations forces, such as those who typically conduct direct-action 
counter-terrorist missions, rely on relative superiority rather than overwhelming 
numbers or firepower to maintain the initiative.  Once a special operations force 
has lost the initiative, the likelihood of regaining relative superiority is increasingly 
small (p. 6).  The key to a successful special operations mission, therefore, “is to 
gain relative superiority early in the engagement.  The longer an engagement 
continues,” McRaven suggests, “the more likely the outcome will be affected by 
the will of the enemy, chance, and uncertainty, the factors that comprise the 
frictions of war” (p. 6). 
McRaven proposes six principles that allow a special operations force to 
achieve its objective: simplicity, security, repetition, speed, purpose, and surprise 
(1995, p. 8).  “Gaining relative superiority,” McRaven says, “requires proper 
integration of all six principles” (p. 8).  Simplicity is the most crucial of the six, and 
relies on innovation, a limited number of objectives, and good intelligence 
preparation (pp. 11-14).  Next, security prevents the enemy from gaining an 
advantage through early detection of the impending attack.  Good security is a 
delicate balance: it “should be as tight as possible, without unduly impeding the 
preparation or execution of operations” (pp. 14-15).  Repetition, in turn, is “the 
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74 Informally, the decisive point is that point at which—if successful—“we” begin to win and the 
enemy begins to lose.  In other words, it is that critical time, event, or action which signals a 
critical shift in the course of a battle. 
link between the principle of simplicity in the planning phase and the principles of 
surprise and speed in the execution phase” (p. 10).  Repetition is manifested in 
the training of the force, in detailed mission rehearsals, and in a well-understood 
doctrine or concept of operations.  The fourth concept, speed, is simple.  A 
special operations mission must be accomplished as quickly as possible in order 
to maintain relative superiority and reduce the force’s window of vulnerability.  
“The enemy’s will to resist is a given, and his ability to react a constant,” 
McRaven points out (p. 19).  “Consequently, over time the frictions of war work 
only against the special operations forces and not against the enemy.  It is 
essential, therefore, to move as quickly as possible regardless of the enemy’s 
reaction” (p. 19).  Understanding and accomplishing the operation’s overall 
objective regardless of obstacles or distracting opportunities that arise 
characterizes the fifth principle of special operations—purpose.  Purpose is 
derived from two factors—a clearly defined mission statement and a sense of 
personal commitment on the part of the special operations forces (pp. 21-22).  
Surprise, the final principle, generally implies catching the enemy off guard, 
affording the special operations force the opportunity to seize relative superiority 
(p. 17).  Special operations forces gain surprise, McRaven concludes, by taking 
advantage of the enemy’s vulnerabilities, by precise operational timing, and by 
employing deception.    
At first glance, deception might seem to be incongruent with the principles 
of special operations.  After all, McRaven notes, “The correlation between 
simplicity, security, and repetition is clear: if a plan is complex it will require 
extraordinary security, and an overabundance of security hinders effective 
preparation” (1995, p. 9).  Deception, especially on a large scale, is generally a 
complex undertaking (e.g., the need for centralized control and detailed 
coordination).  The benefits of deception, however, outweigh the potential cost of 
complexity in the majority of cases, particularly since most special operations are 
also characterized by strong centralized control and detailed coordination.  
McRaven observes that “deception, when it works, either directs the enemy’s 
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attention away from the attacking force [misleading], or delays his response long 
enough [by increasing ambiguity] for surprise to be gained at the critical 
moment,” thus facilitating achieving relative superiority (p. 17).  McRaven clearly 
favors ambiguity-increasing deception over misleading deception for support of 
special operations.  Misleading deceptions, he suggests, are more inherently 
risky than confusing deceptions, and when the former fail, the result can be 
disastrous for the special operations force (p. 17).    
C. DECEPTION TO FACILITATE COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS 
Deception may facilitate counter-terrorist operations in two ways.  First, 
deception may protect counter-terrorism units and missions by contributing to the 
achievement of relative superiority.  Second, deception may be used by special 
operations and/or counter-terrorist units to create operational & tactical 
opportunities where none otherwise exist (Hoffman, 1985, p. 22). 
1. Deception to Protect Counter-Terrorist Units and Missions 
The modern special mission units that conduct direct action missions are 
generally valuable assets with extremely limited recuperability.  The 
organizational capabilities and individual experience possessed by the members 
of a special mission unit, if lost, may take years to replace.  By contributing to the 
achievement of relative superiority, deception gives counter-terrorist units a 
greater chance of operational success and the survivability that goes with it 
(Hoffman, 1985, p. 22).   
a. The Israeli Raid at Entebbe 
The case of the 1976 Israeli hostage-rescue at Entebbe illustrates 
the value of deception to achieve relative superiority, and thus to protect counter-
terrorist units and missions.  On Sunday, 27 June 1976, Air France Flight 139 
had just taken off from Athens, its intermediate destination on a journey from 
Israel’s Lod Airport to Paris, when terrorists hijacked it.  The hijackers ordered 
the crew of the A300 airbus to fly first to Benghazi, Libya, and subsequently to 
Entebbe, Uganda.  In Entebbe, the four original hijackers—two German 
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members of the Baader-Meinhof gang and two Palestinian members of the 
PFLP—were joined by three additional Palestinians.75  The hijackers demanded 
the release of 53 prisoners: Arab, Israeli, and Japanese terrorists held in prisons 
in West Germany, France, Switzerland, Kenya, and Israel.  If their demands were 
not met, they claimed they would begin executing passengers at 1400, Israeli 
time, on 1 July (McRaven, 1995, p. 334).76 
Almost immediately, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) began 
planning and preparing for a number of potential hostage-rescue scenarios.  
Ultimately, the plan called for a force of Israeli commandos, paratroopers, and 
Golani Infantry to fly directly to Entebbe in four C-130’s and conduct a nighttime 
assault landing at Entebbe airport (see Figure 17).  This concept, according to 
the commander of the C-130 squadron, “was based on the fact that no one would 
think we were crazy enough to fly there, so it would be a total surprise” 
(McRaven, 1995, p. 336).  Once on the ground, the commandos—members of 
the Sayeret Matkal Counterterrorist Unit, typically referred to as the Unit—would 
storm the airport’s old terminal, where the terrorists held the hostages.  
Subsequently, the paratroopers and Golani infantry would seize the airport’s new 
terminal and control tower and serve as reinforcements and escorts for the 
hostages (pp. 336-338).  
In order to gain relative superiority, the assault force planned to 
approach the old terminal in a Mercedes and two Land Rovers.  The Mercedes 
was modified to resemble an official Ugandan vehicle, complete with Ugandan 
flags.  This simple ruse, if successful, would allow the assault force to reach the 
terminal and begin their assault without alerting either the terrorists or Ugandan 
security forces (McRaven, 1995, pp. 339-340). 
                                            
75 McRaven suggests that there is reason to believe that three additional terrorists joined the 
group in Entebbe, raising the total to ten terrorists.  At the time of the assault, however, only 
seven terrorists were present at the Entebbe airport (McRaven, 1995, p. 334). 
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76 The deadline was eventually extended until Sunday, 4 July, as a result of the Israeli 
acceptance of the exchange proposal (McRaven 1995, p. 337). 
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Figure 17.   The Entebbe Raid 
Following an intense series of briefings and rehearsals, the entire 
assault force departed from a staging base at Sharm-a-Sheikh in the Sinai on the 
afternoon of 3 July, less than 24 hours before the terrorist’s extended deadline.  
Seven and a half hours later, the lead C-130 touched down on the runway at 
Entebbe.  As the plane taxied, soldiers jumped from the slow-moving aircraft and 
began to place runway lights to guide the trailing aircraft.  On order, the aircraft’s 
ramp was lowered and the Mercedes and the two Land Rovers exited and began 
moving toward the old terminal (McRaven, 1995, pp. 356-358).   
On the ground, tactical deception measures proved as critical to 
mission accomplishment as planners had anticipated.  First, the vehicle ruse 
permitted the assault force to close to within extremely short range of the 
Ugandan sentries, allowing the commandos to engage the sentries before they 
could be engaged.  Second, the deception initially misled the terrorists to believe 
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that their Ugandan hosts had revoked their hospitality and attacked the 
terrorists.77  This second order effect of the deception was unintended, but 
fortuitous nonetheless.  Before the terrorists could correctly ascertain what was 
going on and begin killing the hostages, the commandos had entered the 
terminal and begun clearing the building.  The terrorists and their Ugandan 
counterparts never regained the initiative (McRaven, 1995, pp. 358-360).  In the 
end, McRaven concludes, deception was a key success factor in achieving 
success at Entebbe: “surprise was not absolute, but, coupled with deception, it 
was sufficient to confuse the Ugandans and terrorists long enough to allow the 
commandos to penetrate the old terminal and rescue the hostages” (p. 375). 
  b. Other Israeli Special Operations 
The Israeli raid at Entebbe is neither the first nor the last case of 
Israeli use of tactical deception to facilitate counter-terrorist operations (see 
Figure 18).  Four years earlier, on 8 May 1972, “eighteen commandos disguised 
as mechanics, Red Cross officials, and released Palestinian prisoners” stormed a 
hijacked Sabena aircraft being held by four Black September terrorists at the Lod 
Airport (Hoffman, 1985, p. 37).78  In a raid that lasted less than 90 seconds, the 
commandos killed two of the hijackers, wounded another, and captured the 
fourth unharmed.  Moreover, they freed all 97 hostages on board the aircraft 
without a single commando or hostage being killed (p. 37).79   
Although this case demonstrates the value of deception to protect 
counter-terrorism units and missions, it also raises the issue of the legality of 
certain ruses.  Special operations forces, like their conventional counterparts, are 
subject to the laws governing land warfare.  While deception is an accepted and 
                                            
77 One of the terrorists who was outside the old terminal at the outset of the attack purportedly ran 
back into the terminal shouting, “The Ugandans have gone nuts—They’re shooting at us!” 
(McRaven, 1995, p. 359). 
78 The proven ability of the Unit to “resolve” hijackings culminating at Lod Airport likely figured in 
the 1976 hijackers decision to fly to Uganda rather than return to Israel to negotiate their 
demands. 
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79 Three members of the assault team and five passengers were injured, a remarkably low 
number given the nature of close-quarters combat in a cramped airliner (Hoffman, 1985, p. 37). 
legally permissible component of warfare, perfidy—the betrayal of trust—is not.  
Specifically, Articles 37 and 38 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions prohibit 
“the feigning of protected status” and the “improper use of the distinctive 
emblems of the red cross, red crescent or red lion and sun” to mislead potential 
adversaries (Protocol I, Art. 37-38, 1977).80  Israeli commandos disguised as 
mechanics or even Palestinians “fit” under the laws of land warfare; commandos 
disguised as Red Cross officials, on the other hand, violate those same laws.  
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Figure 18.   Israeli Use Of Deception In Direct Action Counter-Terrorist 
Operations 
In another case, on 28 December 1968, Israeli commandos 
conducted a daring cross-border raid to Beirut Airport in retaliation for the 
hijacking of an Israeli airliner two days earlier.  Commandos posing as Lebanese 
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80 For a complete text of the Geneva Conventions and subsequent Protocols, as well as an 
excellent commentary, refer to the Society of Professional Journalists Web Site: 
http://www.the-spa.com/genevaconventions/Protocol1.html.  
policemen cleared the tarmac of airport personnel and civilians while other 
commandos placed explosive charges on parked aircraft.  In only 45 minutes, the 
commandos destroyed 13 civilian aircraft belong to three Arab countries, causing 
more than $40 million in damages (Hoffman, 1985, p. 34).  While this last case 
does not involve terrorists, the case is nonetheless valuable for its illustration of 
the use of deception to carry out a successful special operation.  The greatest 
threat to the Israeli commandos and the success of the mission consisted of the 
airport personnel and civilians—non-state actors with the capacity to interfere.  
Rather than liquidating these non-state actors, the Israelis used simple deception 
to mitigate the risk that they posed.   
c. Rhodesian Use Of Tactical Deception 
In Commando Raids, Bruce Hoffman of RAND analyzes 100 
commando raids conducted between the end of WW II and 1983.  As part of his 
study, Hoffman includes 15 counter-terrorist and counter-guerrilla raids 
conducted by the Rhodesian Army between 1974 and 1979; six of the fifteen 
accounts are notable for the mention of the role deception played in achieving 
success.  One example took place on 13 May 1976.  In Operation Detachment, 
twenty Selous Scouts, disguised in FRELIMO uniforms and driving vehicles 
modified to resemble Mozambican Army transports, conducted a raid on a 
ZANLA compound more than 180 kilometers inside Mozambique.8182  The simple 
deception allowed the raiders to penetrate safely, conduct the assigned mission, 
and withdraw without incident (Hoffman, 1985, p. 50).  
In another instance, the Rhodesians undertook Operation Long 
John, an attack against a ZANLA base 80 kilometers inside Mozambique on 25 
                                            
81 The Selous Scouts are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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82 FRELIMO is the Frente da Liberataco de Mocambique, the Marxist guerrilla organization that 
fought against the colony’s Portuguese rulers until Mozambique achieved independence in 1974.  
After 1974, FRELIMO “normalized” and became the Mozambican Army (Hoffman, 1985, p. 30).  
ZANLA is the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army, the military wing of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU), led by Robert Mugabe (p. 49).  ZIPRA, in turn, stands for the 
Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army, the military wing of the Zimbabwe African People’s 
Union (ZAPU) (Hoffman, 1985, p. 48). 
June 1976.  As in Operation Detachment, a force of Selous Scouts used trucks 
and scout cars disguised as FRELIMO military vehicles not only to penetrate 
Mozambique, but also to convince sentries to allow the force into a terrorist base 
at Mapai.  Once inside, the Scouts killed or wounded nearly fifty terrorists, 
confiscated the camp’s armory, and destroyed thirteen Mercedes buses used by 
the terrorists for transport to staging bases on the Rhodesian border (Hoffman, 
1985, pp. 50-51). 
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Figure 19.   Rhodesian Tactical Use of Deception 
On 9 August 1976, the Scouts conducted their largest cross-border 
operation to date.  A Scout column of 10 trucks and four armored cars, again 
painted to resemble FRELIMO vehicles, penetrated more than 100 kilometers 
into Mozambique.  At Nyadzonya, the Scouts—dressed in FRELIMO uniforms—
gained easy access to a terrorist training camp.  Much to their own amazement, 
the Scouts were able to drive right in and line up on the edge of the camp’s 
 130
parade ground, where a force estimated at more than 1000 terrorists was 
assembled for morning formations.  At the sight of the vehicles, the terrorists, 
believing them to be a new shipment of military vehicles and weapons, broke 
ranks and rushed toward the Scouts.  The Scouts opened fire just before the 
mob reached the trucks, killing nearly a thousand and capturing 14 key ZANLA 
leaders.  Not a single Scout was killed, and only five received minor injuries 
(Hoffman, 1985, p. 51; Thompson, 1988).  As in previous operations, the Scouts 
overcame overwhelming odds and maintained relative superiority throughout the 
mission as a result of a very simple ruse.   
In May and June 1977, a force of 110 Scouts conducted Operation 
Aztec, an extended series of raids on ZANLA bases deep inside Mozambique.  
Disguised as FRELIMO soldiers and using disguised vehicles, the Scouts raided 
terrorist camps at Jorge do Limpopo, Mapai (site of a previous successful 
operation), and Madulo Pan.  Tactical deception, coupled with a high level of 
proficiency and tradecraft, enabled the Scouts to destroy a key railway line that 
served as the chief supply source for the terrorist bases, seriously interdicting 
ZANLA operations. 
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Rhodesian use of tactical deception in support of counter-terrorist 
and counter-guerrilla operations was not restricted to missions against the ZIPRA 
and ZANLA in Mozambique.  On 13 April 1979, the Scouts resorted to very basic 
deception to facilitate the attempted kidnapping of a key terrorist leader, ZAPU 
head Joshua Nkomo, from his home in Lusaka, Zambia.  In this mission, an 
unknown number of Scouts disguised as Zambian soldiers and traveling in Land 
Rovers disguised as Zambian Army vehicles crossed the border without incident.  
The raiders were able to drive directly to Nkomo’s residence at ZAPU’s well-
guarded headquarters and initiate their raid.  In a lightning operation, the Scouts 
killed 10 ZAPU soldiers, wounded 12, and destroyed two of the buildings on the 
compound.  Despite quickly gaining and maintaining relative superiority, 
however, the mission was ultimately a failure, albeit not as a result of the 
deception.  Intelligence failed to indicate that Nkomo was not in Lusaka at the 
time of the attack.   The Scouts were forced to withdraw from Zambia without 
their target (Hoffman, 1985, p. 53). 
At nearly the same time, in what turned out to be one of the last 
Selous Scout missions, deception again played a significant role.  A captured 
ZIPRA intelligence operative revealed that the entire ZIPRA southern command 
operated out of a single house in Francistown, Botswana.  On 13 April, a Scout 
column of two armored cars and some light trucks were able to drive across the 
border deep into Botswana.  Dressed in Botswanan military uniforms, the Scouts 
were able to seize all of the occupants of the house in question and spirit them 
back across the border into Rhodesia before ZIPRA forces knew what had 
happened (Hoffman, 1985, pp. 54-55). 
d. Assessment   
The German, Israeli and Rhodesian examples mentioned thus far 
all share one common characteristic: the creative use of deception to facilitate 
counter-terrorist direct-action missions, particularly at the tactical level.  
Furthermore, the Rhodesian examples suggest that, despite the differences 
between special and conventional operations, one fact remains constant.  
Creative and skillful use of deception has immense value on the field of conflict. 
2. Deception To Create Counter-Terrorist Opportunities  
Deception to protect counter-terrorist operations and achieve relative 
superiority is only effective when the conditions for counter-terrorism missions 
already exist.  Deception can also contribute to counter-terrorist efforts by 
creating opportunities where none exist. 
a. The Fawaz Yunis Case 
The Fawaz Yunis affair is one case that illustrates the value of 
deception to create opportunities for other counter-terrorism operations.  In 1985, 
Fawaz Yunis—a Lebanese Shiite used-car salesman from Beirut—gained 
notoriety as an international terrorist.  On June 11 of that year, Yunis and several 
compatriots hijacked a Royal Jordanian Airlines plane from Beirut.    Refused 
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permission to land in Tunis, the terrorists blew the plane up on the tarmac in 
Beirut at the end of a two-day ordeal.  Two days later, Yunis emerged into the 
spotlight again, this time as a co-conspirator in the hijacking of TWA Flight 847.  
Along with Imad Mugniyeh, head of the Islamic Jihad, Yunis was one of the 
reinforcements who boarded the TWA plane in Beirut after the murder of 
American hostage Robert Stethem (Clarridge, 1997, pp. 349-350).  Although 
Yunis’ crimes were committed on Lebanese soil, the fact that Americans were on 
board each aircraft allowed the FBI to pursue Yunis under the provisions of the 
Omnibus Crime Act.  The FBI was hindered, however, by two constraints.  First, 
the FBI could only apprehend Yunis in international waters or airspace.  Second, 
for legal considerations, no CIA agents could be physically present at the time of 
his apprehension.   
The operation to apprehend Fawaz Yunis was eventually code-
named Goldenrod.  The plan, according to Dewey Clarridge, then head of the 
CIA’s CTC and the man overall responsible for the deception, called for the CIA 
to “dangle the bait, set the trap, and be sure that the target was delivered into the 
FBI’s hands in international waters” (1997, p. 351).  The CIA recruited a long-
time Yunis acquaintance named Jamal Hamdan to lure the terrorist to Cyprus, 
ostensibly to negotiate a major drug deal.  According to Clarridge, “Hamdan had 
been friendly with Fawaz Yunis since 1981 and had even served as a sort of 
mentor to him in the shadowy world of Middle Eastern black-market commerce” 
(p. 350).  Hamdan convinced Yunis to come to Larnaca, Cyprus, where he had 
supposedly arranged a meeting with an international drug kingpin named 
“Joseph” aboard a yacht in the Mediterranean (p. 352).  If all went as Hamdan 
suggested it would, both men stood to profit immensely from the meeting.   
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Figure 20.   The Capture of Fawaz Yunis 
The actual operation included an almost comical series of minor 
crises.  Even before the operation got underway, the FBI Hostage Rescue Team 
(HRT) assigned to apprehend Yunis resisted the plan to have bikini-clad women 
on board the alleged kingpin’s yacht, even though they were necessary to the 
drug kingpin cover.  After a tense dispute with Clarridge, the HRT finally 
consented to the presence of three female FBI agents to portray the correct 
deception picture.  Second, the local authorities had Yunis on a watch list of 
suspected terrorists, and began searching for him in local hotels upon 
discovering he had entered Cyprus.  The CIA narrowly averted this crisis by 
having Hamdan check himself and Yunis into the same hotel from which 
Operation Goldenrod was being run.  Third, upon leaving the harbor, Hamdan 
and his brother Ahmad, as well as the CIA agents designated to guide them at a 
distance to the yacht link-up, had trouble finding the yacht, which was out of 
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position.  Finally, to compound the navigational problems, the elaborate 
communications system set up to support the operation began to malfunction as 
the operation commenced.  Eventually, however, all of the crises were 
successfully resolved (Clarridge, 1997, pp. 354-358).  In the end, 
communications were restored and Hamdan and Yunis successfully linked up 
with the yacht.  As Clarridge had suspected, Yunis attention was immediately 
drawn to the “party girls.”  He failed to suspect that “Joseph” and his bodyguards 
were actually members of the HRT until he lay face down on the yacht’s deck.   
Within hours, the HRT transferred a straitjacketed and drugged 
Yunis from the yacht to a Navy ammunition ship, the USS Butte.   Four days 
later, the Butte rendezvoused with the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, where the 
HRT put Yunis on an S-3 Viking for the circuitous flight to Washington, DC.  After 
the longest S-3 flight in Navy history, including two midair refuelings, Yunis and 
his captors landed at Andrews AFB, Maryland, without ever having entered the 
sovereign airspace or waters of another country (Clarridge, 1997, p. 358-359). 
In retrospect, Clarridge’s account of the Fawaz Yunis affair bears 
indications of all of the deception success factors.  As the head of the operation 
and architect of the deception, Clarridge exercised solid, centralized control.  His 
ability to coordinate with the HRT to resolve potential problems played a key role 
in achieving success.  The intelligence preparation for the mission was sound.  
Since the target had no significant preconceptions applicable to the situation, the 
CIA appealed to a bias nearly as strong: greed.  The fact that all involved in the 
operation were experienced professionals contributed to adaptability, particularly 
in dealing with potential crises.  Finally, the deception story was extremely 
plausible, and was enhanced by appreciable confirming details such as the 
female FBI agents.   
The Fawaz Yunis affair suggests one potential downside to 
deception to create counter-terrorist opportunities, however.  As was the case in 
this affair, future deceptions involving third party foreign-nationals may require 
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employing potentially unsavory characters.  Jamal Hamdan was, even within the 
context of the ongoing situation in Lebanon, a murderer and a black-marketer, 
hardly the kind of person with whom the American government prefers to affiliate.  
Yet, a Jamal Hamdan was absolutely necessary in order to gain the confidence 
of a Fawaz Yunis.  While the employment of insalubrious informers and agents 
has been prohibited or discouraged in recent years, however, in the wake of the 
11 September attacks this may no longer be a potential sticking point.  The 
considerations that once made dealing with individuals unacceptable appear to 
gradually be disregarded in favor of more pragmatic approaches. 
b. Sindikat I And II 
In the early years of its existence, the Soviet Union conducted a 
number of deception operations to create opportunities for action against non-
state actors viewed as threats to the fledgling nation.  Operations Sindikat I and 
II, running from 1921 to 1927, are typical of these undertakings.  Both operations 
targeted Boris Savinkov, a former Socialist Revolutionary Party terrorist and 
strong anti-Bolshevik leader who fled had fled to the West.  In Operation Sindikat 
I, a Cheka agent named Eduard Opperput contacted Savinkov, portraying 
himself as a defector and presenting a suitcase full of forged documents.  The 
documents told the story of a significant opposition movement, allegedly headed 
by Opperput himself, operating in Byelorussia.  Ultimately, Opperput persuaded 
Savinkov to trust him, the forged materials, and the deception that they depicted.  
Savinkov accepted Opperput as a collaborator and fellow traveler.  As a result, 
Opperput gained access to lists of genuine anti-Bolsheviks operating in Soviet 
territories, as well as lists of potential contacts.  The Soviet intelligence and 
security apparatus netted virtually all those on the list; the overwhelming majority 
were summarily executed (Tugwell, 1990, p. 17).83 
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83 Whereas many case presented thus far indicate tactical use of deception the Sindikat cases 
tend to blur the distinction between tactical and strategic. 
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The Soviets cleverly used kombinatsiya, the combining of operational undertakings in several times and
places, to maximum effect.  The Soviets targeted a wide variety of anti-Bolsheviks and other hostile émigré 
groups in the United States, Japan, Europe, and the Middle East to induce them to act in ways that actually 
favored the Soviet regime.
 
Figure 21.   Soviet Capability And Intention Deceptions 
Operation Sindikat II, in turn, built on the success of Sindikat I.  
According to Tugwell,  
The legend underpinning Sindikat II lured Savinkov into Russia 
where he was later killed, although it is unclear whether he had 
already struck a deal with the regime before returning.  What 
seems reasonably certain is that this second legend was the 
famous ‘Trust’ (Tugwell, 1990, p. 17). 
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The Trust was a fabrication of Soviet state security, and it took the 
form of a notional opposition within the Soviet Union, supposedly named the 
Monarchist Association of Central Russia.  The fictional Moscow Municipal Credit 
Association, also an invention of Soviet state security, served as the 
Association’s cover title.  Soviet state security used the Trust legend to project a 
false picture of reality toward not only anti-Soviet émigré’s in the West, but also 
toward opponents within the Soviet Union and Western intelligence services and 
their governments.  The Trust deception was not only successful in luring 
Savinkov back to the Soviet Union; it also lured Sidney Reilly, the freelance 
agent connected with British intelligence, back into Russia as well.   
c. Pseudo-Gangs 
One of the most successful uses of deception against terrorists, 
particularly in the latter half of the twentieth century, has been the use of pseudo-
gangs.  The purpose of a pseudo-gang, according to Lettieri (2001), is to 
“perpetrate or pretend to be someone or something you are not, to sham or fake 
out an opponent in thinking you are one of their own in order to attain a decisive 
tactical advantage or surprise over the opponent you are impersonating.”84 
Pseudo-gangs are typically counter-terrorist or counter-insurgent forces that pose 
as terrorists by adopting terrorist dress, equipment, speech, behavior, and 
operational methods in order to contact and intermingle with terrorists, gather 
intelligence, and facilitate or even conduct direct-action counter-terrorist 
operations.  The use of pseudo-gangs has repeatedly proven to hold great 
potential against terrorists and insurgents.  When successful, pseudo-gangs 
create opportunities for direct-action counter-terrorist operations, force terrorists 
to sacrifice efficiency in order to regain security, and assist in identifying crucial 
external links that the terrorist or insurgent groups rely on for support.85   
The best-known and best-chronicled use of pseudo-gangs is that of 
the Rhodesian Selous Scouts, already mentioned in Chapter III.  Officially formed 
in 1973, the Scouts were organized in response to a “drastic” increase in terrorist 
operations on the part of the ZIPRA and ZANLA (Dozer, 2000; Bruton, 1978, p. 
17).  Officially, the Selous Scout mission was tracking terrorist patrols infiltrating 
from safe-havens in Mozambique and Zambia. While Scouts actually performed 
this mission to some extent, the mission was actually a cover for their real raison 
                                            
84 Lettieri and other authors use the terms pseudo-gangs, pseudo-insurgents, and pseudo-
terrorists interchangeably. 
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85 Lettieri, Dozer, Thompson, and other authors who have written extensively on the use of 
pseudo-gangs in Kenya and Rhodesia use the terms insurgent and terrorist interchangeably.  
d’etre: pseudo-gang operations.  After detailed intelligence preparation, a Scout 
team would enter an area in which terrorists were known or suspected to be 
operating.  The Scouts would establish contact with the local population in 
general, and specifically with terrorist “agents” within the local villages.  
Ultimately, the Scouts would meet and mingle with the terrorists; these meetings 
were either used to gather intelligence to allow other units to conduct direct-
action missions against the terrorists, or were exploited by the pseudo-gangs as 
opportunities for immediate ambushes (Lettieri, 2000).  The targets of pseudo-
gang deception were two-fold.  On one hand, the population of the villages was 
deceived to disrupt support for the terrorists.  On the other hand, the terrorists 
themselves were deceived in order to facilitate direct action missions against 
them. 
Rhodesian pseudo-gangs adopted a number of creative techniques 
to target terrorists.  On more than one occasion, Scout pseudo-gangs would 
denounce a known terrorist contact as a traitor to the terrorist cause and 
subsequently execute him in front of his entire village.  Since his fellow citizens 
invariably knew the terrorist contact to be a loyal and staunch terrorist supporter, 
the execution would cause incredible disillusionment and an erosion of popular 
support for the terrorists.  At other times, pseudo-gangs posing as either ZIPRA 
or ZANLA terrorists would attack forces of the other group.  This tactic virtually 
ensured that there would be a repeat clash the next time ZIPRA and ZANLA 
forces met.  In a somewhat more dubious tactic, the Scouts would sometimes 
call in an air strike or direct attack on a terrorist force as the force left a kraal 
(village).  According to Lettieri, “after two or three such occurrences the 
[terrorists] invariably suspected the kraal members of informing [Rhodesian] 
Security Forces of their presence.  In revenge, and to forestall any repetition, 
innocent kraal members were executed” (2000).  Almost without exception, this 
would put an end to any voluntary support that the terrorists could expect from 
the kraal. 
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While these pseudo-terrorist techniques proved effective in 
identifying and targeting terrorist groups and activities, they eventually incurred a 
substantial cost for the Rhodesian authorities.  As Lettieri concludes: 
In such operations the population inevitably became the 
battleground.  If adequate protection from the insurgents is not 
provided, pseudo operations cause the local population to be yet 
further alienated from the Security Forces.  In fact, the widespread 
use of such operations in Rhodesia trapped the local population 
between the two opposing sides: the insurgents on the one hand 
and the Security Forces posing as insurgents on the other (2001).   
In the end, the effect of these operations on the collective opinion of the 
population, coupled with the lack of a coherent counter-terrorism strategy, 
resulted in the negotiation of a political settlement to the insurgency that 
ultimately favored the terrorists. 
The Rhodesians, however, did not pioneer the use of pseudo-
gangs.  Rather, the concept was copied from British operations in Kenya during 
the Mau Mau uprising of the early 1950’s.  In the later stages of the Kenyan 
counter-insurgency campaign, the British Special Branch used pseudo-gangs to 
infiltrate and then kill or capture roving bands of terrorists.  British pseudo-gangs 
were typically led by white officers and consisted of loyal Kikuyu tribesmen, 
sometimes drawn from the tribal police or regular constables, and even turned 
Mau Mau.86  Moreover, pseudo-gangs often included women as members, since 
real Mau Mau gangs typically included female terrorists.  Like the real terrorists, 
the pseudo-gangs would call on villages at night for food, gathering information in 
the process.  According to Thompson (1988), this not only made it easier to pass 
as real Mau Mau, but was also the time that the real terrorists came calling.  In 
some cases, pseudo-gangs would use the confidence thus gained in order to 
arrest or ambush the terrorists.  The preferred course of action of Kenyan 
                                            
86 The British officers, Thompson recounts, used potassium permanganate solution to color their 
skin, wore wigs made from the hair of dead terrorists, and learned the Mau Mau ways of 
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pseudo-gangs, however, was to pass the intelligence gathered through this 
simple deception method to tracker-combat teams for direct-action missions.   
The British and Rhodesian use of pseudo-gangs is not the only 
case to be found.  Edward Lansdale describes the use of pseudo-gangs against 
the Huks in the Philippines in the 1950’s.  According to Lansdale, the Filipino’s 
trained and organized a company of Colonel Valeriano’s 7th BCT to pose as a 
Huk squadron.  The pseudo-Huks “lived in a jungle camp, barefoot, eating with 
their fingers out of community bowls, letting hair and beards grow, dressing as 
Huks, learning the pat phrases of dialectical materialism, and singing the 
enemy’s songs (Lansdale, 1991, p. 88).  Once employed in the field, the pseudo-
Huks were able to mingle with real Huk squadrons and get close enough to 
surprise the insurgents in close-quarters or hand-to-hand combat. 
Lansdale’s account of the pseudo-Huks reveals two potential risks 
of such operations.  First, a neighboring Filipino BCT, unaware that the pseudo-
Huks were operating in their area of operations, mistook the pseudo-Huks for 
real Huks and engaged them.  The lesson from this episode is that pseudo-gang 
deception operations require exceptionally close but covert coordination in order 
to prevent fratricide. Second, the Huks adopted the pseudo-Huk concept as their 
own, disguising a real Huk squadron as a Filipino BCT company.  This 
experiment proved to be short-lived.  Lansdale recounts, “On its first operation, 
[the real Huks] ran afoul of 7th BCT troops whose suspicions were aroused when 
these men in 7th BCT uniforms didn’t know passwords or countersigns” (1991, p. 
88).  After a brief and intense firefight, the disguised Huks withdrew.  
Unfortunately for the Huks, however, after retreating several kilometers, they met 
the real pseudo-Huks returning to their own camp.   After exchanging greetings 
and pleasantries, the two units realized the other’s true identities, and the Huks 
found themselves engaged again in a fierce fight.  After this encounter, both 
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squatting, eating, taking snuff, and other day to day activities.  In addition, each white officer in a 
pseudo-gang had a cover man or bodyguard assigned to draw attention away from him (1988). 
sides gradually dropped pseudo-gang deception operations.  Lansdale concludes 
that tighter safeguards on both sides made the operations increasingly difficult 
and decreasingly productive (p. 88).87 
The use of pseudo-gangs brings several potential risks or costs.  
First, according to Dozer, terrorists are likely to place greater emphasis on 
security.  While this is a desirable effect on the one hand, since terrorist 
efficiency and security tend to be inversely related, it may ultimately make 
pseudo-terrorist and other counter-terrorist operations much more difficult 
(Dozer, 2001).  Furthermore, there is the ever-present risk of fratricide against 
pseudo-terrorists.  Pseudo-operations, like any other deception, thus require 
considerable coordination or centralized control in order to avoid compromise or 
“friendly-fire.”  This second risk must be regarded as a constant risk of pseudo-
operations, but is conceivably acceptable when the benefits of the pseudo-
operations outweigh the potential cost.  Finally, there is, according to Dozer, the 
constant danger that pseudo-operations may be used as license of cover for 
transgression of the law.  If pseudo-terrorists fail to exercise extraordinary self-
discipline, terrorists or insurgents may ultimately gain considerable propaganda 
effects from exposing or exploiting pseudo-operations  (Dozer, 2001).  The use of 
pseudo-gangs is a new application of one of the oldest stratagems, and has been 
attempted in many conflicts both before and after the accounts mentioned here.  
In Northern Ireland, for example, the British attempted to form a pseudo-IRA 
effort; the attempt, however, was relatively unsuccessful and short-lived. 
In the end, the close relationships between the government forces 
and elements of the local population were clearly a factor in the ultimate success 
of the pseudo-gangs.  In Rhodesia, initial pseudo-gang members were loyal 
members of the Rhodesian army or police forces.  In Kenya, Kikuyu tribesmen 
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87 Before their use was halted, the pseudo-Huks were also used to gather information by 
“capturing” some in sham battles.  The captured pseudo-Huks were imprisoned with real Huks; 
when they were released from prison, the men invariably had gathered a great deal of information 
on Huk operations (Leites and Wolf, 1970, p. 144).  
with long-standing loyalty to the British colonial government formed the backbone 
of the pseudo-gangs.  In neither case is there a mention of pseudo-gang 
members betraying their comrades.  Filipino pseudo-gangs, in turn, were created 
from some of the best units of the Philippine Army, and had a similar reputation 
for loyalty.  It is unlikely, however, that future pseudo-gang operations would be 
as successful in operations against groups where barriers to social acceptance 
and local support for terrorists are high. 
D. DECEPTION TO CONCEAL CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS 
States have used deception throughout history to conceal their strategic, 
operational, & tactical capabilities and intentions.  In theory, deception can 
certainly be used in the same way against terrorists (Jones, 1979; Handel, 1982, 
p. 148).  Yet, of the three categories of deception against terrorists, deception to 
conceal capabilities and deceptions is the most difficult to comprehend.  Why 
should a state try to deceive terrorists about its intentions?  After all, the state’s 
ultimate goal is almost invariably to defeat terrorist opponents using any and all 
means available.  The ultimate goal of state deception of terrorists regarding 
capabilities and intentions is not, however, a case of attempting to conceal the 
state’s ultimate goal, but rather the state’s specific plan for combating the 
terrorists.  In particular, a state attempts to deceive terrorists regarding its 
strengths and weaknesses, specific means, and timetable for counter-terrorism 
operations. 
Michael Handel offers one way of looking at deceptions to cover strengths 
and weaknesses and specific means.  According to Michael Handel, these 
deceptions fall into two categories.  “The first is intended to create an 
exaggerated evaluation of capabilities in terms of both quantity and quality, the 
second attempts to conceal existing capabilities” (1982, p. 129).  The former type 
of bluff, Handel contends, is normally practiced by a relatively weak state that is 
trying to accomplish one of three ends: deter a more powerful adversary; 
translate an imaginative superiority in military capabilities into political gains; or 
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trying to gain enough time to close a dangerous capability gap (p. 129).  The 
second type of capability deception tries to hide a state’s real capabilities in order 
to create the impression that the state is incapable of executing certain offensive 
plans.  In many ways, such a deception is also an attempt to conceal intentions.  
This latter type of deception, Handel suggests, is more frequently attempted “by 
military leaders and military organizations whose standard operating procedures 
require secrecy and deception” (Handel, 1982, p. 132).  Handel concludes, “Both 
types of capability-oriented deceptions need not (particularly in wartime) be 
contradictory or mutually exclusive.  A state may wish simultaneously to conceal 
certain capabilities and inflate others” (1982, p. 129).88 
Maurice Tugwell, on the other hand, describes the concept behind 
deception to conceal a state’s timetable for counter-terrorist operations:  “Under 
such circumstances [when a state of war or conflict already exists and the 
intention to attack in one place or another is taken for granted],” he writes, 
“deception becomes much more important because it has to give the adversary 
the wrong expectation concerning one’s inevitable and known intention to take 
action” (Handel, 1982, p. 128). 
1. Capability And Intention Deception At Entebbe 
Michael Handel suggests that the Israelis used deception to conceal their 
capabilities and intentions to undertake the raid at Entebbe.  According to 
Handel: 
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88 The US, for example, may want to conceal certain capabilities and intentions while greatly 
exaggerating others in order to force terrorists to either “go to ground” or go deeper underground. 
It is perhaps little known that the preparations for the Israeli raid on 
Entebbe in July 1976 also included a deception plan intended to 
misdirect primarily the Americans, who were apparently watching 
by satellite.  The deception plan indicated (mainly through 
spreading rumors to the press) that the Israelis planned to launch a 
large-scale attack on PLO targets in the Lebanon in order to 
capture hostages who could be traded for the hijacked passengers 
in Entebbe.  As far as is known, this deception plan successfully 
directed attention away from the possibility of a direct raid on 
Entebbe itself.  The attack was a total surprise for everyone 
(Handel, 1982, p. 128). 
Handel’s allegation is certainly interesting.  Unfortunately, it is neither 
substantiated nor supported.  Moreover, the kind of deception Handel suggests 
was virtually unnecessary.  As McRaven points out, the Entebbe mission was 
only possible at the strategic level because the idea of rescuing hostages from a 
sovereign country so geographically removed was so improbable (1995, p. 376).  
McRaven notes, “The boldness of the plan created an environment in which 
surprise was possible.  As Shani said later, the raid was a total surprise, because 
‘nobody [thought] we were crazy enough to fly there’” (p. 376).   
Those facts notwithstanding, it certainly seems plausible that the Israelis 
could have used deception in the manner Handel suggests.  In the end, however, 
if true it is a case of one state deceiving another, and not of a state deceiving 
terrorists.  A much better example of such deception is the German 
announcement prior to the Mogadishu hostage rescue that GSG-9 had returned 
to West Germany. 
2. Soviet Capability And Intention Deceptions 
Superior but more obscure examples of the deliberate use of deception to 
conceal capabilities and intentions are found in Tugwell’s accounts of early 
Soviet deceptions such as Sindikat I and II.  Tugwell suggests that a common 
component of the Soviet deceptions of the period was concealment of Soviet 
capabilities and intentions:  
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Collectively, they can be viewed as survival exercises—operations 
to pre-empt possible threats to the young Bolshevik state.  The 
main targets were the émigré White Russians in West Europe, the 
United States, and Japan, who were still actively plotting to 
overthrow the regime; the governments and intelligence agencies in 
the host countries, some of which might assist émigré operations; 
and, at a more abstract level, the very notion that resistance to 
Communism could ever succeed (1990, p. 16). 
Sindikat II, for example, did not merely lure opposition leaders and agents 
back to their deaths.  In one instance, an opposition leader was unwittingly 
recruited to work for the Soviet Union.  Prominent émigré leader V V Shulkin was 
duped into making an “underground tour” of Russian opposition forces.  Shulkin’s 
visit was covertly facilitated by Soviet security, and resulted in a glowing report 
that was approved by the “Trust” (in actuality, Soviet security) and subsequently 
published in Berlin.  Shulkin’s report declared that Communism was on the way 
out in Russia and that the Soviet leaders were actually misunderstood 
nationalist-monarchs. This coincided with Dzerzhinskiy’s New Economic Policy, 
which portrayed a return to a form of free market economy within the Soviet 
Union.  By the time Operation Sindikat II concluded in 1927, the Soviets had 
achieved all of their original goals and then some: “internal and external 
opposition had been eliminated or mortally wounded, Western intelligence 
agencies had been humiliated, and any lingering hopes among Western 
governments that the Soviet regime might be overthrown were shattered” 
(Tugwell, 1990, p. 18).   
For the Soviets, deception was just one of the elements of kombinatsiya—
“the combining of operational undertakings in several times and places for 
maximum impact” (Tugwell, 1990, p. 18).  In addition to deception, kombinatsiya 
made use of provocation, penetration, diversion, fabrication, and influence.  
Kombinatsiya, in turn, concealed or misrepresented Soviet capabilities and 
intentions, presenting the direction and long-term implications of real or 
supposed changes within the Soviet Union in such a way that the deceptions’ 
target(s) ultimately acted to the advantage of the regime (p. 17).  The effects of 
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the deceptions were not limited to the terrorists themselves.  Western luminaries, 
including George Bernard Shaw, Bertolt Brecht, and Harold Laski were deceived 
by these kombinatsiya; in turn, they deceived their audiences with idealistic 
opinions and stories that were ultimately unfounded. 
3. Summary 
While there is, thus, evidence to suggest that deception to intentionally 
conceal capabilities and intentions from terrorists is a plausible application, the 
evidence is far less compelling—and ultimately more troubling, especially for a 
democratic society—than for the other uses of deception against non-state 
actors.  An analysis of the cases presented here suggests that deception to 
conceal capabilities and intentions is more often a by-product of other deception 
operations than it is a deliberate goal (see Table 7). 
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Table 6.   Assessment Of Deception To Conceal Capabilities And Intentions 
E. CONCLUSION 
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Deception to create and exploit organizational weaknesses and 
inefficiencies holds enormous potential.  Deception to facilitate counter-terrorist 
operations seems to occur routinely.  Finally, although the evidence is hardly 
substantial enough to be conclusive, deception to conceal a state’s capabilities 
and intentions seems to occur most frequently as a by-product of other 
operations. 
States have clearly used deception throughout history to gain a 
competitive advantage against terrorist opponents.  It is just as clear, however, 
that deception has not proven to be a “silver bullet,” guaranteed to work all of the 
time, to achieve the desired result, etc.  Quite to the contrary, it is evident that the 
use of deception against terrorists holds a number of potential costs and risks.  























V. THE COSTS AND RISKS OF DECEPTION 
On 18 February 1978, two gunmen entered the Hilton Hotel in Nicosia, 
Cyprus, and assassinated Yusuf el Sabai, editor of the Egyptian newspaper Al 
Ahram and secretary general of the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization.  
One of the terrorists pinned el Sabai to the floor of the hotel lobby with his knee 
and shot him three times in the head—killing him instantly.  Then, the terrorists 
took 30 hostages in the hotel’s restaurant, threatening to blow them up with 
grenades unless the Cypriot government flew them out of the country.  Among 
the hostages were the Moroccan, Sudanese, Syrian, Somali, Yemeni, PLO, and 
Lebanese Communist Party delegates to the AAPSO meeting (Mickolus, 1985, 
pp. 774-776). 
Deceiving Terrorists
Attempted Hostage Rescue, Larnaca, Cyprus, 18 FEB 78
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operations, open fire on Egyptian commandos, 




surrender to Cypriot 
National Guard
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Egypt with lying 













Map From Web Site Expedia.Com  
Figure 22.   Egyptian Hostage Rescue Attempt at Larnaca 
At 1400 that day, the terrorists agreed to release 12 hostages in return for 
safe transport to Larnaca airport.  Once at the airport, the terrorists released an 
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additional seven of the remaining hostages in exchange for a Cyprus Airways 
DC-8.  At 2030 that evening, the terrorists and their hostages, along with a four-
man volunteer crew, took off in to the Mediterranean night.  Once in the air, the 
terrorists were denied entry first by Libya, then by Kuwait, Somalia, and Ethiopia 
in rapid succession.  Yemen likewise refused the plane permission to land.  
Finally, Djibouti allowed the plane to land, but only to refuel and leave the 
country.  By 1730 the following afternoon, with Algeria having refused entry to the 
terrorists as well, the terrorists and their hostages were back in Larnaca, where 
the flight had begun. 
Once in Larnaca, talks between the terrorists and the Cypriot government 
resumed.  Bruce Hoffman describes what happened next: 
In the midst of negotiations between the Cypriot government and 
the two terrorists, an Egyptian C-130 landed at the airport, 
supposedly containing Egyptian government officials who would 
assist in the negotiations.  Instead, the plane contained 100 
commandos, who burst out of the aircraft and proceeded to attack 
the Cypriot DC-8.  Cypriot National Guardsmen and a team of 
Palestinian commandos sent by PLO leader Yasir Arafat to assist 
the Cypriots opened fire on the Egyptian commandos, killing 15 and 
wounding 16 (1985, p. 57). 
Despite what was—up until the moment of assault—a successful 
deception, the hostage-rescue mission proved a complete failure for the 
Egyptians.  The Egyptian commandos were thoroughly routed.  The terrorists 
immediately surrendered to the Cypriot National Guardsmen.  Cyprus angrily 
claimed that the Egyptians had deceived them about the fact that the C-130 
carried commandos instead of the expected negotiators.  Egypt immediately 
countered that they had, in fact, informed the Cypriots of the rescue attempt, only 
to recant the next day and admit that they failed to notify the Cypriots because 
they feared a leak.  Cyprus responded that a tentative surrender had already 
been negotiated.  Cyprus rejected Egypt’s extradition request, and the nations 
suspended diplomatic relations two days later. 
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Many of those who study about and write on deception suggest that 
deception is cheap.  Michael Handel, for example, observes that deception “is 
neither labor- nor capital-intensive.  It is among the least expensive types of 
modern intelligence work yet yields a high return for a relatively small investment” 
(1982, p. 143).  As a result, he recommends that deception should be included in 
virtually all operations: “Rationality dictates that a move which involves little cost 
and little risk of failure should always be included in one’s repertoire (p. 144).  
The case of the failed hostage rescue at Larnaca, however, suggests that 
deception is not without certain risks and costs.  In fact, one of the least explored 
aspects of deception concerns those characteristics and the impact they have on 
those who endeavor to deceive.  
This chapter considers the costs and risks of deception, beginning with a 
general discussion of those costs and risks.  Once the discussion of risks and 
costs is concluded, this chapter turns to a closely related subject: the legal cases 
for deception.  The second section of this chapter outlines the legal 
considerations concerning the use of deception in general, and its application 
against terrorists in particular.  Then, the section turns to the subject of the ethics 
of deception.  A general framework for analyzing the ethics of deception 
operations is offered; this framework is subsequently applied to some of the 
cases already discussed in this thesis. 
A. COSTS AND RISKS OF DECEPTION 
Although costs and risks might appear at first to be one and the same, 
there is in fact a distinction between the two.  A deception cost, on the one hand, 
is an expenditure that may be incurred as a result of undertaking deception.  A 
deception risk, on the other hand, is a chance of injury, damage, or loss as a 
result of undertaking deception.  Costs are almost certain to arise, although they 
are by no means guaranteed; risks are less certain to arise, consisting more of 
potentially adverse outcomes.  There are six general categories of deception 
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costs, as well as four general categories of deception risks.  The next sections 
explore these risks and costs. 
1. Deception Costs 
The costs that states may incur through the use of deception fall into six 
general categories: time, resources, flexibility, intelligence, coordination, and 
reputation.  The first category, time, is generally overlooked as a potential cost of 
deception, despite the fact that the decision to resort to deception generally 
incurs some time cost for the deceiver.  As noted in Chapter II, decision-makers 
must approve a deception, planners must design it, and the “transmitters” must 
send the appropriate signals to the enemy.  On the target’s side, receivers must 
observe the signals; analysts must determine what those signals mean (putting 
the deception story together); gatekeepers must screen the information and pass 
it on to decision-makers.  Once the deception reaches enemy decision-makers, a 
decision must be made and specific actions ordered.   It takes some amount of 
time, in turn, for those actions to occur, and more time still for the deceiver to 
gather feedback on whether the deception is working.   
For a tactical deception, these steps may take a very short time—no more 
than a few days.  For a strategic deception, on the other hand, the deception may 
take months or even years to develop and to produce results.  Generally 
speaking, the deceiver has more time at the strategic level.  However, if the 
deceiver’s situation compels him to take action immediately—to forestall a 
particular enemy course of action, for example, or to facilitate a planned 
operation—the time costs of an elaborate deception may make deception too 
expensive a course of action. 
The second category of deception costs concerns resources.  Despite the 
assertion of Handel and others that deception is a relatively cheap course of 
action insofar as resources are concerned, the decision to employ deception 
nonetheless imposes some resource costs on those who undertake it.  Chapter II 
suggested that competition for finite resources is a dilemma that every 
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commander faces at one point or another.  Even for a resource-rich nation such 
as the United States, there are rarely enough resources for a decision-maker or 
commander to do all that he needs or would like to do.  As John Van Vleet points 
out, “Competition for resources…is such that the requirements [to carry out 
deception] will have to be filled using the existing force structure.  Any proposal 
for how to do that will have significant drawbacks and will produce many reasons 
that it cannot be done” (Van Vleet, p. 229).  Deception operations invariably draw 
resources away from other missions and operations.  Deception thus generally 
incurs some resource cost on those who undertake it.   
The third category of deception costs concerns flexibility costs.  At an 
operational or tactical level, commitment to a deception operation generally 
commits leaders and decision-makers to a particular course of action.  This is not 
merely because the deception supports one particular course of action, but 
because the allocation of resources to the deception operation may preclude 
other operational courses of action.  At a strategic or grand strategic level, on the 
other hand, commitment to a deception operation may reduce the political and 
diplomatic options available to decision-makers, force them to take certain 
actions to support the deception, and preclude the pursuit of other activities 
which might expose the deception or reveal the dissimulated course of action.   
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The fourth and fifth categories of deception costs, respectively, are 
intelligence and coordination costs.  These costs, and their impact on the 
success of deception, were also covered in significant detail in Chapter II.  
Intelligence, for example, must perform five critical roles in the planning and 
conduct of deception.  First, intelligence must identify adversary decision-makers 
and assess their vulnerability to deception.  Second, intelligence must determine 
the adversary’s preconceptions of friendly capabilities and possible courses of 
action.  Third, intelligence must produce estimates of adversary actions under 
various friendly actual and deception scenarios.  Fourth, intelligence must identify 
adversary information gathering capabilities and communication systems to 
determine the best conduits for a particular deception.  Finally, intelligence must 
assist in the establishment and monitoring of feedback channels to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the deception operation by observation of the adversary’s 
reaction.   Because these basic intelligence tasks must be undertaken in order 
for deception to succeed, intelligence is, therefore, a necessary cost of deception 
(JP 3-58, 1996, p. II-2-3; Sherwin, 1982, pp. 79-80). 
Coordination is also a necessity for successful deception—and may be 
costly.  As Chapter II made clear, detailed coordination—along with centralized 
control—contributes to successful deception by facilitating mutual support 
between deceptions and actual operations (Fowler and Nesbit, 1995, p. 44).  
This mutual support subsequently contributes to the likelihood of success by 
insuring against compromise of the deception, by facilitating protection of limited 
resources, and by facilitating positive control (Godson and Wirtz, 2000, p. 426; 
Van Vleet, 1985, p. 19).  Undertaking deception, therefore, incurs a coordination 
cost on the state that chooses to use it. 
The final category of deception costs, however, is one not yet mentioned 
anywhere else in this thesis; it concerns the reputation of the deceiver.  Damage 
to the deceiver’s reputation is always a potential cost of deception.  It is, 
however, less certain to be incurred than the other costs of deception.  Nowhere 
is this potential cost felt more acutely for the deceiver than on the domestic front.  
As the noted ethicist Sissela Bok observes in her commentary on lying to 
enemies, “all too often, the lie directed at adversaries is a lie to friends as well; 
and when it is discovered, as some always are, the costs are high” (1999, p. 
141).  Maurice Tugwell echoes and elaborates on Bok’s simple observation.  On 
the domestic front, Tugwell suggests, 
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[The] dichotomy between ethics and practice can have serious 
consequences when deception fails, or [even] when it is 
discovered.  This is particularly so when, as these cases reveal, the 
domestic audience becomes one of the primary targets of a 
deception.  While the immediate embarrassment of the perpetrator 
may be short-lived, the long-term consequences may be much 
more serious: the erosion of public confidence and trust in elected 
officials which is essential to a healthy democracy (Tugwell, 1990, 
p. 265). 
 
Costs to the deceiver’s reputation are potentially substantial on the 
international front as well.  “Trust,” Tugwell suggests, “is the first casualty of 
deception on the international front” (1990, p. 405).  Failed or discovered 
deception, according to Tugwell, invariably erodes whatever trust exists between 
nations.  “Without trust,” he asks, “how can relations between blocs, states, or 
individuals be anything other than a state of undeclared war (Tugwell, 1990, p. 
405)?   
While there is a certain common sense to Tugwell’s statement, it must be 
placed in context, however.  States are rarely completely forthcoming in their 
interactions with each other.  Some minimum threshold level of espionage, 
deception, and gamesmanship is an inherent part of the relationship between 
nations.  The case of the failed Egyptian rescue attempt at Larnaca, however, 
illustrates that some deceptions, as well as the operations that they cover, may 
cross that threshold and incur a high cost for the nation that is discovered.    
2. Deception Risks 
While costs are almost certain to arise from the use of deception, risks are 
less certain.  Risks more accurately correspond with potential adverse outcomes 
of deception.  There are four basic categories of deception risks: deception 
failure; exposure or blowback; unintended consequences; and third party actions 
(see Table 8). 
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 Deception Failure 
The message is lost in transmission and never reaches the target 
A competing signal or noise overwhelms the message in transmission 
The “clue” is modified or garbled in the channel; the target receives a 
different signal 
The transmission is received but competing signal(s) overwhelm it in 
interpretation and replace it 
Target receives the transmission but analysts garble the interpretation 
Analysts receive and interpret signal correctly but dismiss the message 
as trivial or irrelevant 
The transmission is received and interpreted correctly but a gatekeeper 
prevents it from reaching the decision-maker 
Exposure or Blowback 
Media may discover and expose deception operation prior to execution 
Media or other parties may expose deception after the fact 
Unintended Consequences 
Target receives and interprets signal correctly but the decision-maker 
ignores it 
Target decision-maker receives and interprets the signal as intended but 
takes an altogether unintended action 
Unintended targets on the deceiver’s side may receive deception message 
and take action as a result 
Third-Party Risks 
Third parties receive deception signal and take unintended action 
Third parties interfere with target taking desired action 
Table 7.   Summary of Potential Deception Risks89 
As with any operation, failure is always a risk attendant to deception.  
Even with the perfectly executed deception, there is no guarantee of success, 
even though all of the success factors are present.  Deceptions fail for any 
number of reasons.   One common source of deception failure, as Robert Jervis 
points out, is improper crafting of the deception message: “Deception that is too 
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89 Like the list of potential deception outcomes, this list is not exhaustive; rather, it merely 
illustrates the range of potential deception risks. 
sophisticated and elegant may be intellectually satisfying to those who create it, 
but may not be picked up by the intended victim” (Handel, 1982, p. 134).  Handel 
expands on Jervis’s observation:  
There is an obvious danger that the message developed by the 
deception planners is understood by them in the context of the 
endless meetings in which alternatives were weighed and details 
worked out.  They are so familiar with their own thinking that they 
risk overlooking the degree to which the message is clear only to 
them only because they know what to look for (Handel, 1982, pp. 
134-135). 
Yet deceptions fail for other reasons as well, as the preceding figure illustrates.  
Sometimes, the target either simply fails to pick up the signals that comprise the 
intended message or sees through them.  At other times, the cacophony of 
competing noise prevents the target from paying proper attention to the 
message.  Furthermore, the deception message may be received and may be 
believable, but it may be ignored nonetheless at some level of the target’s 
hierarchy. 
The second deception risk is exposure or blowback.  Simply put, the 
discovery of deception may cause a backlash against the deceiver. This may or 
may not cause the deception to fail, but virtually always results in unwanted 
attention or pressure.90  One example of deception blowback is the American 
attempt to destabilize the Libyan regime of Moammar Gadhafi and end Libyan 
sponsorship of terrorism in 1986.  When the American media discovered that not 
only was there a plot, but that they had been used to unknowingly perpetrate the 
deception, the resulting blowback was immense (Walcott, 1986, p. A1; Tugwell, 
1990, pp. 403-404).91  Tugwell suggests that exposure or blowback is more likely 
to occur in and to open, democratic nations than in closed ones (Tugwell, 1990, 
pp. 403-404). 
                                            
90 This is closely related to the potential deception cost of reputation. 
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Unintended consequences are another potential deception risk.  
Unintended consequences, in turn, can be classified into two categories—friendly 
and enemy.  Chapter II suggested two potential enemy unintended 
consequences.  On the one hand, the target may receive and interpret the 
deception correctly, only to have the decision-maker ignore the message for one 
reason or another.  Alternately, the target may receive and interpret the 
deception correctly, but the message may prompt the decision-maker to take 
unintended actions (Herbig and Daniel, 1981, pp. 28-32).  Moreover, the target 
may redouble its own efforts as a result of the deception and end up in a position 
of strength relative to the deceiver (Handel, 1982, p. 132).92  In short, even if the 
target “buys” the deception message, he may do something entirely different than 
what the deceiver wants and intends, something ultimately detrimental to the 
deceiver.  Furthermore, even if the target understands and does what the 
deceiver intends for him to do, he may take some long-term action that works in 
his favor and against the deceiver.  The IRA reorganization following the Prison 
Sting is one such example of a long-term unintended consequence.   
Unintended consequences on the part of the target are not the only risk to 
the deceiver.  Unintended consequences also occur when the deceiver is 
seduced by his own deception.  The risk of falling for one’s own deceptions is not 
a simple matter of believing in one’s own capabilities even though one should 
know better.  In some cases, it is a matter of one hand not knowing what the 
other is doing, as Tugwell points out: 
                                                                                                                                  
91 The paradox of blowback is that the risk is generally strategic, even if the deception itself is not.  
The blowback from the Egyptian operational deception at Larnaca certainly occurred on a 
strategic, even though the deception was a simple, tactical one. 
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92 The British development of a strong defensive air force as a result of German strategic 
deception in the 1930’s is a classic example of this unintended consequence (Mihalka, 1980).  
When war ultimately broke out, the British won the Battle of Britain as a long-term result of the 
German deception. 
Moreover, these [propaganda & deception] activities may have 
complicated the intelligence analysis process; on more than one 
occasion OSS-planted disinformation rumours [sic] were picked up 
by Allied intelligence, which was unaware of the original source of 
the information.  This kind of blow-back is a risk inherent in 
deception operations where co-ordination [sic] is poor, as was 
sometimes the case during [WW II] (Tugwell, 1990, p. 270). 
 
The final category of deception risks is third party actions (Jervis, 1968, p. 
476).  As pointed out in Chapter II, even if all goes well in the exchange between 
deceiver and target, third parties may take actions that cause a deception to fail 
or to be altered.  On the one hand, third parties may interject their own messages 
that interrupt, overwhelm, modify, or contradict the deceiver’s signals.  Moreover, 
third parties may see through and unmask the deception either intentionally or 
unintentionally.  Finally, third parties may be deceived themselves and take 
unintended actions as a result (Reese, 1982, pp. 99-102; Moose, 1982, pp. 137-
138).  The actions of the Cypriot National Guard during the attempted hostage 
rescue at Larnaca illustrate the potential for third party actions to either undo the 
deception or render it useless. 
B. THE RIGHT AND WRONG OF DECEPTION 
Serious consideration of the topic of deception should, at a minimum, 
address the basic legal and ethical questions to which deception gives rise.  Is 
deception legal?  Is deception ethical?  What ethical argument exists to justify 
deception?  This section offers a brief examination of these questions. 
1. The Legal Status of Deception 
In general, the use of deception by states as a tool of armed conflict is 
legally permissible under the provisions of the Geneva Conventions, albeit within 
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certain guidelines.93  Specifically, Protocol I of the Conventions, relating to the 
“Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,” allows: 
Ruses of war are not prohibited.  Such ruses are acts which are 
intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly 
but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed 
conflict and which are not perfidious because they do not invite the 
confidence of an adversary with respect to protection under that 
law.  The following are examples of such ruses: the use of 
camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation (Protocol 
1, Art. 37). 
What is not legally permissible, according to Protocol I, are perfidious acts.  
The Protocol defines perfidy as “acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to 
lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or obliged to accord, protection under 
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that 
confidence…” (Protocol I, Art. 37).  Conspicuously perfidious acts include 
feigning intent to negotiate under a flag of truce or surrender, feigning 
incapacitation by wounds or sickness, feigning civilian or other non-combatant 
status, or feigning protected status through the use of signs, emblems, or 
uniforms of “neutral” organizations such as the United Nations or the 
International Committee for the Red Cross (Protocol I, Arts. 37-39).  Moreover, 
under the 1977 Protocol, the use of “the flags or military emblems, insignia or 
uniforms of adverse parties while engaging in attacks or in order to shield, favour, 
protect, or impede military operations” is also prohibited (Protocol I, Art. 39).   
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93 There is not simply one Geneva Convention.  In fact, the first Geneva Convention was signed 
in 1864 to cover the subject of sick and wounded in war.  Two conventions were signed in 1899, 
concerning asphyxiating gases and expanding bullets.  Thirteen treaties covering a variety of 
subjects were signed in 1907.  The Geneva Gas Protocol was added in 1925, covering the use of 
poison gas and bacteriological warfare.  Two more conventions were adopted in 1929 to deal with 
treatment of wounded and prisoners of war.  In 1949, four new conventions were added to extend 
protections to civilians and to those shipwrecked at sea.  Since that time, two additional 
conventions and two protocols have been included.  In most contexts, the common term Geneva 
Convention thus includes the vast body of international law and treaties on the conduct of armed 
conflict (see Society of Professional Journalists Web site: http://www.the-
spa.com/genevaconventions/history.html).  
The Department of Defense’s Operational Law Handbook elaborates on 
the distinction between lawful deception and perfidy, offering several useful 
examples in the process: 
Protocol I, Art. 37 prohibits belligerents from killing, injuring, or 
capturing an adversary by perfidy.  The essence of this offense lies 
in acts designed to gain advantage by falsely convincing the 
adversary that applicable rules of international law prevent 
engaging the target when in fact they do not.  The use of enemy 
codes and signals is a time-honored means of tactical deception.  
However, misuse of distress signals or of signals exclusively 
reserved for the use of medical aircraft would be perfidious.  The 
use of deception measures to thwart precision guided munitions 
would be allowed, while falsely convincing the enemy not to attack 
a military target by evidence that it was a hospital would be 
perfidious (Meyer and Bill, 2001, p. 358). 
 
These distinctions can be used as a basic test to analyze some of the 
cases presented to this point.  Under international conventions, the actions of 
Israeli commandos posing as Red Cross officials in order to facilitate hostage-
rescue operations are not, in isolation, perfidious.  On the other hand, Israeli 
commandos posing as Red Cross officials and actually taking part as “shooters” 
in the hostage-rescue and killing or wounding the hijackers appears to be 
perfidious.  In a similar manner, Selous Scouts acting as pseudo-terrorists in 
order to gather information later used to take direct-action against terrorists is not 
a case of perfidy (Meyer and Bill, 2001, p. 20).  On the other hand, Selous 
Scouts posing as FRELIMO soldiers in order to gain access to a terrorist training 
camp and subsequently raiding that training camp while still dressed as 
FRELIMO soldiers is a fairly clear case of perfidy (Meyer and Bill, 2001, p. 20; 
Protocol I, Art. 37). 
While these simple distinctions are fairly clear, the waters become 
muddied in the case of conflict between a state and a terrorist group.  According 
to the Operational Law Handbook, “terrorists, by definition, do not meet the four 
requirements necessary for combatant status” (Meyer and Bill, 2001, p. 314).  
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Since terrorists are not legal combatants, the international conventions that 
govern armed conflict theoretically no longer bind the state that is compelled to 
respond to terrorism with force.  Generally speaking, terrorists do not wear 
uniforms or other distinctive insignia; neither do they carry arms openly.  
Moreover, terrorists are not presumed to be under the command of a person 
legally responsible for group actions.  Finally, terrorists generally do not conduct 
their operations in accordance with the international laws of armed conflict.  Still, 
US policy is to “apply the ‘principles and spirit’ of the Law of War” to the conduct 
of its own soldiers, regardless of the nature of the enemy or the applicability of 
the Law of War (Meyer and Bill, 2001, p. 10).  As an example, soldiers taking part 
in peacekeeping operations do not, technically, have to follow the laws of armed 
conflict; nonetheless, the US generally requires its soldiers to follow those laws. 
From these seemingly conflicting viewpoints, two conclusions can be 
drawn.  First, state deception against terrorists, like state deception against other 
states, is generally legal (Personal communication with Colonel Jim Coyne, Staff 
Judge Advocate, V Corps, USAREUR, 23 October 2001).  Second, while 
perfidious acts against terrorists are not technically illegal, for Americans at least, 
the same body of law that governs armed interstate conflict generally guides the 
practice of deception against terrorists.   
2. The Ethical Status of Deception 
Because something is legal, however, doesn’t make it ethical.  Certainly, 
segregation of African-Americans in the United States was legal in many states 
in the years prior to the 1960’s.  Just as certainly, however, those laws were 
unethical.  That this paradox exists between legality and ethics compels us to 
look more closely at whether deception is, in fact, ethical. 
Maurice Tugwell is one of the few serious researchers of deception who 
addresses its ethical status in any way.  According to Tugwell: 
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On the one hand, there are strong ethical strictures against 
deception, rooted in the West’s religious teachings and moral 
philosophy.  The Ninth Commandment, for example, states clearly, 
‘Thou shalt not bear false witness…’ Yet it is equally clear that 
deception has a long history in the West, dating from classical 
times.  The writings of Francis Bacon, Edmund Burke, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, and Lewis Carroll attest—in their criticism of 
deception—to its longevity and persistent presence in political life.  
In this century, its use has spread from party politics to business 
and advertising and to war and diplomacy.  Western democracies 
have resorted to deception readily in time of war, and with only 
slightly less enthusiasm in the ‘Cold War’.  In short, insofar as 
Western experience is concerned, ideals are one thing, practical 
affairs are somewhat different (Tugwell, 1990, p. 265). 
Tugwell’s insight is a starting point for thinking about the ethical status of 
deception, although more is needed.  Deception must be held up to the 
magnifying glass of ethical decision-making in some way.  Thus, let us take for a 
moment the viewpoint of one well-known ethicist.  Rushworth M. Kidder, the 
author of How Good People Make Tough Choices, suggests “an orderly 
sequence for dealing with the admittedly disorderly and sometimes downright 
confusing domains of ethical issues” (1995, p. 183).  Kidder’s nine-step 
framework holds promise as a tool for analyzing the ethical status of deception.   
The first set in making an ethical decision, according to Kidder, is to 
recognize that there is a moral issue (1995, p. 183).  This step requires a 
decision-maker to identify the issues needing attention, rather than brushing past 
them without consideration.  Moreover, it requires the decision-maker to sift 
genuine ethical questions from those that merely involve social conventions.  The 
second step, in turn, is to determine the actor—that person or entity responsible 
for making the decision on the issue at hand (p. 183).  The third step, then, is to 
gather the relevant facts.  As Kidder points out, “ethics does not happen in a 
theoretical vacuum but in the push and pull of real experience, where details 
determine motives and character is reflected in context” (pp. 183-184).   
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The next step in the ethical decision-making framework, according to 
Kidder, is to test for right-versus-wrong issues (1995, p. 184).  The first test of 
right-versus-wrong is legal; that is, is the law clear on the question at hand?   If 
the choice is, indeed, one between right and wrong, legal and illegal, then there 
is no ethical dilemma.94  If the law is not clear on the question at hand, however, 
Kidder suggests three tests to help determine the proper course of action.  The 
first is rule-based reasoning, or what Kidder refers to as the “stench test.”  Kidder 
advises that if an action “just smells wrong,” in a visceral sense, it probably is the 
wrong ethical decision.  The second test is ends-based reasoning, which looks to 
consequences as a decision factor.  Kidder refers to this test as the “front-page 
test.”  This test asks the decision-maker to judge the “right” course of action 
according to how he would feel if the decision were to become public, front-page 
material.  The final test is care-based reasoning, something Kidder describes as 
the “Mom test.”  The focus, according to Kidder, is what choice the decision-
maker thinks his mother or some similar moral exemplar who cares deeply about 
the decision-maker would choose (pp. 184-185).  If an issue fails these tests, 
Kidder offers, “there’s no point going on to the following steps.  Since you’re 
dealing with a right-versus-wrong issue, any further elaboration of the process 
will probably amount to little more than an effort to justify an unconscionable act” 
(p. 185). 
If the issue facing the decision-maker passes the right-versus-wrong tests, 
the next step is to test for right-versus-right paradigms.  Based on a broad survey 
of various schools of ethical thought, Kidder suggests four ethical dilemma 
paradigms: truth-versus-loyalty; self-versus-community, short-term-versus-long-
term; and justice-versus-mercy.  The reason for identifying the applicable 
paradigm is not merely an academic exercise; rather, the decision should bring 
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94 Even if an ethical question passes the initial legal test, the decision-maker should at least 
consider the following steps.  After all, as the segregation example points out, just because 
something is legal doesn’t make it “right.” 
the dilemma into a decidedly sharper focus, particularly if it pits two deeply held 
values against each other (Kidder, 1995, p. 185). 
Once the dilemma has been brought into focus, the next step is to apply 
the resolution principles of classical ethical thought: the ends-based or utilitarian 
principle; the rule-based or Kantian principle; and the care-based or Golden Rule 
principle (Kidder, 1995, p. 185).  The goal in this step is to determine which of the 
three seems most relevant and persuasive to the question at hand. 
After that, the next step is to investigate the “trilemma” option.  
Specifically, this step, which may actually be called into play anywhere in the 
nine-step process, asks if there is a third way through the dilemma.  The third 
way out, if present, may either be the result of a compromise between the 
principles at play or the result of a creative course of action that comes to light 
during consideration of the issue (Kidder, 1995, pp. 185-186). 
Once these steps are complete, the subsequent step is to make the 
decision.  This step is the critical link between analysis and action, and between 
the theoretical and the practical (Kidder, 1995, p. 186).  Finally, Kidder suggest 
that the decision-maker return to the question once the issue has settled 
somewhat, reviewing the question and seeking the lessons that will build 
expertise, adjust the moral compass, and provide new examples for moral 
discourse and discussion (p. 186). 
When applied to the subject of deception of terrorists in general, Kidder’s 
framework reveals little.  In a general sense, we have already seen that 
deception is legal.  However, too many key details necessary to frame the 
questions and apply the right-versus-right paradigm and resolution principles are 
missing to grant blanket ethical approval to deception against terrorists.95  
The framework is valuable on a case-by-case basis, however, for 
determining whether a particular deception operation is ethical.  The Egyptian 
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deception operation in support of the attempted hostage-rescue at Larnaca, for 
example, fails at the right-versus-wrong step of Kidder’s framework for two 
reasons.  First, the failure of the Egyptians to “read in” the Cypriots on the plan, 
while understandable, violated the sovereignty of the state of Cyprus.  In 
contrast, the German notification of the Somali government, admittedly a 
calculated risk, respected the sovereignty of the Somalis.96  Second, the 
portrayal of commandos as negotiators, although not expressly forbidden by 
international law, tends to violate the good faith principle that underlies that body 
of law.  In contrast, the Fawaz Yunis affair passes the ethical test.  Not only was 
the operation legal, but the real ethical question—whether to employ Jamal 
Hamdan to deceive Yunis—was justifiable under the right-versus-right paradigms 
and the utilitarian resolution principles.  The framework thus offers one tool for 
resolving ethical questions regarding the use of deception in specific cases 
against terrorists. 
C. SUMMARY 
The observations of Whaley, et al, suggest that deception generally is a 
low-cost, low-risk undertaking.  This, however, is not always the case, as this 
chapter shows.  The potential costs and risks of deception operations are 
substantial.  In many ways, deception, even if successful, may result in a high 
price for the state that chooses to use it.  Still, though, conflict itself is an 
expensive business.  There are risks and costs attendant to virtually every action 
that a state takes in armed conflict, even in armed conflict with terrorists.  For this 
reason, those who choose to employ deception as a tool against either state or 
non-state actors should strive to gain an appreciation of the risks and costs that a 
                                                                                                                                  
95 This does not imply that deception versus terrorists, while legal, is unethical in most cases; it 
merely suggests that more information is usually necessary to make a valid ethical decision. 
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96 One common cognitive bias is the false analogy.  In keeping with that bias, it is tempting to use 
the example cited here to question the Israeli operation at Entebbe.  After all, the Israelis did not 
have Ugandan permission to conduct the operation.  In fact, however, the complicity of the 
Ugandans in the terrorist operation changes the facts of the case entirely, negating the legal 
consideration of sovereignty. 
particular deception course of action will incur relative to the benefits that 
deception is likely to provide.   
Moreover, careful consideration should be given to whether a particular 
deception is, in fact, legal, and whether it is ethical.  The framework offered here 
is only one means of making that decision regarding the legality and ethics of a 













































VI. CONCLUSION  
“…A peaceful, gain-loving nation is not far-sighted, and far-sightedness is 
needed for adequate military preparation, especially in these days.” 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, 1894 
A. SYNOPSIS 
This thesis addresses one means available to states for dealing with 
terrorists.  The study began by exploring the body of theoretical literature in order 
to establish the foundation necessary for a discussion of deception.  Deception 
was defined as those actions taken during periods of conflict or intense 
international competition to deliberately confuse or mislead enemy decision-
makers, with the ultimate goal of gaining a decisive advantage by provoking a 
specific action (or the lack thereof) on the adversary’s part.  Furthermore, 
deception was distinguished from related activities such as PSYOPS, 
propaganda, OPSEC, and camouflage. 
Next, the thesis examined the six reasons that states use deception in 
interstate conflict.  In particular, the study found that states employ deception 
during periods of armed conflict in order to gain or maintain surprise, to create 
conditions favorable to victory, and to reduce risks and costs.  It also 
demonstrated that states use deception in situations short of armed conflict in 
order to mobilize groups and to protect legitimacy.  Finally, it noted that there is 
considerable evidence that states use deception in periods of both war and 
peace to conceal capabilities and intentions.  From this list, three potential uses 
of deception against terrorist were suggested.  Specifically, the thesis proposed 
that states use deception to create and exploit organizational inefficiencies and 
weaknesses in terrorist organizations, facilitate counter-terrorist operations, and 
conceal counter-terrorist capabilities and intentions. Subsequently, the cases 
presented in this thesis illustrated that deception has enormous potential as one 
tool to deal with terrorists.  In particular, they revealed that states have in fact 
successfully used deception in the past to create and exploit organizational 
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inefficiencies and weaknesses in terrorist organizations, facilitate counter-terrorist 
operations, and conceal counter-terrorist capabilities and intentions.   
The examination of deception against terrorists was prefaced with a look 
at the rise of terrorist networks, a trend that holds unusual significance for 
counter-terrorism.  From this brief appraisal, a number of implications, both for 
counter-terrorism in general and for deception against terrorists in particular, 
were offered.  
Finally, this thesis also explored two areas that normally receive little 
attention in typical anecdotal studies of deception.  First, it explored the analytical 
works of deception observers from a number of different academic backgrounds.  
The resulting multidisciplinary approach afforded a unique glimpse into how 
deception works and suggested a number of factors necessary for successful 
deception.  Second, this thesis addressed the often-overlooked subject of risks 
and costs, demonstrating that the use of deception is almost never without 
expense.  Even when deception succeeds, its use inevitably incurs costs and 
opens the door to certain risks.  Moreover, the study showed that deception—
while both legal and ethical in the larger sense—might be illegal or unethical in 
certain applications. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis shows that deception is, indeed, a valuable tool against 
terrorists.  It is necessary, however, to emphasize four additional conclusions in 
this closing chapter.   
First, the likelihood of achieving successful deception depends on four 
success factors: centralized control, coordination, and integration; intelligence; 
adaptability and feedback; and plausibility and confirmation.  These success 
factors can be viewed in much the same way as McRaven’s six principles of 
special operations.  All are present to some extent in successful deceptions; 
however, the importance of each varies in relation to the situation.  Although 
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there is no magic formula that can be applied to deception, the success factors 
can be viewed as four pillars on which every deception should be founded. 
Second, the “right” application of deception depends on the situation. The 
cases presented here seemed to suggest that each potential use of deception 
against terrorists may be more beneficial at certain levels of application than 
others.  Judging solely on the basis of these cases, the organizational 
application—deception to create and exploit organizational inefficiencies and 
weaknesses in terrorist organizations—seems to have the greatest potential 
utility at the operational level and above.97  The operational applications of 
deception, on the other hand—particularly deception to facilitate counter-terrorist 
operations—seem to have the greatest utility at the operational level and below.  
Furthermore, the cases suggest that the third application—deception to conceal 
capabilities and intentions—occurs most frequently in subordination to and 
support of the other applications.98  These observations do not imply that each 
application of deception only works at certain levels, but rather that their effects 
seem to be best applied at certain levels. 
Third, there is a great danger in seeing each opportunity for a counter-
terrorist operation as a nail, and deception as a hammer.  As Chapter V 
demonstrated, costs and risks may occasionally outweigh the benefits of 
deception.  While deception creates opportunities where none previously existed, 
it invariably closes the doors to other options at the same time.  The decision-
makers who appoint and approve the use of deception, particularly deception 
against terrorists, should understand and weigh the potential costs and risks in 
relation to the benefits that deception promises.99  That cost-benefit calculus 
                                            
97 The Filipino examples, however, demonstrate that the utility of this application in the hands of 
skilled deception practitioners is not limited to the strategic and operational levels. 
98 For example, the United States government should want its terrorist enemies to know that they 
will be hunted down and brought to justice for their actions.  It should, however, conceal its plans 
for doing so, in order to achieve maximum effect with its counter-terrorist measures, be they 
deception, direct action, diplomatic initiatives, asset seizure, or any other host of options. 
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99 The cost and risk analysis itself should address at least four questions.  First, what is the risk 
and result of discovery?  Second, what will the deception make the enemy do, and what happens 
should invariably include consideration of the ethical and legal status of 
deception within the context of the situation.   
Finally, deception has the potential to be very complex.  Skillful deception 
thus requires knowledgeable execution.  Some researchers have suggested that 
deception should be institutionalized, either by creating formal organizations to 
conduct it, or by designating a professional cadre whose expertise is deception.  
While recognizing both the logic behind and the potential value of these 
recommendations, the author of this thesis stops short of endorsing either.  On 
the first point, professional institutions have a tendency over time to move away 
from a collective mindset that favors innovation toward a mindset that avoids risk.  
Yet, innovation is a key component of successful deception.  Over time, a 
deception organization—like any organization—would have the tendency to 
succumb to the organizational propensity toward bureaucracy; consequently, the 
organization’s effectiveness would have the potential to decline to the point that it 
would outlive its usefulness.  As to the second point, an individual whose focus is 
solely deception will rarely have the access to decision-makers that he needs to 
be of real value.  Often, he will only be summoned when those above him see no 
other way.  What is needed, in contrast to these two courses of action, is a 
fundamental change in the way we think about deception.  Those whose area of 
responsibility includes the potential for deception—political, diplomatic, and 
military decision-makers in particular—should adopt a mindset in which 
deception is always considered as one of many tools potentially available.   
C. WHAT MIGHT FUTURE DECEPTION AGAINST TERRORISTS LOOK 
LIKE? 
This study has paid considerable attention thus far to what cases of 
deception versus terrorists have looked like in the past.  Little mention has been 
made, however, of what deception against terrorists might look like in the future.  
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if he doesn’t do it?  Third, what’s going to be different with and without the deception?  Finally, are 
you better off in the long run with or without deception? 
In order to remedy this shortcoming, this section departs from the tone of the rest 
of the thesis and offers a number of very simple deception scenarios.  For the 
sake of unity, each is portrayed as an operation against the same terrorist 
alleged to be behind the instance of terrorism that opened this thesis—Usama 
bin Laden (UBL).  For the sake of convenience, all of the events described here 
are referred to in the present tense.  While the tone of the paper clearly shifts to 
prosaic and speculative at this point, the underlying implications are serious and 
solid: deception is a counter-terrorist tool with tremendous potential. 
1. Scenario #1—Create Inefficiency In The Organization 
One way to reduce the efficiency of a clandestine organization is to target 
the group’s operational security, or at least the group’s confidence in its security. 
With this in mind, the US government undertakes the task of deceiving UBL 
about our having penetrated his communications networks, if not his inner circle 
itself  (see Figure 23).  That we have not in fact done so is a moot point.  A 
carefully crafted series of messages is “slipped” to bin Laden’s backers through 
previously trusted channels.  This effort is augmented with press releases by 
various overt agencies and statements by high government officials.  As a result, 
the deception successfully plants the doubt necessary to cause UBL to begin to 
believe that his organization has been compromised from within.  Subsequently, 
one of UBL’s lieutenants receives large unexplained deposits in his bank 
accounts; this fact too is “slipped” to UBL’s backers, ultimately reaching UBL 
through channels he trusts.  Unable to be certain whether it is a setup or not, bin 
Laden is forced to upgrade his operational security at considerable expense to 
his operational capacity by eliminating a previously trusted lieutenant.  The net 
effect on those portions of the al Qa’ida network directly influenced by bin Laden 
is chaos and inefficiency; operations in progress are delayed by months, if not 
years, and the organization as a whole feels the adverse impact. 
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Scenario #1: Create Inefficiency In The Organization


















Figure 23.   Organizational Approach Scenario 
A concept like the one presented here may prove successful on more than 
point.  First, it may cause an organization that practices good communications 
procedures to forego those procedures, even for a time, in the interest of 
increasing security.  Second, it may prove useful for breaking the ties of a trust 
network.  However, the risk of unintended consequences is always a possibility, 
even with successful deception.  That danger is a significant possibility in this first 
scenario.  Such a deception might cause a group like the one targeted here to 
respond not with chaos, but rather with innovation, ultimately making the 
organization much more difficult to target. 
2. Scenario #2—Exploit Security Shortcomings   
At about the same time, a US government agency discovers a number of 
the “channels” used by UBL’s organization to pass encrypted information over 
the Internet.  The US government implements a deception to convince UBL that 
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we have not penetrated this medium. In fact, a number of sources are used to 
convince UBL that we are focusing on the wrong media entirely—primarily 
satellite phones and wireless communications, in this case—in efforts to intercept 
his communications.  The net effect is the purchase of time to exploit the 
resulting security flaws.  For more than eight months, we are able to intercept a 
significant amount of UBL’s message traffic to cells operating in Europe and the 
US. 
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Figure 24.   Exploitation Scenario 
There is a long history of the use of deception to cover the exploitation of 
compromised communications channels and other security shortcomings.  This 
was certainly the case with some of the deceptions carried out by the British 
Committee for Special Means during WW II, in which deception was one means 
used to concealing the fact that ULTRA allowed the Allies to “read” the Germans 
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“mail.”   A deception such as the one suggested here follows in much the same 
vein.   
3. Scenario #3—The Lightning Rod 
Through the source in Scenario #2, we learn that UBL wants to attack a 
US government facility in Asia.  UBL’s targeting of such a facility reflects the 
realities of an increasingly restrictive security environment in the US, Europe, the 
Middle East, and Africa.  By various means, information is slowly but surely 
leaked to UBL that indicates that a specific facility in Indonesia meets his 
targeting needs.  The net effect is a baited ambush.  Within a few weeks, 
Indonesian government forces apprehend a group of UBL’s “soldiers” as they 
prepare to carry out their mission.  The fact that American agents and special 
mission units support the bust is well concealed; in the following days and weeks, 
all indications and reports to and through the media are painted to look as if the 
bust was a lucky break for the Indonesian government. 
Deceiving Terrorists
Scenario #3: The Lightning Rod
Intel indicates that UBL
wants to target US 
facility in Asia
Deception measures
implemented to lead 
UBL to believe that
a facility in 
Indonesia meets his
targeting needs
Deception used in ensuing
days & weeks to exploit
the bust as an apparent
“lucky break”
With covert support,
GOI busts plot 
immediately prior to 
execution
 
Figure 25.   Lightning Rod Scenario 
 178
Deceptions such as the one suggested by scenario 3 tend to be risky 
undertakings.  Inviting attack when it can also be discouraged is a dangerous 
game in which the deceiver assumes the ability to outmaneuver the target of the 
deception.  The concept of unintended consequences, however, suggests that 
such a deception might not only inspire the target to undertake the desired 
operation, but may cause him to do so in ways that the deceiver had 
unanticipated.  The opportunity of a critical interception of a terrorist organization 
“in the act” must, in this case, be weighed against the probability and 
consequences not of failing at the deception, but of failing at the operation the 
deception was intended to facilitate. 
4. Scenario #4—Deception As A Stand-Alone 
US intelligence sources discover that UBL is planning to take delivery of 
nuclear materials from “entrepreneurs” in a breakaway state of the former Soviet 
Union (see Figure 26).  Sensitive political concerns—not to mention the risk of 
exposing key intelligence methods and sources—make a direct preemptive strike 
extremely risky, although UBL and his business associates do not know it.  To 
the contrary, the US government makes it clear through multiple channels that an 
American special operations task force is prepared to interdict the transaction.  
Sympathizers in the intelligence service of a neighboring state send urgent 
messages to UBL through his backers that a robust force is indeed on the 
ground, and ready to undertake long-range interdiction operations.  Although he 
does not entirely believe that the Americans could reach out to interdict the 
transaction, UBL is nonetheless impelled to cancel the buy. 
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Figure 26.   Stand-Alone Scenario 
Given bin Laden’s propensity and stated willingness to use weapons of 
mass destruction against his perceived enemies, there are few—if, indeed, any—
political concerns that would prevent the United States and its allies from actually 
targeting a transaction like the one proposed here.  That is not the point of the 
scenario, however.  What is relevant is that on occasion, deception has the 
ability—if carefully crafted and skillfully execute—to serve as a stand-alone 
course of action.  The opportunities for such deceptions are rare, but they do 
exist. 
5. Scenario #5—Going Hunting 
Finally, the US and its allies spun a new deception story—that we are 
about to seize UBL in Afghanistan.  Again, does not know that the Commander in 
Chief of US Central Command has no desire to conduct an operation to root bin 
Laden from a cave complex, but the point is a minor one.  At a minimum, we 
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expect to cause inefficiency as UBL is again forced to sacrifice operational 
capacity to guarantee his security; at a maximum, however, we expect to 
convince him to give up his current security environment, flushing him into the 
open where he can be hit.  In fact, the latter occurs.  On Christmas Day, a 
Ranger company intentionally conducts a full-blown deception raid on a “dry 
hole” used very recently by UBL.  Convinced that the US is only a step behind, 
UBL is convinced to flee the country.  As he flees, a waiting special operations 
task force intercepts him in the open rather than in one of his well-prepared and 
heavily defended cave complexes.  The fight is short and intense, but bin Laden 
is killed in the end.   
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Figure 27.   Final Scenario 
On a practical note, such a deception seems implausible.  After all, the 
series of events that culminated with the events of 11 September justify going 
after terrorists like bin Laden at almost any cost.  What those actions do not 
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justify, however, is recklessness—employing special operations troops in 
situations where relative superiority cannot be either gained or sustained.  A 
special mission unit like Delta is expected to take risks and assume casualties; a 
few men lost in an extremely important mission, however tragic their loss may be, 
can ultimately be replaced.  An entire Delta squadron, on the other hand, cannot 
be easily replaced.  Deception is a proven means of helping such units gain 
relative superiority, thus ensuring the accomplishment of missions and objectives 
so critical to the nation’s interests. 
Although somewhat whimsical, these scenarios suggest the value of 
deception against terrorists; in this context, it is easy to see the potential of 
deception as a counter-terrorist tool. 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 As one of the first forays into the field of deceiving terrorists, this 
thesis merely opens the door to the subject.  In so doing, however, it exposes a 
number of related subjects that require further study.    
1. Terrorist Use Of Deception 
Most notably, the research for this thesis turned up a very large number of 
examples of terrorist deception against states.  Deception, necessitated by the 
desire to survive, is a key component of terrorist tradecraft.  As the United States’ 
war on terrorism continues, this is a subject that demands serious, immediate 
attention. 
2. Analysis Of Classified Cases Of Deception Against Terrorists 
Furthermore, the cases used as illustrative examples in this thesis are all 
open-source cases.  Presumably, other cases exist, hidden behind the veil of 
secrecy mentioned first in Chapter III.  One area for further research is thus a 
detailed study of the classified cases of deception against terrorists and other 
non-state actors.  Such a study is necessary, ultimately, to cast the conclusions 
of this report in their proper perspective. 
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3. Empirical Analysis Of Deception Versus Terrorists 
Next, two of the most useful references in preparing this work were Barton 
Whaley’s Stratagem and John Van Vleet’s Tactical Military Deception.  Each 
work is notable for the detailed, empirical analytic approach to the subject of 
military deception, as well as the conclusions that can be drawn from such an 
approach.  As the body of literature on deception versus terrorists expands, this 
same analysis is necessary for this “new” area of deception. 
4. Legal and Ethical Status Of Deception Against Terrorists 
Additionally, while this study broached the subject of the costs and risks of 
deception, much more detailed analysis of these closely related areas is 
necessary.  Currently, deception against terrorists is “undiscovered country.”  
The decision-makers and leaders who will lead the expedition into this 
undiscovered country need and deserve sound guidelines on which to base their 
decision and actions.  A detailed comparison of the costs and risks of deceiving 
terrorists on both a strategic and tactical level is thus necessary in order to 
determine whether certain deceptions carry higher costs and risks than others.  
Also, more research is needed into the legal and ethical status of efforts to 
deceive terrorists, in order to produce better guidelines for decision-makers.    
5. Psychological Approach 
Finally, in order to guide those who will conduct deception against 
terrorists, more research is needed to suggest the role that psychology plays in 
deception.  Since there is no universal psychological profile for terrorists, some 
other means of predicting the vulnerabilities and reactions of terrorists to 
deception is necessary.  One possible starting place for that research is in the 
area of influence psychology—the study of how we all are affected by what 
amount to universal influence principles, such as reciprocity, commitment and 
consistency, liking, and others.  Terrorists are, after all, human, and are—within 
reason—predictably subject to the same psychological principles as everybody 
else. 
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E. PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 
If there is anything that the historical record suggests to us, it is that 
terrorism is and will be a long-enduring phenomenon.  The Zealots Sicarii, for 
example, raged first against the Greek population of Judea and then their Roman 
governors for more than a quarter of a century (Rappoport, 1984, pp. 658-669).  
The original Thugs terrorized India for more than six centuries; their modern 
counterparts, in turn, for more than three.100  The Assassins terrorized the 
Muslim world for more than two hundred years, bent on purifying the Islamic 
faith.101  In our own century, Abu Nidal gained and held the world’s attention for 
more than a decade (Seale, 1992).  Most recently, Usama bin Laden and al 
Qa’ida have commanded a position on the world stage for a time.   
History shows us that bin Laden, like his predecessors, will someday fade 
away—another name in a history book.  Yet, there will be others.  Even now, a 
young man living on the West Bank, or in Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Indonesia is 
walking the long path that will someday lead him from troubled youth to terrorist 
superstar.  Like those who came before him, he will need to be dealt with. 
This thesis opened with the premise that an innovative tool was required 
for the new war that America finds itself in.  At the end of 2001, even with the 
Taliban regime broken and the future of Usama bin Laden’s al Qa’ida network 
uncertain, that requirement still exists.  Deception, history suggests, may be that 
tool. 
  
                                            
100 The best single-source document summarizing the history of the Assassins, the Thugs, and 
the Zealots-Sicarii is David Rappoport’s Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions (1984, pp. 658-
677). 
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101 The Assassins were also known as the Ismailis-Nizari (Rappoport, 1984, p. 664). 
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